Lebanese Consociation : Assessing Accountability and Representativeness by Horn, Stine Nicoline Kleven
Lebanese Consociation 
Assessing Accountability and Representativeness 
Stine Nicoline Kleven Horn 
 
Department of Political Science 
OSLO UNIVERSITY 
May 22, 2008 
ii  
iii  
Acknowledgments 
Upon completing this project I am indebted and grateful to so many people. My special 
interest in Lebanon began in Paris 2004 when as a student I met several Lebanese who 
inspired me to later visit the country and study the language. I am especially grateful to 
my supervisors Håvard Hegre and Constantin Karamé who have followed me from the 
frustrating beginning to the termination of this project (fall and spring term 2007–08). 
Håvard deserves a special thank you for asking challenging and constructive questions 
and for fruitful feedback and support. Thanks to Constantin for being a font of 
knowledge on Lebanon, for insightful and detailed comments, and for providing useful 
contacts in Lebanon. I thank the Department of Political Science at Oslo University for 
funding my fieldwork in Lebanon. 
I am grateful to several persons who made my fieldwork in Lebanon an unforgettable 
experience. I am especially thankful to Marie-Joëlle Zahar, visiting professor at 
Université Saint Joseph, who inspired and motivated my research in Beirut. I am grateful 
to Elias Karamé for useful contacts. Additionally, I am grateful to all my interviewees – 
without them this project would have been less insightful. Moreover, special thanks go 
to Dagfinn Björklid at NORWAC for contacts, but also interesting conversations and 
Beirut evenings. I also convey my gratitude to Amira Sadek and her family for providing 
a home, invaluable friendship, and Christmas celebrations.  
Last but not least, I would like to thank all my friends, family, and Aleksander for 
support and motivation. Unni Claussen deserves a special thank you for helpful 
comments and encouragement throughout the writing process. Responsibility for any 
faults is, of course, all my own. 
Stine Nicoline Kleven Horn 
Oslo, May 2008 
Total number of words: 37 517 
iv  
 
v  
Table of Contents 
ABBREVIATIONS ......................................................................................................................VIII 
FIGURES.............................................................................................................................................................. IX 
TABLES................................................................................................................................................................ IX 
1 DEMOCRATIC CONSOCIATIONS: A CONTRADICTION IN TERMS? .......................1 
1.1 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE, THEORY, AND DELIMITATIONS ....................................................................4 
1.2 DEFINING CONSOCIATION.....................................................................................................................6 
1.3 CATEGORIZING LEBANON .....................................................................................................................6 
1.4 METHODOLOGY.......................................................................................................................................7 
1.4.1 Case Study as Research Method.........................................................................................................7 
1.4.2 Data Collection.................................................................................................................................8 
1.4.3 Generalizing Internally and Externally........................................................................................... 11 
1.5 THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS......................................................................................................... 12 
2 LEBANESE POWER SHARING.........................................................................................13 
2.1 CONFESSIONALISM................................................................................................................................ 14 
2.2 LEBANON’S POWER-SHARING AGREEMENTS ................................................................................... 16 
2.2.1 Election Procedures of the Troika.................................................................................................... 20 
2.3 THE POLITICAL CONTEXT ................................................................................................................... 20 
2.4 THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM..................................................................................................................... 26 
3 ASSESSING ACCOUNTABILITY AND REPRESENTATIVENESS ............................. 32 
3.1 DEFINING ACCOUNTABILITY AND REPRESENTATIVENESS ............................................................ 33 
3.2 ALTERNATIVE DEMOCRATIC IDEALS ................................................................................................. 34 
3.3 INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS TO ENSURE ACCOUNTABILITY AND REPRESENTATIVENESS..... 36 
3.3.1 Parliamentary Opposition ............................................................................................................... 36 
3.3.2 Elections ........................................................................................................................................ 36 
3.3.3 Political Parties .............................................................................................................................. 39 
3.4 CHALLENGES TO ACCOUNTABILITY................................................................................................... 41 
vi  
3.5 CHALLENGES TO REPRESENTATIVENESS...........................................................................................43 
3.5.1 Challenges to Descriptive Representativeness.....................................................................................43 
3.5.2 Challenges to Substantive Representativeness....................................................................................44 
3.6 ACCOUNTABILITY AND REPRESENTATIVENESS IN CONSOCIATIONS.............................................45 
3.6.1 Consociational Challenges to Accountability.....................................................................................46 
3.6.2 Consociational Challenges to Representativeness ...............................................................................47 
4 THE GRAND COALITION................................................................................................ 53 
4.1 PROSPECTS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY .....................................................................................................54 
4.1.1 Limited Parliamentary Monitoring ..................................................................................................54 
4.1.2 Opposition and Mutual Veto in the Troika and Cabinet.................................................................55 
4.1.3 Foreign ‘Real Movers’ Hinder Domestic Accountability ...................................................................59 
4.2 PROSPECTS FOR REPRESENTATIVENESS .............................................................................................62 
4.2.1 Representativeness of the Post-war Executive Power .........................................................................62 
4.2.2 Corruption and Poor Policy Performance..........................................................................................69 
5 ELECTIONS..........................................................................................................................71 
5.1 PROSPECTS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY .....................................................................................................72 
5.1.1 Short Term, Tactical, and Cross-Ideological Alliances......................................................................72 
5.1.2 Absence of Competition, Coherent Alternatives, and Moderation......................................................76 
5.1.3 Monopolization of the Muslim Communities....................................................................................79 
5.2 PROSPECTS FOR REPRESENTATIVENESS .............................................................................................84 
5.2.1 Lack of Substantive Representation of the Christian Community......................................................84 
6 POLITICAL PARTIES ..........................................................................................................91 
6.1 PROSPECTS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY .....................................................................................................92 
6.1.1 Individuals over Platforms ...............................................................................................................92 
6.1.2 Political Parties as the Personal Expression of Leaders....................................................................94 
6.1.3 The Elected Representative as a Social Intercessor ............................................................................97 
6.2 PROSPECTS FOR REPRESENTATIVENESS ...........................................................................................100 
6.2.1 Recruitment Structures Restrict Voters’ Options ............................................................................100 
6.2.2 Non-Aggregation of National and Secular Interests .......................................................................100 
7 CONSOCIATION: A CHALLENGING FORMULA .......................................................105 
vii  
7.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ..................................................................................................................... 105 
7.2 METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES ................................................................................................... 107 
7.3 UNDEMOCRATIC CONSOCIATION..................................................................................................... 108 
7.4 RELEVANCE AND GENERALIZATION............................................................................................... 109 
APPENDIX 1.................................................................................................................................. 111 
LIST OF INTERVIEWEES.................................................................................................................................. 111 
APPENDIX 2 ................................................................................................................................. 114 
TABLE OF MAIN POLITICAL PARTIES AND GROUPS IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD .................................. 114 
APPENDIX 3 ................................................................................................................................. 116 
TABLE OF PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 1972–2005................................................................................. 116 
APPENDIX 4 ................................................................................................................................. 117 
TABLE OF MAJOR BLOCS IN 2005 ................................................................................................................. 117 
BIBLIOGRAPHY........................................................................................................................... 118 
viii  
Abbreviations 
Amal  Amal Movement (Harakat Amal) 
Ba’ath  Ba’ath Arab Socialist Party (Hezb al-Ba’ath al-Arabi al-Ishtiraki)  
DLM  Democratic Left Movement (Harakatu-l-Yasari-d-Dimuqrati) 
DR  Democratic Renewal (Harakat al-Tajadod al-Dimuqrati) 
FPM  Free Patriotic Movement (Tayyar al-Watani al-Horr) 
FNC  Free National Current (Tayyar al-Watani al-Horr) 
Future  Future Tide Movement (Tayyar al-Mostaqbel) 
GoC  Guardians of the Cedars (Hurras al-Arz) 
Hezbollah Party of God (Hezbollah) 
JI  Islamic Community (al-Jama’a al-Islamyya) 
Kata’ib The Phalanges (al-Kata’ib al-Lubnaniya) 
LCP  Lebanese Communist Party (Hizbu-sh-Shuy‘i-l-Lubnani) 
LF  Lebanese Forces (al-Quwat al-Lubnaniya) 
NB  National Bloc Party (al-Kutla al-Wataniyya) 
NLP   National Liberal Party (Hezb al-Ahrar al-Watani) 
PSP  Progressive Socialist Movement (al-Hezb al-Taqdimi al-Ishtiraki) 
QSG  Qurnet Shehwan Gathering (Liqa’ Qornet Shehwan) 
SIPP  Society of Islamic Philanthropic Projects (al-Ahbash)  
SSNP  Syrian Social Nationalist Party (al-Hezb al-Qaumi al-Itjtima’I as-Suri) 
ix  
Figures 
Figure 1: Four modes of citizen control 
Figure 2: The representativeness of the Troika 
Tables 
Table 1: Resident and emigrant Lebanese citizens by confessional community acccording 
to the 1932 census 
Table 2: Registered voters in 2005  
Table 3: Electoral districts and sectarian distribution in the 1992 and 1996 parliamentary 
elections 
Table 4: Electoral districts and sectarian distribution in the 2000 and 2005 parliamentary 
elections 
Table 5: Specification of institutions and mechanisms designed to ensure accountability 
and representativeness 
Table 6: Summary of main electoral alliances compared with parliamentary alliances 
Table 7:  Non-partisans in Parliament 1972–2005 
Table 8:  Representation of secular political forces 1972–2005 
x  
 
1  
1 Democratic Consociations: A Contradiction in 
Terms? 
 “The current situation is symbolic of the dead end of the political leadership and a crisis of representativeness. 
The crisis demonstrates the consociational system’s ambiguity.” 
(Fadia Kiwan 2007 [Interview], my translation) 
The state of the art literature on accountability and representativeness contends that 
consociationalism weakens accountability but strengthens representativeness. This study 
aims at assessing empirically these hypotheses by studying the case of Lebanon. As a 
plural society with a long history of consociation, Lebanon is an interesting case in this 
context. Gaining independence in 1943, Lebanon was relatively stable until the outbreak 
of civil war in 1975. It ended in 1990. The peace agreement of 1989, the Ta’if 
Agreement, solidified consociationalism at an institutional level and gave Syria a 
privileged role in national security matters despite lack of consensus among all the sects.  
 This thesis makes three main arguments. First, it concurs that consociational 
institutions in Lebanon have lead to weak accountability. The institutional structure of 
Lebanon’s executive power has limited Parliament’s monitoring and control of the 
executive. Mutual veto, intended to protect minorities, has lead to conflict and stalemate 
in Lebanese state institutions. The electoral system has resulted in an absence of 
competition through cross-ideological, short term, and tactical alliances. Second, the 
thesis modifies the argument that consociational systems lead to representativeness. 
Representation of the sects, descriptive representativeness, has partly been guaranteed in 
the post-war period, albeit overrepresentation of minorities deviates from 
proportionality. The substantive representativeness of political elites, however, is 
substantially reduced. Political elites are substantively representative if they mirror voters’ 
opinions. The Christian community, especially, has felt excluded and unrepresented in 
the post-war period. Inability to address economic and social disparities and widespread 
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corruption further undermine substantive representativeness. Third, on this basis the 
thesis argues that Lebanon predominantly has been what O’Leary (2003, 2005) terms an 
undemocratic consociation in the post-war period.  
 The study starts with a historical and empirical presentation of Lebanese 
consociation. In order to empirically assess political elites’ accountability and 
representativeness in Lebanon, it is necessary to build a solid theoretical framework to 
guide the study. I conducted 19 interviews with top elected officials in the Lebanese 
Cabinet and Parliament, as well as prominent experts from academia and civil society, 
during a two-month field-stay. Interview data is supplemented by secondary literature. 
The analysis applies the theoretical framework on Lebanon. 
 The study’s backdrop is found in the need to find institutional responses to 
achieve democratic stability in plural societies such as Bosnia, Iraq, Sri Lanka, Rwanda, 
and Lebanon (Roeder and Rotchild 2005:1–6). Of the various power-sharing 
arrangements, the consociational power-sharing approach has been touted as the most 
successful at achieving democratic stability (Lijphart 1977; Nordlinger 1972; O’Leary 
2003). Advocates of consociationalism assume that plural societies can be stable and 
democratic as a result of political elites’ efforts to avoid competitive practices of 
majoritarian democracy (Daalder 1974:607). Therefore, the key provisions of 
consociation intend to reduce inter-sectarian competition, and to give sectarian elites 
predominance and autonomy to bargain among themselves (Lijphart 1977). The 
provisions call for an executive grand coalition including all significant segmental groups; 
proportional representation of segmental groups in the distribution of legislative seats and in 
selected offices; segmental autonomy through federalism or other devices; and mutual veto 
through decision making (Ibid; Reilly 2001; Horowitz 1985).  
 To Arend Lijphart, consociation is a type of democracy. Yet, consociationalism is 
criticized for taking the democratic nature of such institutional arrangements for granted 
(e.g. Daalder 1974; Barry 1975; Lustick 1979, 1997). Several scholars voice concern over 
consociationalism’s effects on the quality of democracy (e.g. Lustick 1997; Van 
Schendelen 1984; and Roeder and Rotchild 2005). Critics have asserted that 
consociationalism impedes democratic consolidation in a long term perspective (Roeder 
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and Rotchild 2005; Jarstad 2006a). Presumably, consociational institutions challenge 
democracy because autonomous elite rule involves ‘firm control’ over the masses and 
prevents people from political participation (Barry 1975; Daalder 1974:608; Lustick 
1997:108). On this basis, critics question whether consociationalism is democratic at all.  
 Proponents of consociationalism have responded to the criticism in two ways. 
First, some claim that consociationalism is compatible with democracy but corresponds 
to an alternative democratic ideal. Ruby Andeweg (2000) responds in this way, taking as 
his reference point Robert A. Dahl’s (1971) two-dimensional definition of democracy as 
competition and inclusiveness. Andeweg (2000:530) maintains that elite autonomy and 
cooperation do not hinder electoral competition. Moreover, Andeweg holds that 
consociationalism may outperform competitive majoritarian democracy as consociation’s 
main objective is inclusion of all the significant segments of a plural society in 
government.  
 Second, some argue that consociations can be either democratic or undemocratic. 
Brendan O’Leary (2003, 2005) argues for distinguishing between these by the 
accountability and representativeness of political elites. In undemocratic consociations 
“political leaders of communities co-operate and conduct themselves according to 
consociational but not democratic practices” (O’Leary 2003:698). Moreover, 
undemocratic consociations have “complete or factional cartels, in which each segmental 
partner is controlled by an elite or faction that is not democratically controlled within its 
own constituency” (Ibid). Power is shared among the elites “with little or no reference to 
their bloc” (O’Leary 2003:698). In contrast, in democratic consociations nothing 
“precludes intra-bloc democratic competition, or the turnover of political elites, or shifts 
of support between parties” O’Leary (2005:11). 
 In sum, both responses point to two main dimensions or indicators of 
democracy, accountability and representativeness, albeit their terminologies differ slightly. 
Competition can be considered a condition for accountability, and inclusiveness equal in 
meaning to representativeness. Assessing accountability and representativeness in 
consociations can therefore determine whether consociations can be democratic or, as 
critics contend, whether democratic consociations are a contradiction in terms. In fact, if 
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consociationalism per se impedes accountability and representativeness, democratic 
consociations are ipso facto non-existent. 
 In the remaining of the chapter I will specify the study’s research objective, use of 
theory, and delimitations. Then I define consociation and categorize Lebanon on this 
basis. Finally, I present and discuss the study’s methodology and research design in light 
of methodological weaknesses.  
1.1 Research Objective, Theory, and Delimitations 
This study’s research objective is to empirically assess the hypotheses regarding accountability and 
representativeness in consociations in Lebanon.  
 Unfortunately, when distinguishing between democratic and undemocratic 
consociations, O’Leary (2003, 2005) provides few explicit guidelines for assessing 
accountability and representativeness. I therefore supplement the definitions given by 
O’Leary with theoretical contributions from two sets of literature. First, I study the 
standard literature on representation, accountability, and democratic government. 
Noteworthy scholarly contributions in this field are Bernard Manin, Adam Przeworski, 
and Susan Stokes’ Democracy, Accountability and Representation (1999), Kaare Strøm, 
Wolfgang C. Müller, and Torbjörn Bergman’s Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary 
Democracies (2003), Bingham Powell Jr.’s Elections as Instruments of Democracy (2000), and 
Phillippe Scmitter’s Parties are not what they once were (2001). Second, I look into the 
literature that is more specifically about power sharing. Arend Lijphart’s works (e.g. 
1969, 1977, 1999), and those of Donald Horowitz (1985, 2002), and Brendan O’Leary 
(2003, 2005), are important contributions in this field. Arend Lijphart’s Democracy in 
Plural Societies (1977) is cardinal for the consociational approach to power sharing 
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whereas Donald Horowitz’ Ethnic Groups in Conflict (1985) is pivotal for moderation-
focused incentivism1.   
 The theoretical framework identifies certain institutional mechanisms to ensure 
accountability and representativeness. Elections and political parties both ensure 
accountability and representativeness although in different ways and forms. A 
parliamentary opposition is one mechanism to ensure accountability. However, 
consociations favor representativeness over accountability. The grand coalition is 
therefore a mechanism to ensure representativeness, but it also limits opposition. The 
analysis is structured around these institutional mechanisms.  
 A few delimitations are necessary. Temporally, the thesis restricts the scope of the 
research to the post-war period (1990–2006). Substantially, the thesis delimitates the 
scope of research by adopting an ‘outcome understanding’ rather than a ‘control 
understanding’ of accountability (Strøm et al. 2003). An outcome understanding focuses 
on holding elected representatives responsible for their performance. Elections are the 
principal mechanism to ensure outcome accountability. A control understanding sees 
accountability as a continuous process of controlling representatives in office. 
Constitutional devices, like the judiciary and the legal framework, ensure control. This 
thesis concentrates on outcome mechanisms as – although constitutional devices are 
important – I consider them secondary to institutional mechanisms. Moreover, the thesis 
studies three consociational provisions – grand coalition, mutual veto, and 
proportionality – but not segmental autonomy, as I consider it less relevant to political 
elites’ accountability and representativeness.  
                                              
1 Moderation-focused incentivism is also called centripetalism or integrative dynamics.  
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1.2 Defining Consociation 
This thesis adopts Lijphart’s institutional definition of consociation. As we have seen, it 
comprises four institutional traits. First, the key provision of consociation is government 
by a grand coalition including the political leaders of all significant segments (Lijphart 
1977:25). Various institutional arrangements may constitute grand coalitions as long as 
the leaders of all significant segments participate (Lijphart 1969:213). Second, segmental 
autonomy means that segmental groups have autonomy to run their own internal affairs 
(Lijphart 2002:39). Third, proportionality in the composition of the legislature, public 
service and in the allocation of public funds defines consociation (Ibid:52). With regard 
to the electoral system, proportionality dictates some form of proportional 
representation (PR). But electoral systems can also try to achieve proportionality without 
straightforward PR. Fourth, mutual veto can be an informal and unwritten understanding, 
or a formally agreed upon rule (Lijphart 1977:38). It can apply to all decisions or to 
specified areas only. 
1.3 Categorizing Lebanon 
Lijphart classifies Lebanon as a consociational democracy from independence in 1943 
until the war broke out in 1975, then again after 1989 (1977:147–150; 1996:59). This 
thesis considers Lebanon a consociation – as do Michael C. Hudson (1988), Elizabeth 
Picard (1997), Samir Khalaf (1987), and Michael Suleiman (1967) – but is aware of the 
small deviations from the typical model. Overall, the political system in Lebanon displays 
the four institutional traits or principles of consociation. 
 First, in Lebanon the grand coalition comprises several top executive posts instead 
of ‘a grand coalition cabinet’. The posts of the Presidency, Premiership, and Parliament 
Speaker, are distributed between the segments. The Presidency is reserved for a 
Maronite, the Premiership for a Sunni, and the Parliamentary Speakership for a Shiite.  
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 Second, confessional communities are delegated autonomy in most personal status 
issues, such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance (EU EOM 2005). Decentralization is 
non-territorial and constitutes the main device to delegate power. 
 Third, Lebanon tries to achieve proportionality by a non-PR method. The legislature 
is elected by plurality voting, but seats in the legislature and state administration are 
allocated according to parity (5:5) between Muslims and Christians. The Muslim and 
Christian seats in all the electoral districts are further allocated to specific confessional 
communities.  
 Fourth, mutual veto is formally enshrined in the constitution by demanding a two-
thirds majority in certain fundamental questions. Mutual veto also exists informally as top 
posts are allocated to the three most significant sects. Thus no decision can be made 
without a Sunni-Shiite-Maronite agreement.  
1.4 Methodology 
1.4.1 Case Study as Research Method 
The case study design seems the most suitable to address the research question as it 
allows for in-depth study of a case and generalizations if appropriately designed (Yin 
2003). The case study is “an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of 
understanding a larger class of similar units” (Gerring 2004:342). The thesis understands 
the case study as a method, as a way of defining cases (Gerring 2004). Lebanon is thus 
conceived of as a case of a larger class of phenomena, consociations. The study therefore 
seeks to stress the general rather than the unique features of the consociational system in 
Lebanon.  
 The study’s main objective is to develop and modify existing theory on power 
sharing and democratization. A hypothesis-generating design is thus suitable for my 
research objective (See Andersen 1997:35). The data collection is guided by theory. 
Personal informant interviews and secondary literature are employed as data collection 
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strategies. My research strategy is to analyze the empirical evidence in light of the 
theoretical framework built on theories of representation in general and power sharing in 
particular. Aspects of these theories are applied to, and tested on, Lebanon to explain 
shortcomings in accountability and representativeness. The theoretical framework 
addresses prospects and challenges to accountability and representativeness in 
democracies and in consociations especially.  
1.4.2 Data Collection 
Data collection is based on two strategies: a review of secondary literature, and 
individual semi-structured interviews, conducted over two months in Lebanon. 
Secondary literature used includes books, reports, articles, newspapers, and statistics.  
 The collection, presentation, and analysis of statistics constituted a particular 
methodological challenge. A lack of official statistics, and sources that contradicted one 
another necessitated that statistics be evaluated thoroughly before use. This was 
demonstrated in the presentation of the 2005 election results. As-Safir, El-Mustaqbel, and 
An-Nahar – three major newspapers – showed different results (EU EOM 2005). For 
instance, Rafic Hariri’s Future Tide Movement got 20 percent according to the Hariri-
backed paper El-Mustaqbel whereas it got 9 percent according to the Hezbollah/Amal-
backed paper As-Safir. Assessing sources’ credibility and methods was therefore crucial 
due to political bias and shortcomings in the legal framework, especially concerning 
party membership. For the parliamentary elections prior to 2005 I have relied on Farid 
Al-Khazen (2003). For 2005 election statistics I look at the EU Election Observation 
Mission data. However, election statistics are not given a prominent place in the thesis as 
a systemactic analysis was hindered by lack of comparative data. Population numbers are 
based on reliable sources such as the EU EOM (2005), Rania Maktabi (1999), Hanna 
Ziadeh (2006), and the CIA Factbook (2008).  
 During a two-month field-stay in Lebanon I conducted 19 individual semi-
structured interviews. Additionally, the stay increased my knowledge and understanding 
of Lebanese politics and society. It also gave me the opportunity to carry out several 
informal conversations, and attend seminars and informal meetings. Only the formal 
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interviews serve as the basis for comparisons and are explicitly used in the data analysis. 
I applied the so-called interview guide approach (See Mikkelsen 1995:103). I formulated 
three main guides – for experts, deputies, and cabinet members respectively. The guides 
were used to ensure that all interviewees were asked about central topics. This enabled a 
more systematic data analysis and comparison in order to find general patterns. Still, the 
interview style remains fairly conversational and allows for the follow up of topics 
arising during the interview.  
 The selection of interviewees was based on theoretical and methodological 
considerations. The interviews were arranged after arriving, though facilitated through 
several contacts from a previous stay in Lebanon. Twelve interviews were conducted 
with politicians (deputies, cabinet members, former politicians, or politicians without 
office) and 7 interviews with experts (academics, NGO staff, and journalists). A full list of 
interviewees is provided in Appendix 1. 
Interviewees’ representativeness on a number of demographic characteristics was 
emphasized. Because cleavages exist in plural societies, the representation of the most 
significant groups seemed especially important. The selection aimed at achieving a fairly 
even distribution of interviewees according to confession and geography. Among the 
politicians were Shiite, Sunni, Druze, Maronite, Armenian Orthodox, and Greek 
Catholic, thus covering the most significant sects. All the regions (South, North, Beirut, 
Mount Lebanon, and Beqa’) are represented.  
 Interviewees’ substantive representativeness was also taken into account. I 
focused on finding experienced and knowledgeable politicians when choosing interviewees 
(Rubin and Rubin 2005:64–67). I interviewed politicians from the opposition and the 
majority in Parliament. Within the majority, representatives were interviewed from the 
Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), Future Tide Movement (Future), Kata’ib, the Democratic Left 
Movement (DLM), and the National Liberal Party (NLP). Within the opposition, one 
deputy for the Free Patriotic Movement was interviewed but unfortunately it proved 
impossible to arrange a formal interview with either Hezbollah or Amal representatives. 
However, I interviewed representatives who belong to their bloc in parliament and who 
were well informed about Hezbollah’s and Amal’s viewpoints and organizations. The 
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political situation in Lebanon throughout November and December was tense, and 
made it more challenging to arrange formal meetings with Hezbollah and Amal 
representatives.  
 Opinions differ as to whether it is better to take notes or use a recorder (Rubin 
and Rubin 2005:110). I chose to use a recorder in order to better concentrate on 
listening and asking follow-up questions. Recording interviews also gives benefits in 
terms of accuracy and responsiveness. But using a recorder can also restrain the 
interviewees. Yet, my interviewees did not express any hesitance and soon forgot about 
the recorder. Most interviewees are public and well-known figures, exposed to 
researchers and media. Interviewees are named according to their own wishes; 
permission to quote and to record was requested before interviewing. 
 A solid theoretical framework and multiple data sources strengthen the validity of 
the study’s data (Andersen 1997; Yin 2003). Construct validity is maintained by the 
collection of supplementary data from secondary literature and interviews. However, 
interviews can produce biased data because politicians portray themselves as more 
accountable and representative than they really are, so-called “interviewer effects”. 
Comparing data from interviews with politicians with data from the expert interviews 
may expose possible interviewer effects. Such systematic comparison may compensate 
for interviewer effects and improve the general conclusions drawn. Politicians’ 
geographical and confessional variations also control for differences related to region or 
confession. Furthermore, the methodological weaknesses of some statistics, election 
statistics in particular, are taken into consideration. Yet, in general, the empirical sources 
used in the study are considered correct. The interview data and secondary literature data 
have confirmed each other and thus increase the chance that these are correct.  
 Reliability is enhanced by specifying my theoretical approach, data types, and the 
analysis of empirical sources. This means that other investigators should arrive at the 
same findings and conclusions if the study were conducted again (Yin 2003:37–39). The 
references to secondary literature and statistics allow another researcher to 
independently examine the source. However, replicating interview data is more 
challenging. Interviewees may respond differently at another time and under other 
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circumstances. The use of secondary literature partly compensates for this 
methodological weakness.   
1.4.3 Generalizing Internally and Externally 
This study aims at drawing descriptive and causal inferences. Qualitative data constitute 
its main source. Qualitative data often entail causal complexity as it is difficult to separate 
the studied phenomenon from its context (Andersen 1997). This thesis argues that 
consociationalism affects accountability and representativeness. Achieving control in 
case studies constitutes a methodological challenge to internal validity. Because the study 
is guided by a solid theoretical framework, ensuring analytical control, its internal validity 
is strengthened (Ibid:16). Additionally, rival explanations, or other possible independent 
variables are discussed in the analysis, according to Yin’s criteria (2003:34, 36). For 
instance, the Syrian influence and the societal structure constitute complementary 
independent variables. However, case studies cannot measure partial correlations. 
Analyzing the empirical evidence and comparing the study’s findings to theory enable an 
approximate assessment of the relative importance of the variables.  Case studies can 
thus contribute to knowledge of causal mechanisms whereas they cannot do so 
concerning causal effects (Gerring 2004:348). Furthermore, the study makes several 
observations while analyzing some parliamentary elections. Increasing the number of 
observations enhance internal validity (King et al. 1994:116–117). Regarding some causal 
relationships, the variable ‘Syrian influence’ can be controlled for by comparing 
observations prior to 2005 with the 2005 observations. These analytical tactics increase 
internal validity.  
 The classical objection to single case studies concerns whether it is possible to 
generalize from one case (Andersen 1997). This study aims at making an analytical 
generalization, i.e. to develop and modify theory. It therefore compares the empirical 
results to existing theory. Especially, the study aims at developing and modifying power-
sharing theory in order to learn more about consociations as a class of phenomena and 
certain conditions for accountability and representativeness in consociations (Andersen 
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1997:16). Theoretical comparison of cases strengthens prospects of external validity (Yin 
2003:37). 
1.5 The Structure of the Thesis 
The second chapter introduces the background for Lebanese power sharing, the post-
war political context, and the electoral system. Chapter 3 presents the theoretical 
framework applied to assess accountability and representativeness. Chapters 4 through 6 
constitute the analysis. These chapters are divided into two parts. The first part analyzes 
accountability and the second part analyzes representativeness. Chapter 4 analyzes the 
grand coalition, mutual veto and parliamentary opposition. Chapter 5 analyzes elections 
and proportionality focusing upon alliance making, whereas chapter 6 analyzes political 
parties. The last chapter summarizes, and concludes with regard to the research 
objective. 
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2 Lebanese Power Sharing 
At the beginning of the 20th century Lebanon was pictured as an ideal of inter-
communal national coexistence and liberal prosperity. At the end of the century, 
however, it was seen as a typical example of a disintegrated and failed state (Ziadeh 
2006:3). Lebanese society and elites were torn apart by the long years of civil war from 
1975 to 1990 (El-Solh 2006:xiv). The Ta’if Agreement of 1989 intended to create a new 
national consensus yet failed. Instead, it solidified the consociational system at the 
institutional level, but not at the national level. Additionally, the agreement’s 
implementation has been flawed which enabled Syrian hegemony until 2005 (Haddad 
2002). Thus, the post-war transition did not lead to a viable democracy, but rather to an 
unstable and faulted one in which both accountability and representativeness have 
suffered. Today Lebanon is at a crossroads. The Syrian pull-out in 2005 inaugurated a 
critical period and mounting challenges. Since 2005, Lebanese state institutions have 
been increasingly unable to perform their duties due to political crises.  
 This chapter describes the background of Lebanese power sharing to later use it 
for case analysis. The chapter starts by analyzing Lebanon’s confessional segmental 
structure and that structure’s demographic features. It thereafter studies the previous 
power-sharing arrangements, and the current arrangement implemented through the 
Ta’if Agreement. Then an overview of the post-war political context is given. Finally, it 
outlines and explains the post-war electoral laws. The background is essential in order to 
use Lebanon as a case in the analysis.  
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2.1 Confessionalism 
With several confessional communities2, Lebanon is a typical case of a plural society. 
There are seventeen institutionalized confessional communities (Azar 1999:35; EU EOM 
2005:12). Among these are 12 Christian (Maronite, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, 
Armenian Orthodox, Armenian Catholic, Chaldean, Nestorian, Syriac, Jacobites, Latin, 
Protestant, and Copt), four Muslim (Shiite, Sunni, Druze, and Alawite), and one is 
Jewish. Additionally, there are two non-institutionalized communities, the Ishmaelite and the 
secular community, recognized in 1936 (EU EOM 2005). The institutionalized 
communities are delegated autonomy in most personal status issues and have their own 
sectarian courts (See 1.5).  
 Confessionalism permeates Lebanese society on many levels. Beydoun (cited in 
Azar 1999:36, my translation) defines a confessional community as “a social multiple 
functional formation that polarizes numerous aspects of its members’ existence”. 
Community membership is mandatory from birth (Azar 1999:37). The confessional 
communities can be understood as “mutually separated political subcultures” (Almond 
cited in Lijphart 1977:6). This implies that societal actors – political parties, interest 
groups, organizations, media, and schools – typically organize along such cleavages in a 
plural society. Lebanese society is thus a fragmented political culture.  
 In this context, demographics play an important role since the power-sharing 
regime is based on a confessional allocation of seats in the Parliament. The last official 
census was conducted in 1932 (See Table 1). The sectarian allocation of seats was based 
on the census until altered by the constitutional amendments in the 1989 power-sharing 
agreement (Maktabi 1999:220).  
                                              
2 The terminology associated with plural societies is vast. The segments in Lebanon are sometimes referred to as sects, confessions, 
or confessional communities. 
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Table 1: Resident and Emigrant Lebanese Citizens by Confessional Community 
According to the 1932 Census 
Confession Residents in percent of total resident  
citizens (amount) 
Confession  in percent of total 
Lebanese citizenry, emigrants and 
residents (amount) 
Maronite 28.7 (227,800)  33. 5  (351,197)
Greek Orthodox 9.7 (77,312) 12.8  (134,343)
Greek Catholic 5.9 (46,709) 7.3  (76,336)
Armenian 4.0 (31,992) 3.3  (34,416)
Other Christian (a) 1.7 (13,133) 1.6  (16,498)
Total Christian 50 (396,946) 58.5  (612,790)
Sunni 22.5 (178,100) 18.6  (195,305)
Shiite 19.5 (155,035) 15.9  (166,536)
Druze 6.7 (53,334) 5.9  (62,084)
Total Muslim 48.7 (387,469) 40.4  (423,934)
Other non-Christian (b) 1.3 (9,981) 1.1  (11,659)
Total 100 (793,396) 100 (1,048,383)
Source: The table is based on Maktabi (1999). 
(a) The category ‘other Christians’ includes Protestants, Syriac Catholics, Syriac Orthodox, Chaldean 
Orthodox.  
(b) The category resident ‘other non-Christians’ includes 3588 Jews and 6393 other persons labelled 
‘miscellaneous’ in the 1932 census.  
 
 Demographics have changed since the 1932 census, especially due to the high 
birth rate among Muslim communities, and to Christian emigration (Azar 1999). 
Underrepresented sects therefore demand a new census in order to get a more 
proportional sectarian distribution. This concerns the Muslims in general and the Shiites 
in particular. Demographics are thus heavily politicized. A reexamining of the census 
indicates that the apparent Christian majority was controversial as it was based on the 
exclusion of considerable numbers of residents as well as inclusion of a significant 
number of emigrants (Maktabi 1999).  Thus the underrepresentation of certain sects, 
most notably that of the Shiites, was not a result of evolving demographics only, but also 
a means to secure and legitimize Christian political dominance. Today the most 
influential confessional groups are considered to be Sunnis, Maronites, Druzes, Shiites, 
Greek Orthodox, and Greek Catholics (Azar 1999:41; EU EOM 2005:12). There is no 
new official census, but the Ministry of Interior yearly updates the registry of the voting 
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population (EU EOM 2005) (See Table 2). The registry does not take into account 
whether the voter resides in Lebanon or abroad. The EU EOM estimates that one 
million registered voters live abroad. The numbers reported in Table 2 are supported by 
the CIA World Factbook (2008) reporting 59.7 percent Muslims, 39 percent Christian, 
and 1.3 percent other.  
Table 2: Registered voters in 2005  
Confession Percent Registered Voters 
(Amount) 
Maronite 22.2 (667,556)
Greek 
Orthodox 
7.9 (236,402)
Greek Catholic 5.2 (156,521)
Armenian 3.7 (110,892)
Protestant 0.6 (17,409)
Total Christians 39.6 (1,188,780)
Sunni 26.4 (795,233)
Shiite 26.1 (783,903)
Druze 5.6 (169,293)
Alawite 0.8 (23,696)
Total Muslims 58.9 (1,772,125)
Minorities* 1.5 (47,018)
Total  100.0 (3,007,927)
Source: The table is based on figures from the EU EOM Report (2005). 
*Chaldean, Nestorain, Syriac, Jacobites, Latin, Copt, and Jews. 
2.2 Lebanon’s Power-Sharing Agreements 
The modern Lebanese state has historical roots that predate its formal creation in 1920 
(Kingston & Zahar 2008:84, forthcoming). Lebanon was a distinct political entity based 
on a dynasty of local overlords joining Maronites and Druzes in Mount Lebanon already 
in the 16th century (Cobban 1987:35). The Ma’an Amir (Prince), Fakhr el-Din II (1585–
1635), was pivotal for the development of the inter-sectarian system in Mount Lebanon 
(Ibid:37). The Ottoman Empire divided Mount Lebanon into two administrative units in 
1843 (Ofeish 1999). These units were headed respectively by Maronite and Druze 
administrators. The Ottomans and the Europeans later jointly intervened again, in 1860, 
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to impose a power-sharing agreement between the two communities to unify Mount 
Lebanon under a new system, the mutassarrifiiya. The mutassarrifiiya reinforced the 
principle of sectarian representation. 
 In 1920 France secured its mandate over Lebanon and created Greater Lebanon, 
Lubnaan al-Kabiir (Salibi 1989:131). The creation of Greater Lebanon resulted from 
internal Lebanese and external factors (Ziadeh 2006:87–88). It was a result of both the 
Ottoman Empire’s demise after the First World War and the Christian majority’s wish 
for political self-assertion. Lebanon was invoked as a non-Muslim enclave that could 
reform the “backward Muslim and Asiatic region”, and function as a “terre d’asile” to 
the Christian populations of the Middle East (Makdisi 1996:24).  
 However, the Christian Maronites were unsuccessful in creating an exclusively 
Christian homeland (Ziadeh 2006:88). The Beqa’ Valley and Beirut province3 were 
joined to the governorate of Mount Lebanon’s total population of only 300,000, 
consisting of Maronites, Druze, and some Greek Catholics (Picard 1996:32). The 
expanded territory now included Sunnis, Shiites, and Greek Orthodox. The Muslim 
communities, led by the urban Sunni elite, resisted the new state and its Christian 
identity. Their alternative national project was based on a history of Arabic national 
awareness that involved inclusion in an Arab nation state in the form of the Ottoman 
wilaayaat or a less expansive one in a Greater Syria. The 1926 Constitution declared 
Lebanon a presidential parliamentary democracy. 
 The French Mandate ended with Lebanon’s independence in 1943. At this time 
the sectarian system was fully developed (Ofeish 1999). The oral National Pact (al Mithaq 
al Watani) between Bishara al-Khoury and Riad al-Solh, representing the Maronite 
community and the urban-based Sunni merchants respectively, consolidated the 
sectarian system. The Pact came after a period of intense communal confrontation 
(Ziadeh 2006:111). It was partly a result of the Christian fear of being dominated by the 
                                              
3 The cantons of Safita and Hosn in the prefecture of Tripoli were not included (Picard 1996:32).  
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Muslim communities and the surrounding Arab countries, and the Muslims' fear of 
Western hegemony (USIP 2006). First, the National Pact gave Lebanon an Arab face or 
orientation (wajh ‘arabii) but no definite national identity, thus suspending both the 
Maronite and the Greater Arab nation projects (Ziadeh 2006:116). Second, it preserved 
the Maronite Presidency, Sunni Premiership, and Shiite Parliamentary Speakership. The 
Deputy Parliamentary Speakership was allocated to the Greek Orthodox. Third, it 
stipulated that deputies be at a ratio of 6:5 (Christians to Muslims) based on each 
community’s numerical size in the 1932 Census4 (Ziadeh 2006:117). The Pact therefore 
extended and legitimized the established confessional allocation of political, judicial, and 
administrative positions based on the 1926 Constitution, Article 95 (Ibid:117). Although 
a Maronite-Sunni compromise now was at the core of the power-sharing formula 
(instead of a Druze-Maronite) the arrangement reinforced the Maronite hegemony as the 
ultimate executive authority was still concentrated in the Maronite Presidency (Ibid:114–
115).  
 In 1975, civil war broke out in Lebanon, which lasted fifteen years. There were 
both internal and external reasons for the war. First, the privileged status of Maronites 
over Muslims, including the increase in the Muslim population, the rise of an 
intelligentsia supportive of pan-Arabism, and elite failure to handle regional and socio-
economic disparities, are seen as important causes of the civil war (Ziadeh 2006). In this 
view, the causes of regime failure are ascribed to the deficiencies of the power-sharing 
arrangement and its inability to regulate elite discord, and to deal with social mobilization 
and demographic changes (Seaver 2000). Second, regional instability, in particular, the 
escalation of the Arab-Israeli dispute after 1967 and its Palestinian dimension, is 
considered a primary cause (Ibid; Khalaf 2002). Arab nationalism and its synergy with 
Palestinian nationalism strained the elite consensus upon which power sharing is based. 
This perspective emphasizes that it was not the system’s centrifugal tendencies per se, 
but the ‘internalization of communal conflict’ that caused regime collapse (Khalaf 2002). 
                                              
4 Maktabi (1999) claims that the Christian majority was controversial based on her reexamination of the 1932 census (See 
section 3.1).  
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Are Knudsen (2005) distinguishes contributions that focus on the following factors: 
economic (Makdisi and Sadaka 2002), political (Khazen 2000), social (Johnson 2001), 
and regional (O’Ballance 1998). For the purpose of this thesis, it suffices to say that a 
complex relationship between such factors contributed to Lebanese regime failure.  
 The Document of National Understanding of 1989, the Ta’if Agreement, was 
negotiated at the end of the civil war, and modified the ‘rules of the game’ of the 1943 
power-sharing arrangement. However, it did not alter its basic character (Hudson 
1999:27). In fact, the agreement had a dual character: it reinforced the sectarian political 
system but it called for its gradual abolishment. There were several reasons. According to 
Sami Ofeish (1999:104), the new preamble to the Constitution based on the Ta’if 
Agreement reflected three underlying causes of the civil war. First, it addressed the 
national identity conflict. The 1943 National Pact stressed Lebanon’s dual relationship to 
the West and Arab countries, while the preamble stressed the Arab identity of Lebanon. 
However, it also rejected any partition of Lebanon and underlined sectarian coexistence. 
Second, it addressed the socioeconomic differences and called for “social justice and 
equality between citizens” and even development between regions (Ibid). Third, it called 
for the abolishment of sectarianism through a piecemeal plan. Despite the latter, the 
preamble solidified the political system’s confessional nature as it declared parity in the 
distribution of seats in parliament between Muslims and Christians, and the proportional 
distribution of seats between the confessions within the Muslim and Christian 
communities respectively. However, the meaning of ‘proportional’ is controversial since 
demographic changes were not taken into account in the distribution (Ziadeh 2006:141). 
 The preamble rearranged the power relations between the communities and 
between the top state leaders (Ziadeh 2006:140–143). The Sunni Premiership was 
strengthened on behalf of the Presidency and was from now on clearly the one heading 
the Council of Ministers and acting as its representative.  Several of the Maronite 
President’s prerogatives were removed. The Shiite-held Parliamentary Speakership was 
also empowered, extending its term from one year to two years. The President’s 
authority to dissolve the Parliament was removed, thus strengthening the Parliament, 
and also tipping the institutional balance of power in favour of Parliament (Salloukh 
2007). In fact, the constitutional amendments in Ta’if equipped Lebanon with ‘three 
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presidents’ in the Troika. The President is the head of state, but executive power lies 
mainly in the Council of Ministers. Decision-making power is shared between the 
President and the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers. The presidents therefore 
“share power almost equally, though in different capacities” (Ofeish 1999:104).  
 The Ta’if Agreement was brokered by Saudi Arabia with “the discreet 
participation by the United States and behind-the-scenes influence from Syria” (Hudson 
1999:27).  The agreement provided Syria with a privileged role in matters of national 
security. But on the condition that Lebanon hold presidential elections, form a new 
cabinet, and execute several ‘reforms’, the accord stipulated that Syria redeploy its forces 
within two years. Two years later, Syria refused to do so, arguing that Lebanon had not 
enforced all the political reforms, such as deconfessionalizing the political system 
(Ibid:28). In fact, international and regional developments would help Syria solidify its 
stronghold over Lebanon. 
2.2.1 Election Procedures of the Troika 
The President is elected indirectly by a two-thirds majority in Parliament. Thus the aim is 
to elect a consensus candidate with support across communities. The Prime Minister is 
appointed by the President in consultation with the Parliament Speaker on the basis of a 
binding parliamentary consultation (Ta’if Agreement 1989 found in Ziadeh (2006), 
Appendix L: Article 1.2.ب.6). The President issues the decree appointing the Prime 
Minister (Ibid: Article 1.2.ب.7). In agreement with the Prime Minister, the President 
issues the decree forming the Council of Ministers (Ibid: Article 1.2. ب.8). The 
Parliament Speaker is elected by Parliament for the duration of its term (Ibid: Article 
1.1.2. أ.1).  
2.3 The Political Context 
The war between 1975 and 1990 left Lebanon in ruins. It was extremely bloody and 
many atrocities were committed (Knudsen 2005:1; Khalaf 2002). Thus, democratic 
transition needed to take into account communal fear and the need to protect minorities. 
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Post-war reconciliation and democratization in plural societies have normally “involved 
establishing a democratic political system, reviving political parties and holding 
elections” (Manning cited in Knudsen 2005:5). Yet, Knudsen (Ibid:5–6) describes a state 
of worrying democratic deficit in post-war Lebanon. Both the accountability and the 
representativeness of the political elite to the citizenry have been severely flawed.  
 The post Tai’f political elite was composed of former militia members and 
leaders, businessmen, professionals, and religious figures (Gebara 2006:3). Former 
warlords’ privileges were maintained and many were integrated into the new leadership 
(Adwan cited in Gebara 2007:10). Political leadership in pre-war Lebanon was associated 
with honor and patriarchy (Johnson 2001, Sharabi 1988). Features and organization of 
political leadership varied according to community and region. In rural areas, political 
leaders were feudal lords whose legitimacy stemmed from family genealogies whereas in 
the cities the political leaders (zu’ama) came from notable merchant families of more 
recent ascension (Johnson 2001:25).  A za’im (plural zu’ama) was a sociopolitical leader. 
They were often powerful parliamentarians, who operated as patriarchal political leaders 
at the head of a clientele (Ibid:28). However, the civil war replaced the pre-war zu’ama 
clientelism with a new complex mix of clientelistic networks around militias, parties, and 
Islamist groups (Hamzeh cited in Knudsen 2005:4). The government still functions as a 
system based on exchanging favors, and Lebanese politics are thus grounded in 
clientelism and personal enrichment (Haddad cited in Ibid). The integration of warlords 
into the state led to state disintegration and weakened accountability as the government 
acted as the agent of individual and sectarian interests (Picard cited in Gebara 2007:10–
11). State disintegration has contributed to institutionalize corruption in the post-war 
years (Gebara 2007:18). 
According to Knudsen (2005:5–6) the Lebanese political system is an “oligarchy 
where party politics doesn’t exist, political leaders are marginalized and most parties 
without partisans.” The transition to post-war democracy in Lebanon was supposed to 
be governed by the Ta’if Agreement which demanded the demobilization of all militias, a 
timetable for Syrian redeployment and withdrawal, an end to Israeli occupation, and 
political and administrative reforms.  Yet, Syria managed to establish and later 
consolidate a proxy security regime in Lebanon in the post-war period despite the 
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provisions of the Ta’if Agreement (Salloukh 2007). Two factors decreased US and Saudi 
Arabian influence in Lebanon – despite their role in the power-sharing agreement – and 
subsequently empowered the Syrian regime.  First, the inter-Christian struggle between 
the interim PM General Michel Aoun and the Lebanese Forces (LF) neutralized their 
ability to ensure the Syrian withdrawal.  Second, the US’ desire to include Syria in their 
coalition against Iraq after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 ended the US 
and Saudi roles as third parties overseeing the Syrian redeployment. The Syrian regime 
infiltrated the political society and ensured political forces’ subservience by various 
institutional techniques (Ibid; Favier 2006).  
 The transition from war to democracy was abrupt, and political parties that acted 
as militias during the civil war only slowly ceased wartime practices (Al-Khazen 
2003:612). Syrian political domination marginalized the Christian post-war community. 
Christian opposition toward the Syrian occupation mounted after the Ta’if Agreement. 
Most Maronites and large segments of other Christian communities opposed the 
’selective’, ’incomplete’ and ’faulty’ implementation of the Ta’if Agreement (Ziadeh 
2006:153).  
 The Christian nationalist parties, the Kata’ib, the National Liberal Party (NLP), and 
the National Bloc were weakened by internal power struggles, family vendettas within the 
leading Franjieh, Gemayel, and Chamoun families, and electoral boycott (Knudsen 
2005:6). Fragmentation of political leadership and the Christian nationalist parties’ 
decline in power led to the organization of Christian opposition to the Syrian military 
presence under the leadership of the Maronite Church (Ziadeh 2006:153; Knudsen 
2005:6). This was embodied in the massive mubay’a (declaration of allegiance) to the 
Maronite Patriarch.  
Large parts of the Christian elite boycotted elections in 1992 and 1996 but 
returned with some force in the 2000 election (Ziadeh 2006:153). The increasing 
Christian opposition to Syrian hegemony in Lebanon led to the formation of the Qurnet 
Shehwan Gathering (QSG) in 2001, which demanded a timetable for the withdrawal of 
Syrian troops in 2003 (Knudsen 2005:6). The coalition, under Patriarch Sfeir’s initiative, 
gathered 29 Christian politicians from different political groups (Lebanonwire 
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[15.04.08a]). The relation toward the Syrian regime created conflict in the Christian 
community. Within the Kata’ib for instance, it led to the formation of two other factions, 
Reform Kata’ib lead by Amine Gemayel and Opposition Kata’ib by Elias Karamé.  
 The Lebanese ultra-nationalist parties were subject to official persecution by the 
Syrian regime (Knudsen 2005:6–7). The Lebanese Forces (LF), which had been the main 
militia on the Christian side during the war, dissolved as a political party and its leader, 
Samir Geagea, was jailed for eleven years (1994–2005). Aoun, former General of the 
Lebanese Army and now leader of the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), left for exile in 
France for fourteen years (1991–2005). The right-wing militia, the Guardians of the Cedars 
(GoC), was banned and its leader sentenced to death. Today, the FPM and the LF 
mobilize a large part of the Christian community.  
 Contrary to the Christian parties, the three main Muslim parties in the post-war 
period – Hezbollah, Amal Movement (Amal), and the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) – thrived 
under Syrian occupation (Knudsen 2005:7). Within the Shiite community Hezbollah has 
transformed from a radical, clandestine militia, established in the civil war’s latter period, 
to a moderate, mainstream political party with an armed resistance wing (Harik 2004:1). 
It is the only wartime militia that hasn’t disarmed (Droz-Vincent 2007:29). Their ‘Islamic 
resistance’ (al-muqawama al-islamiyya) centered on the Israeli occupation of South 
Lebanon until its end in 2000 and thereafter on the liberation of the Shebaa farms. 
Moreover, claims of deep faith and a literal interpretation of the Quran underlie the 
party’s actions (Harik 2004:1). Currently, the party no longer strives to create an Islamic 
Republic, but rather an Islamic situation (al-hala al-islamiyya) (Droz-Vincent 2007:29). 
Hezbollah’s adoption of modern political techniques and its extensive social work have 
earned it respect (Harik 2004:4). 
 The other main Shiite party, Amal, emerged from the Movement of the Deprived, a 
social movement for Shiite emancipation – led by Imam Moussa Sadr. Amal was created 
as the military wing of the movement (Lebanonwire [15.04.08b]). In the post-war period, 
the party has remained politically influential because of party leader Nabih Berri’s tenure 
as Parliament Speaker (Knudsen 2005:7). Its program is secular.  
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 Within the Druze community, the PSP has emerged as the main party; it has 
prospered far beyond what would seem proportionate given the sect’s demographic 
share (Knudsen 2005:7). Originally a cross-sectarian socialist party, it became more 
sectarian in nature in the post-war period (Richani 1998).  
 During the post-war period, Hariri’s Future Tide Movement (Future) emerged as the 
main Sunni political actor. Hariri was central in the Ta’if Agreement. Contrary to the 
former Sunni elite, oriented toward the Greater Arab Nation and pan-Arabism, Hariri’s 
aspirations for the Sunni community looked inwards (Ziadeh 2006:155). The Syrian 
regime tried to contain Harirism, and thereby French and Saudi Arabian influence by 
supporting Hariri’s rivals, the old Beiruti families such as the Solhs. Nonetheless, Hariri’s 
influence increased steadily from 1992. He formed five cabinets before he was 
assassinated on February 14, 2005 (Lebanonwire [18.02.08]) (See Appendix 2 for an 
overview of main political parties and leaders in the post-war period).  
 There were several important political changes in the Lebanese political landscape 
from around 2000 due to international, regional, and domestic factors (EU EOM 
2005:20–23). The liberation of South Lebanon in 2000, the death of Hafez el-Assad in 
Syria, and the end of the US-Syrian partnership after the Gulf War constitute essential 
events in the context of mounting polarization since 2000.  The turning point took place 
in 2004 when the UN Security Council enacted Resolution 1559. It called for the 
withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon and the disarmament of all militias. The 
following day the Parliament extended President Emile Lahoud’s mandate. This was part 
of  Syria’s strategy to consolidate its control over Lebanon because it felt threatened by 
the increasingly aggressive role of the US after the US-Syrian rupture over Iraq (Droz-
Vincent 2007:27). These events triggered the Cedar Revolution and greater political 
freedom. Since then, two coalitions have emerged gradually, the opposition and the 
loyalist camps (EU EOM 2005:20).  
 The assassination of Hariri in February 2005 sparked a cycle of demonstrations 
and counter-demonstrations (Patrie and Espanol 2007a). The opposition, later named 
the March 14 Alliance (March 14), gathered anti-Syrian forces that demanded 
independence from Syria. The opposition included Hariri‘s and Jumblatt’s parliamentary 
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blocs, as well as  LF, the reunited Kata’ib, most members of QSG, FPM, Democratic Left 
Movement (DLM), Democratic Renewal (DR), and several independent deputies (Salloukh 
2007:28, fn 117). Initially, Hezbollah and Amal stayed on the sidelines although many 
Shiites sympathized with the movement. The pro-Syrian Karami Cabinet was 
destabilized and resigned on February 28. On March 8 Hezbollah and Amal allied in 
organizing a counter-demonstration to the anti-Syrian demonstrations – and in particular 
to the demonstrators’ call for the application of resolution 1559 (Patrie and Espanol 
2006). This alliance was named the March 8 alliance (March 8). The counter-demonstration 
showed  Hezbollah’s force and capacity to mobilize other parts of society that had been 
left out of Hariri’s economic prosperity and who had experienced the Israeli occupation 
of the South (Droz-Vincent 2007:30). The cycle of demonstrations culminated with the 
anti-Syrian demonstration on March 14, 2005 in which one million Lebanese called for 
‘truth, freedom, and national unity’. The demonstration was especially important as it 
was the first time that the words Lubnan Awalen (‘Lebanon First’) were used by groups, 
who previously had worked for their own communal projects.  
 The events resulted in the withdrawal of Syrian troops on April 26, 2005. March 
14 won a majority, 72 out of 128 seats, in the following May-June 2005 parliamentary 
elections (Droz-Vincent 2007:29). A national unity cabinet was formed, headed by 
Fouad Siniora, including also Hezbollah and Amal from the pro-Syrian camp. However, 
FPM, headed by Aoun, was excluded from the Cabinet although it participated in the 
anti-Syrian movement. This left a significant part of the Christian community with a 
feeling of non-representation. The FMP thus split from March 14. Moreover, 
disagreement over Lebanon’s place in the region, the international tribunal5, and the role 
of Hezbollah has resulted in immense conflict between the two blocs and lead to political 
crisis. The majority in the Cabinet is backed by the Unites States, Saudi Arabia, and 
France whereas the minority is backed by Syria and Iran. Moreover, Hezbollah has allied 
with FPM leader Aoun. The Cabinet became paralyzed due to the resignation of the 
                                              
5 The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1664 on March 30, 2006; it calls for establishing an international tribunal to 
legally investigate the assassination of Rafic Hariri and other politically motivated assassinations committed from 2002 to 2006.  
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Shiite Amal and Hezbollah cabinet members November 11, 2007, and by Parliament 
Speaker Nabih Berri’s subsequent decision not to convene Parliament on the rationale 
that the Cabinet is unconstitutional without Shiite representation (Patrie and Espanol 
2006b:8). The political climate and security situation have deteriorated since then. 
Several politically motivated assassinations have taken place and Lebanon has entered its 
worst political crisis since the civil war. 
2.4 The Electoral System 
As I will demonstrate in this section, Lebanon has an open list system based on plurality 
voting in multi-member districts. It is a vote pooling system because electoral districts 
are mostly multi-confessional and all voters vote for all seats in an electoral district.  
 Andrew Reynolds, Benjamin Reilly, and Ellis Andrew (2005:169) classify 
Lebanon’s electoral system as a block vote system (BV). A BV uses plurality voting in 
multi-member districts. In BV “[v]oters have as many votes as there are seats to be filled 
in their district, and are usually free to vote for individual candidates regardless of party 
affiliation (Ibid:44).” Elections are held on the basis of several multi-member electoral 
districts. The voters in each electoral district have one vote for each seat in that electoral 
district. The seats in each district are allocated to specific confessional groups. For 
instance, in the Shouf electoral district (See Table 4) there are 3 Maronite seats, 1 Greek 
Catholic seat, 2 Sunni seats, and 2 Druze seats. Voters are presented with electoral lists 
that correspond to the predetermined confessional allocation.  
 Voters can vote for candidates from all confessional groups regardless of their 
own confession (Salem 2006). This is labelled a vote pooling system. Candidates from 
different confessions therefore form a list together that corresponds to the pre-set 
allocation. Except for the pre-set confessional ratio there are not other formal criteria for 
list formation. Incomplete lists are accepted. The example of the Tripoli electoral district 
can demonstrate the vote pooling system. Under vote pooling, the candidates of 
minority confessional groups in a specific electoral district are elected by voters who 
belong to the majority confessional groups (IFES 2005). In Tripoli, there are two 
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Christian seats and eight Muslim seats. The Muslim majority therefore elects the 
Christian candidates. The confessional allocation of seats differs from district to district. 
Most electoral districts are multi-confessional with either a Muslim or Christian majority. 
Others are uni-confessional (See Tables 3 and 4). 
 Yet, voters may subtract names from or add names to the list as long as the 
sectarian proportions of the lists are not altered, a practice dubbed tashtib (cross-out) 
(Salloukh 2006:640). It is thus an open list system as the candidates are elected from these 
lists separately to the seats allocated for each confessional group. Individual candidates 
thus win regardless of the other candidates’ share of votes on the same list. If two lists 
compete against each other in one electoral district, the individual candidates with the 
highest share of votes win regardless of list affiliation, for example two candidates from 
list A and one candidate from list B.  
 The electoral formula employs plurality voting. Candidates are elected if they 
receive a plurality of the votes for the seats allocated to the confession they belong to 
(IFES 2005:9). In other words, in Tripoli, Maronite candidates compete for one seat, 
Creek Catholics compete for one seat, Sunnis compete for two seats, and Shiites 
compete for six seats. For instance, the top two Sunni candidates running for the two 
Sunni seats are elected. In Lebanon, plurality voting creates ‘winner-takes-it-all’ effects 
within each confession rather than among confessions since seats are allocated to 
predetermined confessional groups.  
 Post-war elections have violated the Ta’if Agreement. First, the agreement raised 
the number of parliamentary seats to 108 from the pre-war total of 99. Nine new Muslim 
seats were to be allocated to areas with clear Muslim demographic concentrations 
(Salloukh 2006:644). But later Law 154 of 1992 raised the number to 128 seats, adding 
29 new seats to the pre-war total of 99. Second, when the Ta’if Agreement was 
negotiated, Lebanon was organized into six administrative regions (mohafazat) within 
which there were 26 districts (aqdya) (See Map). The Ta’if Agreement stipulated that the 
mohafaza should be the basis for elections after an administrative redrawing of the map. 
The constituencies were drawn on the basis of both the mohafaza and the qada (EU 
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EOM 2005:16). Where the mohafaza was the basis for the electoral constituency, the qada 
remained a unit within it.  
 
Map of Lebanese Regions and Districts 
 
Source: Wikipedia [15.04.2008].  
The map shows the administrative units in Lebanon. The six larger regions (mohafazat) are shown in bold 
script: North, Mount Lebanon, Beirut, South, Nabatieh, and Beqaa. There are 26 smaller districts (aqdya). 
The administrative drawing has not changed after the Ta’if Agreement, although the definition of 
electoral districts has varied. (Note that on this map Beirut is both a region and a district). 
 
Electoral districts were drawn on a mixed basis and subject to substantial 
gerrymandering in the post-war elections. Pro-Syrian post-war parliaments have 
gerrymandered electoral districts to serve the Syrian regime’s and its clients’ electoral 
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interests (Knudsen 2005:7–19). Changes to the electoral law were introduced at each 
election except the 2005 election. Changes to the electoral law require a two-thirds 
majority in the parliament. In 1992, elections were based on the Beirut, South, and 
North mohafaza, and on the qada in Mount Lebanon and the Beqa’ (EU EOM 2005:16). 
The 1996 elections introduced one amendment to the 1992 law. The three Beqa’ districts 
were rearranged into one large electoral district, neutralizing the Christian vote and 
weakening the Sunni vote (Atallah cited in Salloukh 2006:645–646). With one larger 
district the Shiite vote became more important as there is plurality voting (See Table 3). 
The 2000 electoral law introduced substantial amendments to the 1996 electoral districts 
(Salloukh 2006:645–647). The 2000 electoral law was named the ‘Ghazi Kanaan law’ 
after the former head of the Syrian intelligence service in Lebanon due to the particularly 
salient Syrian interference in the making of the law. Beirut was divided into three 
electoral districts, and in Mount Lebanon districts were reduced from six to four (Ibid). 
The aim was to contain Hariri in Beirut and Jumblatt in Mount Lebanon. The North and 
the South were divided into two electoral districts, neutralizing the Christian vote and 
strengthening the Shiite vote. The Beqa’ was re-divided into three districts as was the 
case in the 1992 electoral law. According to Salloukh (Ibid:647), the latter amendment 
had no specific impact due to Syria’s dominant role in the region anyway (See Table 3 of 
the 1992 and 1996 electoral districts and Table 4 of the ones in 2000 and 2005).  
 The electoral law has been criticized for insufficient regulation in a number of 
fields and for a range of other shortcomings (EU EOM 2005). The legal framework fails 
to meet the provisions of the UN International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights. 
For instance, the ballot’s secrecy is not guaranteed, campaign financing is not regulated, 
and there is widespread vote buying (Ibid; Saad 2007).  
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Table 3: Electoral Districts and Sectarian Distribution in the 1992 and 1996 
Parliamentary Elections 
Electoral District 
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Mount Lebanon (6) 35  
Northern Metn  8 4 2 1 1               
Shouf 8 3   1     2   2       
Ba’abda 6 3           2 1       
‘Alay 5 2   1         2       
Jbayl 3 2           1         
Kiserwan-Al Etouh 5 5                     
North (1) 28   
Akkar 7 1 2       3     1     
Dennieh 3           3           
Bshari 2 2                     
Tripoli  8 1 1       5     1     
Zgharta 3 3                     
Batroun 2 2                     
Al-Koura 3   3                   
Beirut (1) 19   
Beirut  19 1 2 1 3 1 6 2 1   1 1 
Beqa’ (3)* 23   
Ba’albak-Hermel 10 1   1     2 6         
Zahlé 7 1 1 2 1   1 1         
Western Beqa’-Rashaya 6 1 1       2 1 1       
South (1) 23    
Saidon 2           2           
Al-Zahrani 3     1       2         
Jezzine 3 2   1                 
Tyre  4             4         
Nabatiyé 3             3         
Bint Jbayl 3             3         
Marje’youn 5   1       1 2 1       
Total Number of 
seats per sect 
128 34 13 9 5 1 27 27 8 2 1 1 
Source: Farid Al-Khazen and Paul Salem both cited in Salloukh (2006) 
*1996 elections were held on the basis of one large electoral district (mohafaza). The three electoral 
districts were rearranged into one.  
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Table 4: Electoral Districts and Sectarian Distribution in the 2000 Parliamentary 
Elections 
Electoral district 
(Number of Seats) 
Seats/ 
Districts
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Mount Lebanon (4) 35  
Northern Metn 8 4 2 1 1        
Shouf 8 3  1   2  2    
Ba’abda- Alay  11 5 1     2 3    
Kiserwan -Jbayl 8 7      1     
North (2) 28  
Akkar- Dennieh- Bshari 11 3 2    5   1   
Tripoli-Menieh-Zgharta- Batroun- 
Al-Koura 
17 6 4    6   1   
Beirut (3) 19  
Achrafiyi-Mazra’a-Saifi 6 1 1 1   2    1  
Bashora-Msaytbé-Rmayl 6  1  1  2 1    1 
Ain el-Mrayse-Mdawwar-Mina al-
Hosn-Port. Ras Beirut-Zqaq el-Blat 
7    2 1 2 1 1    
Beqa’ (3) 23  
Ba’albak-Hermel 10 1  1   2 6     
Zahlé 7 1 1 2 1  1 1     
Western Beqa’-Rashaya 6 1 1    2 1 1    
South (2) 23  
Bint Jbayl-Tyre-Saidon-Zaharani 12   1   2 9     
Hasbaya- Jezzine- Marje’youn- 
Nabatiyé 
11 2 1 1   1 5 1    
Total number of seats per sect 128 34 14 8 5 1 27 27 8 2 1 1 
Source: www.libanvote.com cited in Salloukh (2006) 
Note: Districts set in italics were changed in the 1999 electoral law. 
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3 Assessing Accountability and 
Representativeness 
In a representative democracy elected representatives take decisions that are 
implemented by appointed officials to whom the representatives delegate some 
responsibility (Manin et al. 1999:1). Representatives decide what citizens can and cannot 
do, and hence oblige citizens to comply with these decisions. The question of 
representation in all its aspects could take us into political and philosophical terrain well 
beyond this thesis’s scope. Nonetheless, an outline of the main theoretical 
considerations is relevant to the thesis. Critics of consociationalism hold that 
consociations increase agency problems as institutional mechanisms to hold agents 
accountable are lacking. Presumably, prospects for democratic government in 
consociations are poor.  
 This chapter outlines an analytical framework to assess accountability and 
representativeness. The chapter has two parts. The first part presents a general 
framework in order to assess and explain challenges to accountability and 
representativeness. This part defines and introduces concepts in the literature on 
representation and democratic government, discusses the alternative democratic ideals 
which constitute the bases for democracy models, and discusses the mechanisms to 
ensure accountability and representativeness.  Institutional mechanisms to ensure 
accountability and representativeness are presented, followed by a discussion of 
challenges to the latter two. The second part presents a supplementary theoretical 
framework in order to assess the accountability and representativeness in consociations. 
It identifies specific challenges to accountability and representativeness in consociations.  
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3.1 Defining Accountability and Representativeness 
Citizens delegate responsibility to representatives due to limits on their own capacity and 
competence (Strøm 2003). Delegation is “an act where one person or group, called a 
principal, relies on another person or group, called an agent, to act on the principal’s 
behalf” (Lupia 2003:35). Yet, delegation implies the risk of agency problems (Strøm et al. 
2003). According to Strøm et al. (2003:23) there are two main challenges. First, 
principals may not be able to keep their agents ‘honest and diligent’ (moral hazard). 
Second, principals may not be able to choose the right agents in the first place (adverse 
selection).  Agency problems may lead to agency loss. Agency loss can be defined as “the 
difference between the actual consequence of delegation and what the consequences 
would have been had the agent been perfect” (Lupia 2003:35). A perfect agent is a 
“hypothetical agent who does what the principal would have done if the principal had 
unlimited information and resources to do the job herself” (Ibid). Representativeness and 
accountability are important parameters of democratic governance because they serve to 
reduce agency loss.  
 The literature on accountability has been dominated by the responsible party 
government model (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007:1; White 2006). The model adopts a 
rationalistic perspective to explain democratic processes of representation in which 
agency theory is used as a conceptual framework to investigate delegation. 
Representation is thus conceived to be the result of the interaction between principals 
(voters or citizens) and agents (electoral candidates or elected officials). This interaction 
features five main elements (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007:1–2). First, voters have policy 
preferences that stem from interests and values. Second, politicians and parties that seek 
office structure policy positions into electoral platforms or programs, and promise to 
enact these if elected. Third, voters make a strategic choice between different programs. 
Fourth, victorious parties or party coalitions then carry out their programs and keep in 
touch with constituencies’ evolving preferences. Fifth, at the next election voters 
evaluate parties’ and officials’ performance, and decide whether to retain the 
incumbents. Voters thus hold the representatives accountable. The definition of 
accountability used here is as follows:  
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The agent (elected official/s) will be politically accountable when the principal (citizen/s) can hold him 
responsible for past performance and, therefore, reward him with reelection and punish him with defeat 
(Maravall 1999:155).  
 Another paramount aspect of democratic government is representativeness. For 
the purpose of this thesis, a distinction between descriptive and substantive 
representativeness is pertinent. Descriptive representation focuses on mirroring demographic 
characteristics, what Hannah Pitkin (1967) named ‘the representation of presence’.    
Substantive representation concerns mirroring opinions, what Anne Phillips (1995) called 
‘representation of ideas’ (Randall 2006:392–393). Definitions of descriptive and 
substantive representativeness applied in this thesis are formulated as follows: 
A body is descriptively representative if it mirrors voters’ demographic characteristics. 
A body is substantively representative if it mirrors voters’ opinions. 
 Since Mill’s Considerations on Representative Government in 1861 it has been assumed 
that electing politicians mirroring the electorate’s demographic composition produces 
governments that also mirror voters’ opinions (Manin et al. 1999:32). In short, 
descriptive representation presumably ensures substantive representation. However, this 
is not necessarily given. For instance, government may mirror the demographic 
characteristics of the electorate, in terms of gender, age, regional belonging etc, but 
nonetheless, act contrary to voters’ opinions in certain policy areas. Thus, the 
government is descriptively representative, but not substantively so. The distinction 
between descriptive and substantive representativeness is therefore useful. In fact, both 
accountability and descriptive representativeness can be considered as mechanisms that 
ensure substantively representative governments.  
3.2 Alternative Democratic Ideals 
A much applied definition of democracy is “government by and for the people”, but as 
Lijphart (1991b:111) notes, it does not specify who should do the governing nor to 
whose interests the government should be responsive. Alternative democratic ideals 
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respond to this uncertainty. The majoritarian model favors concentrated power in the 
hands of the majority. The majoritarian definition of democracy is hence “government by 
the majority of the people” (Lijphart 1999:31). Ideally, the minority should act as an 
opposition in the parliament, and majorities and minorities should alternate in 
parliament according to the will of the people. In contrast, the consensus democracy 
model establishes an alternative democratic ideal. The consensus model favors dispersed 
or shared power (Lijphart 1991b, Powell 2000). The consensus definition of democracy is 
hence “government by as many people as possible” (Lijphart 1991b:112). The consensus 
model argues that the preferences of all citizens, not just the majority’s, should be taken 
into consideration. Emphasis is put on bringing representatives from all factions of 
society into policy coalitions. Proponents of the consensus model assert that the 
majoritarian model presupposes a homogenous majority. If on the contrary, the 
population is heterogeneous, majoritarian democracy may exclude certain groups. 
Minority exclusion, however, is mitigated if majorities and minorities actually alternate in 
parliament, but not if the minority is “condemned to permanent opposition” (Lijphart 
1999:32). Minority exclusion is especially dangerous in heterogeneous or plural societies 
in which loyalties are rigid, and majorities and minorities are less likely to alternate.    
 In the preceding discussion, it was established that both accountability and 
representativeness constitute essential democratic parameters. Yet, they are accentuated 
to varying degrees by the majoritarian and consensus models of democracy. The 
majoritarian model is more concerned about delegation risks and agency problems than 
the consensus model is. The consensus model, on the contrary, is more concerned with 
the exclusion and non-representation of minorities. Thus majoritarian democracy tends 
to stress accountability over descriptive representativeness in order to achieve 
substantively representative government and consensus democracy vice versa. In the 
following discussion, the terms majoritarian democracy and majoritarianism on the one 
hand, and consensus democracy and proportionalism, on the other, will be used 
interchangeably.  
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3.3 Institutional Mechanisms to Ensure Accountability and 
Representativeness 
In the following I will present three mechanisms that ensure accountability and 
representativeness: parliamentary opposition, elections, and political parties.  
3.3.1 Parliamentary Opposition 
The Cabinet may be accountable directly to the citizens or indirectly through parliament 
(Laver and Shepsle 1999:279). Parliament is meant to monitor and control the collective 
cabinet as well as individual cabinet members. In this regard, parliamentary opposition 
constitutes an essential mechanism to ensure accountability by providing ‘checks and 
balances’.  This mechanism is called horizontal accountability in the following chapters. 
3.3.2 Elections 
Both the majoritarian and the consensus models consider elections as the fundamental 
mechanism to link citizens to policy makers (Powell 2000). However, they disagree on 
how elections serve to link citizens to policy makers. One difference between majoritarian 
and consensus democracy concerns whether elections serve to link citizens to policy 
makers primarily by means of control or influence (Powell 2000:5). Proponents of 
majoritarianism favor accountability over representativeness, and regard elections primarily 
as a means to control policy makers through the threat of being removed from office. 
Proponents of proportionalism favor representativeness over accountability, and regard 
elections primarily as a means to influence policy making. In the former, citizens use 
elections to choose among policy makers or to reward or punish the incumbents. In the 
latter, citizens use elections to choose representative agents who should bargain over the 
most preferable policies to their constituents.  
 Two dimensions characterize citizen choice (Powell 2000:7–10). First, the vertical 
dimension of citizen choice concerns the target of voting. A citizen’s target in 
majoritarianism is the collective government. The government bears responsibility for policy 
making as a collective body – its members are not individually responsible. In contrast, 
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proportionalism considers the target of voting to be the representative agent. The 
representative agent can be a person, or a political party that will try to serve its 
constituents in negotiations or in coalitions.  
 Second, the horizontal dimension of citizen choice refers to voter’s time perspective 
(Powell 2000:9). Retrospective voting involves looking backwards, voting on the basis of 
evaluating the performance of the government or the representative. Prospective voting 
involves looking ahead, voting on the basis of an evaluation of which government or 
representative will best attend to the voter’s interests. Thus, retrospective voting entails 
using elections as a sanctioning device because they might induce elected officials to 
keep their promises to stay in office (Fearon 1999). Then again, prospective voting can 
be conceived of as a selection device because it allows citizens to choose governments or 
representative agents who presumably will act in the citizens’ interests. Nonetheless, 
Fearon (Ibid:83) claims that the mechanisms of selection and sanctioning will interact 
because voters, when choosing future representatives, will choose on the basis of 
evaluating representatives’ past performances as well. 
 According to Powell (2000:8) the two dimensions of citizen choice can be 
combined to form four modes of citizen control by the way elections link citizens to 
policy makers. Hence, the four types derived are accountability, electoral mandates, 
representative trustee, and representative delegate (See Figure 1).  The former two correspond to 
a majoritarian vision of democracy that considers accountability primary. The latter two 
correspond to a proportional vision of democracy in which representativeness is the 
fundamental consideration. Accountability and representativeness will therefore be 
ensured to varying degrees in the four types. 
 In the first mode, elections ensure accountability because of the possibility to 
‘throw the rascals out’ (Powell 2000). Citizens hold the collective government 
responsible for its past performance. In the electoral mandates mode, citizens focus not 
on the incumbent government, but rather on the opposition and policy alternatives in 
order to choose a prospective new government. In the latter two modes, elections are 
not decisive for policy making. The voter rather assumes that bargaining takes place on 
policy issues. In the representative trustees mode, citizens evaluate representative agents’ 
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performance in retrospect. This mode is less applied (Powell 2000), and will not be used 
in the analysis. In the representative delegates mode, the voter chooses an agent or a 
delegate (candidate or party) to bargain on her behalf in policy making. The 
representative agent is thus given an authorized representation in policy making.  
  
Figure 1: Four modes of citizen control 
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 Different electoral systems are designed in order to respond to the ideals of 
majoritarian and consensus democracy. A majoritarian electoral system is better designed 
to ensure accountability, whereas a proportional electoral system is better designed to 
ensure descriptive representation.  A majoritarian electoral system ensures accountability 
because it is better at carrying voter majorities into majority cabinets that are able to 
convert promises into outcomes. Voters can therefore hold cabinets responsible for 
outcomes (Powell 2000). A proportional electoral system better ensures descriptive 
representativeness because it better generates policymaking coalitions in which more 
cabinet members can be influential. In addition, an election system’s electoral attributes, 
such as district magnitude and constituency structure can be designed to produce more 
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or less descriptively representative election results (Lijphart 1999; Blanc et al. 2006). 
Such attributes are discussed in section 3.5.1.  
3.3.3 Political Parties 
“Elections must be helped by other organizations and by rules that encourage 
communication and cooperation” (Powell 2000:4). In the absence of an organizational 
and regulatory framework, citizens would not be able to use elections as means to ensure 
accountability or representativeness. Political parties are paramount to link citizens and 
policy makers, as well as individual candidates and collective policy commitments.  
Huckshorn (cited in White 2006:5) gives a pragmatic definition of a political party as “an 
autonomous group of citizens having the purpose of making nominations and 
contesting elections in hope of gaining control over governmental power through the 
capture of public offices and the organization of the government”. Aldrich’s (cited in 
Ibid:6) definition also includes an organizational aspect “[…] a political party is an 
institutionalized coalition, one that has adopted rules, norms, and procedures.” 
 Political parties may play a particularly crucial role in the consolidation of 
democracy (Catón 2007). According to Schmitter (2001) political parties have four 
important functions. First, they should structure the electoral process through 
nominating candidates, and thus provide citizens with a choice between alternative sets 
of leaders. Second, they should provide citizens with a stable and distinctive set of ideas 
and goals and orient them toward policy options. Third, they should be capable of 
forming a cabinet and making policy. Fourth, they should aggregate a significant 
proportion of the citizenry’s interests. Thus, political parties are important to ensure 
accountability in both majoritarian and proportional models. In majoritarian models 
political parties are important because they provide institutional structures to hold a 
collective government accountable (Katz 2006:35). For instance, political parties run in 
elections on political programs. At the next elections, voters will evaluate the fulfillment 
of these programs. In proportional models voters give representative agents (political 
parties) ‘authorized representation’ to bargain on their behalf in negotiations and 
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coalition building. Political parties can create more effective agents that are more likely 
to influence policy making.  
 Moreover, the party system influences prospects of accountability and 
representativeness. On one hand, the majoritarian model views a two-party system as an 
essential requirement for achieving accountability “in which the opposition party acts as 
the critic of the party in power, developing, defining and presenting the policy 
alternatives which are necessary for a true choice in reaching public decisions” (White 
2006:10). On the other hand, the consensus democracy model favors multiparty systems 
because such systems are able to include more citizen preferences (Lijphart 1999:87). In 
homogenous societies with few cleavages, a small number of parties (or a two-party 
system) may be sufficient to aggregate voters’ interests and values. Yet, in heterogeneous 
societies with several segments or groups, a two-party system will create unrepresentative 
government that fails to mirror the electorate.  
 Political parties’ internal structure influences accountability and 
representativeness. Internal party democracy can contribute to holding party leaders 
accountable (Katz 2006:36). Because political parties have adopted “rules, norms, and 
procedures” as Aldrich noted, there are procedures for decision making and policy 
making. In the same way that governments or representative agents are subject to 
elections, so are party leaders internally. Without internal party democracy, the link that 
political parties provide between policymakers and citizens may be broken, thus 
hindering accountability. Maravall (1999:165) asserts that parties may impede 
accountability if “their leaders use them in order to manipulate information and prevent 
monitoring”. In contrast he asserts that democratic political parties may “be important 
instruments of accountability”. 
 In addition, internal party democracy may enhance representativeness indirectly. 
By allowing for greater participation by ordinary party members, a greater number of 
citizens influence policy making (Katz 2006:35).  
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3.4 Challenges to Accountability 
Proponents of majoritarianism are more concerned about agency problems than 
proponents of proportionalism are (Powell 2000:7). The main criticism concerning 
accountability therefore comes from the majoritarian school. Manin et al. (1999:38) 
argue that information asymmetries in the principal-agent relationship create moral 
hazard as agents might try to benefit from this relationship. This would still not be a 
problem if accountability were guaranteed, but politicians are not legally compelled to 
abide by their platform in any democratic system. Manin et al. (Ibid:17) further remark 
that agents determine how much principals will know of agents’ actions. Information 
asymmetry may enable agents to withhold information, give incorrect information, or 
blur their responsibility (Ferejohn 1999). Politicians may also manipulate citizens’ 
preferences and thus obtain a margin of autonomy for their policies, so-called 
“leadership effect” (Jacobs and Shapiro cited in Maravall 1999:157). Hence, information 
asymmetry can lead to moral hazard and may therefore undermine accountability (Müller 
et al. 2003; Manin et al. 1999; Powell 2000).  
 However, challenges to accountability vary according to the type of political 
design, mainly majoritarian or proportional. One aspect of the information asymmetry 
problem is citizens’ ability to place responsibility on the agents (Powell 2000:11, 92; 
Manin et al. 1999:47). Clarity of responsibility is a fundamental condition for holding 
agents accountable for their performance. As Powell (2000) has pointed out, the target 
of accountability differs within majoritarianism and proportionalism. Placing 
responsibility is more difficult in an authorized representation mode because the 
representative agent will be one part out of several in a coalition or a negotiation. 
Citizens may not know how their representative agents acted within these coalitions or 
negotiations. In contrast, in a strict majoritarian regime, the collective government is 
held responsible. Elections determine whether the incumbent government should stay or 
leave. Moreover, it is a precondition for placing responsibility that ‘the real movers’ be 
identified (Burke cited in Dunn 1999). In countries that have especially numerous and 
strong external relations, ‘the real movers’ are sometimes hard to identify.  
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 Elections presumably work as an institutional mechanism to ensure accountability 
by constituting a threat to politicians who want to get reelected. However, sometimes 
candidates do not seek reelection (Manin et al. 1999). They may wish to stay in office 
one period only, reaping the benefits, and leave office before the next period. Moreover, 
in some cases there are term limits, and officials may not have the possibility to run again 
anyway. Elections – as a mechanism to control elected representatives through the threat 
of being removed from office – may only ensure prospective voting. This scenario may 
be especially valid for presidential candidates. Hence such cases challenge accountability.  
 In a recent study, Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) identify another type of 
principal-agent relationship that challenges the traditional ways of thinking about 
accountability. Their study depicts a voter-politician linkage based on patronage. In many 
political systems, particularly in new democracies which are of prime concern to this 
thesis, direct material inducements to individuals or groups are exchanged for votes. 
Clientelistic accountability represents “a transaction, the direct exchange of a citizen’s vote in 
return for direct payments or continuing access to employment, goods, and services” 
(Ibid:4). All politicians in democracies target benefits to particular voter groups but in 
clientelistic systems the provision of services is contingent upon voters’ electoral support 
(Ibid:10). Voters’ electoral support is monitored. Furthermore, electoral competition 
strengthens the client’s (principal’s) bargaining leverage vis-à-vis patrons (agents). Thus 
in clientelistic societies in which democratic institutions have been introduced, local 
clientelistic networks may turn into national, hierarchical ones through competitive 
elections. 
 In the preceding discussion, challenges to accountability have been analyzed 
through the lens of agency theory which conceives electoral behavior as rational and 
linkages as strategic. However, as Fearon (1999:57–58) notes, there are, indeed, 
“elections with no expectation of accountability”, thus challenging the rational view that 
elections are part of an agency relationship. For instance, voters may conceive elections 
as conferring honor on the best or most distinguished person, hence voting according to 
whom presumably deserves the honor of political authority.  In many Middle Eastern 
countries, Lebanon included, honor is a significant determinant in politics. In a similar 
mode, other non-strategic linkages, such as political leadership based on traditional or 
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charismatic leadership, naturally constitute different forms of voter-politician linkages 
not always bound by rationality.  
3.5 Challenges to Representativeness 
3.5.1 Challenges to Descriptive Representativeness 
A fair electoral system should create a representative assembly (Blanc et al. 2006:39). As 
noted earlier, electoral system designs and special electoral attributes constitute the main 
institutional mechanisms to ensure descriptive representativeness. Majoritarianism and 
proportionalism constitute the main theoretical approaches to the study of electoral 
systems. The main types of electoral formulae are plurality, majority, and proportionality. 
There are several ‘sub systems’ to these systems; this thesis’s scope does not allow for a 
specific discussion of these, but I will outline general advantages and disadvantages. 
 Proportional representation designs achieve more representative election results 
(e.g. Lijphart 1991c; O’Leary 2003). Proponents of majoritarian democracy advocate 
plurality or majority electoral formulae. Such electoral formulae may create 
unrepresentative legislatures because of winner-takes-it-all effects. The candidate 
supported by most voters wins, and all the other voters remain unrepresented. On a 
national basis voter majorities will tend to be overrepresented in majoritarian systems 
(Lijphart 1999:143). In contrast, proportional electoral systems (PR) aim to reflect or 
translate votes proportionally, seeking neither to overrepresent majorities nor 
underrepresent minorities.  
 An important electoral attribute is district magnitude. “The magnitude of an 
electoral district denotes the number of candidates to be elected in the district, and has a 
strong effect on the degree of disproportionality and the number of parties” (Lijphart 
1999:150). Within plurality and majority systems, increasing the district magnitude entails 
greater disproportionality and advantages for larger parties, whereas under PR it results 
in greater proportionality and better conditions for small parties. Blanc et al. (2006:48) 
hold that plurality voting in single-member districts has a negative impact on 
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representativeness because it hinders small parties from representation. If a party’s 
support is evenly distributed across constituencies, the largest party will benefit, whereas 
small- and medium-sized parties with similar support patterns will have difficulties in 
being represented. Except for parties with strong regional support, it can be hard for 
new parties to enter the political system. Hence, constituency structure partly determines the 
proportionality of the election results, especially if support varies regionally (Ibid:50). 
Gerrymandering – the redrawing of electoral district boundaries for electoral gain – 
constitutes an issue in many countries. It is a particularly strong temptation in single-
member districts, but becomes more difficult with increasing district magnitude (Lijphart 
1999:193) 
 Some features that do not relate to the electoral system per se may also influence 
representativeness. First, defining the demos – or deciding who shall have the right to 
vote (Blanc et al. 2006) – has consequences for the legislature’s representativeness. 
Certain restrictions on the demos, such as concerning minimum voting age, are widely 
accepted. Nonetheless, restrictions on citizenship or residence etc. may pose greater 
controversies, especially in plural societies. Second, the prohibition of certain political 
parties with a significant voter basis may cause unrepresentative government. Third, 
electoral participation is crucial to the genuine representativeness of the electorate and 
the legitimacy of electoral results. Hence, parameters such as electoral turn-out and 
boycotts are vital to assess descriptive representativeness.  
3.5.2 Challenges to Substantive Representativeness 
Low accountability undermines substantive representativeness. Shortcomings in 
descriptive representativeness may also undermine substantive representativeness, 
although this relationship is less clear.  
 The adverse selection problem challenges substantive representativeness in 
particular (Müller et al. 2003:24). Adverse selection entails cases in which voters may fail 
to choose agents that have the same policy preferences as they do. Adverse selection has 
several causes. First, voters may not have sufficient or accurate information about the 
candidates. Second, the electorate, or parts of it, may vote on the basis of patronage 
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instead of choosing agents with the same political policy preferences. In conflict areas, 
the electorate may vote on the basis of who can provide patronage in terms of security. 
Third, voters can be motivated by other than strategic interests as pointed out earlier, for 
instance by honor, patriarchy or charismatic leadership. Last, the choice presented to the 
voters may be short of candidates with opinions and preferences coinciding with those 
of the voters. Hence, several conditions may affect the adverse selection problem such 
as insufficient electoral campaigns, poor socio-economic situation, an unstable security 
situation, and cultural patterns.  
 The type of party system and the recruitment processes of electoral candidates influence 
voters’ political options. First, scholars argue that a multi-party system correlates 
positively with greater proportionality and aggregation of voter interests (Lijphart 
1999:87–88). A high number of political parties most likely aggregates more voter 
preferences than a low number, and hence reduces the potential of agency loss caused by 
adverse selection. The desirable number of parties depends on the cleavages that exist in 
a given society. Second, the recruitment process is important for determining the type of 
candidates that run in elections, and whether they are representative of the electorate. 
For instance, insofar as new candidates’ access to the electoral arena is hindered by 
elitist, hereditary, or patriarchic recruitment patterns, the electorate’s opinions may not 
correspond to those of electoral candidates.   
3.6 Accountability and Representativeness in Consociations  
The institutional structure of consociations poses specific challenges and prospects for 
accountability and representativeness in addition to the general challenges discussed in 
the preceding sections. The following sections discuss the challenges to accountability 
and representativeness in consociations. Consociational challenges to accountability are 
discussed first and to representativeness thereafter.  
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3.6.1 Consociational Challenges to Accountability  
Segmental elites play a particular and crucial role in consociations (Parry 2005:7). 
Lijphart (1977) argues that elites need extensive autonomy to make inter-communal elite 
compromise and consociation is therefore contingent upon a politics of accommodation. This 
involves secrecy in decision making and bargaining. According to Daalder (1974:608), 
“[s]uch politics inevitably reduce the importance of elections and even of the direct 
accountability of leaders.” Such politics emanate within a consociation from the 
institutional decision-making structure through a grand coalition. Lustick (1997:104) 
asserts that Decision making within consociations includes practices of exclusion and 
control.  
 As we have seen, this institutional structure challenges accountability as it 
increases information asymmetries between agents and principals. Information 
asymmetries increase within consociations due to two aspects resulting from the 
institutional structure of a grand cabinet. First, a cabinet representative of all significant 
segments tends to be over-sized, including most groups represented in parliament. Thus 
with regard to such an institutional structure of cabinet, the mode of citizen control 
corresponds to an authorized representation mode (See 2.3.1). A conclusion from the 
discussion of the different modes of citizen control was that accountability in authorized 
representation regimes primarily entails the selection of representative agents (Powell 
2000).  
 The inherent principal-agent information asymmetry within consociations is 
problematic. Placing responsibility for outcomes or policies executed by grand coalitions 
can be difficult. Options for ‘rent-seeking’ politicians therefore increase as elites have 
greater opportunities to withhold information from voters or manipulate it. So-called 
‘leadership effects’ therefore constitute a greater threat within consociations. In plural 
societies in particular, elites may benefit from playing on sectarianism and communal 
fear in order to sustain their elite status. 
 Second, information asymmetries between agents and principals within 
consociations increase because of the absence of parliamentary opposition in 
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consociations (Barry 1975, van Schendelen 1984, Lustick 1997, Brass 1991). Inclusion in 
the cabinet of most groups represented in parliament reduces opposition. The prospects 
for opposition within consociations depend on the cabinet’s inclusiveness (O’Leary 
2005:17). The less inclusive the cabinet, the more opposition there will be in the 
parliament. Brass therefore (1991:338) opines that the “democratic benefits that can 
accrue from ‘tossing the rascals out’ are unavailable, and do not give powerful 
parliamentary players incentives to keep government honest by shining light in dark 
corners”. Thus, the inherent lack of horizontal accountability in consociations enhances 
risks for moral hazard.  
 Critics of consociationalism further claim that power-sharing agreements create 
monopolies for the parties to the agreements (Roeder and Rotchild 2005:331). O’Leary 
(2005:11) holds on the contrary that nothing precludes electoral competition. Critics of 
consociationalism assert, moreover, that links to foreign actors, especially by financial 
ties, may help maintain elite monopolies (Zahar 2005). Naturally, this applies not only to 
consociations. However, many accounts hold that consociations are more vulnerable to 
foreign interference, for instance because elites may ally with foreign actors or states to 
increase their domestic power. 
3.6.2 Consociational Challenges to Representativeness 
This sections first looks at consociational challenges to descriptive representativeness. 
Then, it looks at challenges to substantive representativeness.  
 
Descriptive Representativeness 
Descriptive representativeness is of particular concern in consociations as segmental 
representation in political institutions presumably manages and moderates sectarian 
conflict and protects minorities. Consociationalism encourages proportional electoral 
system designs (e.g. Lijphart 2004). Yet, most power-sharing regimes in plural societies 
seek to achieve proportionality through non-proportional electoral designs (Reilly 2005). 
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Predetermining seats for certain groups can also achieve segmental proportionality 
although it is more difficult to engineer.  
 Such predetermination in the distribution of seats may produce negative effects on 
representativeness (O’Leary 2003, 2005; Lijphart 1991a). Predetermination can be 
distinguished from self-determination6. Lijphart (Ibid:66) defines self-determination as “a 
method or process that gives various rights to groups within the existing state – for 
instance, autonomy rather than sovereignty – and it allows these groups to manifest 
themselves instead of deciding in advance on the identity of the groups.” On the other 
hand, predetermination is “an internal process […] and means that the groups that are to 
share power are identified in advance” (Ibid). Predetermination may undermine 
descriptive representativeness in at least two ways. First, predetermination may challenge 
descriptive representativeness because the system fixes the relative shares of 
representation and other privileges for the segments on a permanent or semi-permanent 
basis (1991a:73). Thus the system will be unable to adapt to changes in demographics 
and the result will be descriptively unrepresentative bodies. Brass (1991:342) asserts that 
consociations “violate the rights of those groups in being and those that may develop in 
the future whose existence is not recognized by the state.” In contrast, with self-
determination, the share and type of segments will adapt to possible demographic 
changes.  
 Second, predetermination often tends to overrepresent minorities. On one hand, 
overrepresentation is a method to protect minorities, and is therefore often demanded 
by them (O’Leary 2003:725). On the other hand, overrepresentation of minorities and 
mutual veto rights – a consociational prescription – are problematic to majorities, and 
deviate from the principle of representativeness. Majorities may accept veto rights but 
not overrepresentation.  
                                              
6 Lijphart’s terminology is used in addressing these issues as it is more well-known. O’Leary (2003) refers to predetermined as 
corporate and self-determined as liberal.  
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 The representativeness of the legislature influences the composition of the 
executive. Nonetheless, there is no automatic link between the composition of the 
legislature and formation of government. On one hand, it may seem as if proportional 
system designs also better produce representative executives or ‘grand coalitions’ 
(O’Leary 2003). On the other hand, Reilly (2005) states that empirical findings contradict 
consociational arguments. Reilly investigates the relationship between electoral PR 
systems and the executive’s representativeness7. According to Reilly (2005), voluntary 
agreements by parties determine cabinet representativeness more than electoral systems 
do.  
 In order to assess the executive power’s representativeness in consociations, 
O’Leary (2003, 2005) distinguishes between democratic consociations which can be 
complete, concurrent, or weak on one hand, and between undemocratic consociations 
on the other hand. In a complete consociation “the political leaders of all significant segments 
of an ethnically differentiated territory are represented” (O’Leary 2003:700). Thus, if 
there are two segments, for instance Muslims (M) and Christians (C), and their voters 
split their support between two political parties respectively (M1, M2, C1, C2), and all of 
these groups are represented, the consociation is complete. In a concurrent consociation each 
significant segment is represented (M, C), and has at least majority support from each 
such significant segment (M1 and C1 are supported by a majority; M2 and C2 are not 
represented). In a weak consociation, each significant segment has elected political leaders 
who have at least plurality support amongst their voters (M1 and M2 are supported by a 
plurality) (Ibid:702). If one or more segments give its plurality assent while other 
segments give majority or higher levels of support, it counts as a weak consociation (for 
instance, M1 is supported by a majority, M2 by a plurality). Within a weak consociation 
the non-representation of certain groups within segments, and low support by 
represented groups, may undermine both descriptive and substantive representativeness 
                                              
7 Reilly (2005) uses inclusiveness of the executive’ instead of representativeness. I will use my own terminology for reasons of 
simplicity.  
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as the groups within segments may reflect either demographic characteristics or mirror 
voters’ opinions. 
 In contrast, undemocratic consociations lack the representation and participation 
of “one or more demographically, electorally and politically significant” segment 
(O’Leary 2003:704). In such a consociation, a dominant coalition may either exclude 
another significant segment (exclusion), or a whole segment or a majority of a segment 
may refuse to participate even though they are offered places (voluntary self-exclusion). This 
undermines descriptive representation.  
 
Substantive Representativeness 
The sectarian distribution of seats within consociations can undermine substantive 
representativeness because it stresses the representation of sectarian interests over other 
interests (Horowitz 1985). Critics of consociationalism contend that sectarian 
distribution impedes the aggregation of socio-economic and national interests. Ghai 
(2002:153) argues against sectarian representation because it makes it hard to establish 
national parties, and because sectarian identity gains prevalence over class. Although 
consociationalists recognize that such sectarian distribution of seats tends to follow this 
pattern, they argue that sectarian cleavages are the most salient cleavages in plural 
societies (e.g. Lijphart 1997). However, although consociations favor sectarian parties, 
the contention that they do not aggregate class interests should be modified. Richani 
(1998) notes that sectarian cleavages often overlap with class divisions. Thus establishing 
national parties is difficult because cleavages are overlapping and not crosscutting. 
 Moreover, sectarian distribution of seats on the basis of predetermination is 
problematic for substantive representativeness as it assigns individuals to specific 
segmental groups. Individuals may object to such labeling, for instance, if citizens 
consider themselves secular but are officially registered as part of a religious group 
(Lijphart 1991a:72). Such systems may therefore pre-empt people’s identities and 
preferences (O’Leary 2003:724). It also means that there is no place for individuals or 
groups that reject the premise of a society defined on a communal basis (Lijphart 
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2002:50). Self-determination, in contrast, avoids the issue of who should be represented 
because the segments identify themselves (Lijphart 1991a:71). 
 Critics of consociationalism assert that sectarian distribution of seats favors the 
emergence of sectarian and non-moderate politicians; they therefore suggest a vote 
pooling system. This approach is labeled moderation-focused incentivism or centripetalism. Vote 
pooling arrangements are described as follows by Dahl, Shapiro, and Cheibub 
(2003:152):  
[T]he exchange of votes by ethnically-based parties that, because of the electoral system, are marginally dependent 
for victory on the votes of groups other than their own and that, to secure those votes, must behave moderately on 
the issues in conflict. The electoral rewards provided to a moderate middle compensate for the threat posed by 
opposition from those who can benefit from the aversion of some group members to interethnic compromise.  
 Vote pooling is expected to promote “pre-electoral coalitions, coalitions that 
need to compromise in order to attract votes across group lines but that may be opposed 
by ethnic parties on the flanks” (Dahl et al. 2003:152). However, Salloukh (2006) claims 
that vote pooling and inter-sectarian alliances restrict citizens’ electoral and political 
choices. In fact, certain traits of the electoral alliances may increase the risks for moral 
hazard because they contain incentives for sectarian leaders to manipulate the elections 
for their own private gains (Ibid:639). Salloukh (2006) argues that such electoral alliances 
undermine both accountability and representation and they are therefore ultimately 
problematic for substantive representativeness.  
The adverse selection problem is especially relevant to consociations because 
segmental elites play vital roles.  Elitist theory is specifically critical toward the role of 
societal elites because their position may enable them to control elections and leave the 
great majority of the people little effective choice over candidates (Parry 2005). Brass 
(1991:338) lamented that consociationalism permits “the same combination of elites to 
entrench themselves at the peaks of spoils and patronage hierarchies more or less 
continually.” According to Salloukh (2006), vote pooling and pre-electoral alliances 
decrease competition and thus the choice over electoral candidates. 
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Table 5: Specification of Institutions and Mechanisms Designed to Ensure 
Accountability and Representativeness 
Accountability 
Institution  Specification of Mechanism
1. PARLIAMENTARY OPPOSITION • Monitor the Cabinet 
2. ELECTIONS • Sanction incumbents (Government 
accountability mode) 
• Select alternatives  (Government 
mandates mode) 
• Select representative agents to 
bargain (authorized representation 
mode) 
3. POLITICAL PARTIES • Provide political choices 
• Form cabinets 
Representativeness 
Institution  Specification of Mechanism
1. GRAND COALITION • Represent all significant segments 
in the executive 
2. ELECTIONS • Achieve proportionality through PR 
designs or non-PR method 
3. POLITICAL PARTIES • Nominate electoral candidates 
• Aggregate voters’ interests 
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4 The Grand Coalition 
Different approaches in democratic theory consider the grand coalition to be either a 
panacea or an Achilles’ heel for democratic government. Consociationalism considers it 
the prime tool to ensure representation of various segments in the executive power (e.g. 
Lijphart 1977). Critics of consociationalism contend on the contrary that grand 
coalitions thwart democracy (e.g. Roeder and Rotchild 2005; Jarstad 2006a). In Lebanon, 
executive power before the Ta’if Agreement was concentrated in the Maronite 
Presidency and the Sunni Premiership (Ziadeh 2006:140–143). With the Ta’if Agreement 
(1989), the institutional arrangement called the Troika emerged as the real decision maker 
(Haddad 2002:213). In addition, the Cabinet was strengthened relative to the President. 
The Cabinet decides on routine matters whereas the Troika handles the more 
contentious issues, like foreign policy. In order to assess the executive’s accountability 
and representativeness in consociations during the post-war period, it is pertinent to 
examine the Troika and the Cabinet. This chapter shows that grand coalitions weaken 
accountability because horizontal accountability is undermined, and shows that the 
mutual veto leads to fractionalized decision making. Moreover, the chapter shows that 
grand coalitions do not necessarily lead to high representativeness.  
 The chapter is divided in two main parts which assess accountability and 
representativeness respectively. The chapter starts by analyzing the consociational 
system’s influence on horizontal accountability and opposition, then analyzes how 
foreign interference and ties undermine domestic accountability on the whole. Then the 
post-war executive is analyzed concerning representativeness. Finally, particular flaws in 
substantive representativeness are discussed.  
54 The Grand Coalition 
4.1 Prospects for Accountability 
4.1.1 Limited Parliamentary Monitoring  
Scholars of majoritarian democracy argue, as we have seen, that an opposition is 
fundamental to the checks and balances between the legislative and executive branches 
(See section 3.3.1). This section therefore analyzes prospects of horizontal 
accountability. 
 In Lebanon, national unity cabinets have been formed after 1990; they included at 
least six main confessional communities and various political groups (Gebara 2007:16). 
The cabinets were very large, encompassing around thirty members. Oversized cabinets 
leave little room for parliamentary opposition. If nearly all political groups represented in 
parliament also are included in the Cabinet, no clear alternative exists to the incumbents. 
Critics thus claim that the “democratic benefits that can accrue from ‘tossing the rascals 
out’ are unavailable, and do not give powerful parliamentary players incentives to keep 
government honest by shining light in dark corners” (Brass 1991:338). Oversized 
cabinets create weak opposition. Salem (2007 [Interview]) remarks that “the parliament 
doesn’t really hold the government accountable. They are like a team. The deputies from 
a bloc support their part in government no matter what.” This damages Parliament’s 
monitoring role and thus undermines horizontal accountability. For example, the 
Lebanese parliament has never had a no-confidence vote against any cabinet or cabinet 
member, and few cases concern the condemnation of a cabinet member (Krayem 
[10.04.08]; Salhab 2003:90–91). However, the principle of non-confidence votes 
contradicts the essence of a consensus-based political system.  
 A number of Lebanese particularities, moreover, reduce the prospects for 
horizontal accountability. First, there is no restriction on holding positions in the 
Parliament and in the Cabinet at the same time. In other words, “politics plays judge and 
jury at the same time” (Salloukh 2007 [Interview]). Second, cabinet members are often 
recruited from Parliament. Consequently, aspiration for cabinet office induces a sort of 
patron-client relationship between the Cabinet and Parliament (Harik 1975). Also, the 
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lack of a legal rational bureaucracy reinforces this relationship as the allocation of 
resources to confessional communities or regions is based on personal and clientelistic 
ties. It is common practice that the deputies lobby the Cabinet for resources to their 
electoral districts. Farid Al-Khazen (2007 [Interview]), a deputy affiliated with the FPM, 
said that deputies need to lobby and put pressure on the Cabinet continuously because 
of corruption and favoritism in the Cabinet, and because of the lack of a social security 
system guaranteeing a minimum of benefits and services to people. Parliament’s 
monitoring role is therefore significantly weakened. Salam (cited in Salhab 2003:91) 
depicts a reversed relationship between the executive and legislative in Lebanon:  
Instead of controlling the executive, the deputies need most often to be at the service of the executive in order to 
achieve certain favors, in particular, electoral victory in the next elections due to the support of the executive. 
Hence, the roles are reversed. It is the executive who controls, to a large extent, the legislative instead of being 
controlled by it.  
 Blurry lines between the legislative and executive thus create poor prospects for 
accountability. However, opposition is moved from the parliamentary arena to other 
arenas. Majorities and minorities in parliament are not allowed to exist under 
consociationalism as most groups are included in the executive. In majoritarian 
democracy, executive power is assumed to shift between Cabinet alternatives whereas in 
consociations the Cabinet includes several alternatives at the same time. 
Consociationalism moves opposition from the parliament to the grand coalition and the 
Cabinet. Consequently, opposition in post-war Lebanon has been exercised within the 
Troika and by cabinet members (Al-Khazen 2003:613).  
4.1.2 Opposition and Mutual Veto in the Troika and Cabinet 
The institutional structure of the Troika allows for the three presidents to veto each 
other’s decisions informally. Hudson (1988:227) recognizes that the distribution of high 
offices among the sects operates as a mutual veto in a “practical if not strictly legal way”. 
The constitution, however, enshrines formal veto power via a two-thirds vote by cabinet 
members on fundamental issues (Ta’if Agreement found in Ziadeh (2006), Appendix 
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L:Article 1.2 د. 6). Fundamental issues are: states of emergency and their abolition, war 
and peace, general mobilization, international agreements and treaties, the state's general 
budget, comprehensive and long term development plans, the appointment of top-level 
civil servants or their equivalents, reexamination of the administrative division, 
dissolving the Chamber of Deputies, the election law, the citizenship law, the personal 
status laws, and the dismissal of cabinet members. In addition, the President issues the 
decree forming the Council of Ministers (Ibid:Article 1.2.ب.8) and thus he may de facto 
obstruct or veto a cabinet.   
 The Troika can be said to have led to rigidity and fragmented decision making. 
Gebara (2006:7; 2007:17) asserts that the Troika divided the state apparatus among 
themselves and that each became the major decision maker for his designated share. 
Thus in 1992 Prime Minister Hariri became the sole decision maker for economic and 
reconstruction matters, Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri for relief and reconstruction 
matters in the South, and President Elias Hrawi for oil and gas sector matters. The 
practice of the Prime Minister’s being in charge of the economy has been consolidated 
since 1992. Moreover, Berri, alongside Hezbollah, is still primarily responsible for the 
South. According to El-Ezzi (2003:16), when the Troika unites, it is primarily to defend 
their own personal, partisan interests respectively, instead of national ones. In the post-
war period, in cases of mounting disagreement and conflict between the three 
presidents, a top-down decision was made by the Syrian regime (Ibid). Power struggles, 
that sometimes have resulted in inability to take decisions and execute policies, have 
characterized the post-war period. In the absence of ‘an external power’ after the 2005 
Syrian withdrawal, disputes and political crises have increased. My interviews with 
Lebanese decision makers suggest that although internal Lebanese decision making 
became more autonomous after the Syrian withdrawal, the power struggle among the 
Troika and within the Cabinet has in fact resulted in less decision making.  
 The troubles surrounding the establishment of the International Tribunal 
demonstrate the negative effects caused by the mutual veto enabled by the institutional 
structure of the Troika. The International Tribunal were to try suspects in the 
assassination of Hariri and in the politically motivated assassinations of others from 
2004 to 2006 (Patrie and Espanol 2007b:8). Former President Emile Lahoud – installed 
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by the Syrian regime in November 1998, and whose mandate was extended in 2004 in 
violation of the Constitution – refused to ratify the reforms proposed by the Cabinet. 
Hence the International Tribunal’s establishment was made very difficult (Ibid). 
President Lahoud was boycotted by the main parts of the international community who 
considered his tenure unconstitutional. Although the boycott reduced his power, Lahoud 
managed to play a certain political role by refusing to ratify cabinet decrees.   
 Consociational cabinets correspond to the authorized representation mode 
presented in section 3.3.2, because cabinet members are expected to bargain for their 
voters’ interests. The data suggests that cabinet members experience a double role that 
can undermine national coherent decision making and raise the level of conflict in the 
cabinet. On one hand, a cabinet member is part of a collective body that should execute 
national policies. In particular, a cabinet member is responsible for a specific post, for 
instance health or administrative planning. On the other hand, a cabinet member is 
elected on a sectarian quota and is thus expected to serve his community. The interview 
data shows that cabinet members perceive their role as a political, technocrat, and 
communitarian one. Haddad (2002:210) asserts that cabinet members in Lebanon mainly 
represent their sects. Tension exists as national interests sometimes contradict 
communal ones. Yet, tension appears more often in some cabinet posts, like in the 
service ministries.   
 That cabinet members have double roles increases conflict. One example of an 
informal use of veto in the post-war period concerns the resignation of the six Amal and 
Hezbollah cabinet members on November 11, 2006 (Favier 2006:15). The formation of 
the 2005 national unity cabinet was based on an agreement between March 14 and March 
8 that Hezbollah would take part in the government on the condition that it be protected 
against, amongst others, US efforts to classify Hezbollah as a terrorist organization and to 
disarm its military wing. In return, March 14 would reelect Nabih Berri as Parliament 
Speaker. The cabinet majority (March 14), however, refused by majority vote to postpone 
the composition of the International Tribunal’s Inquiry Commission. Hezbollah feared 
that the Tribunal would weaken its prime ally, Syria, and that it might establish a 
precedent that might be replicated, to legally try Hezbollah for its alleged role in terrorist 
actions in the 80s (Safa 2006:3). Claiming that the Cabinet is unconstitutional because of 
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the lack of representation of one of the major segments8, the Shiite representative in the 
Troika, Nabih Berri, has refused to convene parliament, thus preventing the parliament 
from ratifying the tribunal. In other words, Hezbollah performs a sort of ‘empty-chair 
politics’ by refusing cabinet participation. Hence, a minority president, Berri, is able to 
thwart the majority’s will (Patrie and Espanol 2007b:8). 
 On one hand, the Troika guarantees cross-sectarian elite agreement in decisions. 
In this perspective, the Troika is essential to prevent majority rule and the exclusion of 
segments. On the other hand, power sharing in the top executive and mutual veto may 
lead to stalemate and deadlock. The ultimate consequence is a non-functioning 
democracy in which the institutions are unequipped to handle conflict. 
Consociationalism as we have seen can lead to low policy performance if actors pursue 
only their own interests. Consequently, governments are factionalized in the post-war 
period by heterogeneous ideological, political, and sectarian interests (Gebara 2007:6). 
The result is factionalized and rigid policy making.  
 Against this backdrop, prospects for accountability are low. Additionally, the 
practice of veto or high levels of conflict within the Troika or Cabinet may cause agency 
loss due to agents’ inability rather than unwillingness, according to the idea of Müller et al. 
(2003). It might be that representative agents do not act in the interests of their voters 
not because of moral hazard but because they are opposed or hindered by the other 
presidents or cabinet members. For instance, Speaker Nabih Berri has hindered the 
Parliament from functioning since he refuses to convene it.  
                                              
8 The Ta’if Agreement is ambiguous on this aspect. On one hand, it stipulates that the Cabinet is unconstitutional if more than 
one-third of its members resign. The Shiite ministers had 6 of 24 posts when the Cabinet was formed. Thus the Shiites did not 
constitute even one-third. On this basis the Cabinet is thus constitutional (Article 1.2. ﻩ. 1. ب.). On the other hand, the Ta’if 
Agreement stipulates that every power (sulta) that contradicts the principle of mutual coexistence (el-aysh el-moustarak) (Article 1. 
1. ط.) is illegitimate. On this basis, any Cabinet without participation from the most significant sects is illigtimate. 
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4.1.3 Foreign ‘Real Movers’ Hinder Domestic Accountability  
In order to place responsibility for policy outcomes, principals need to identify ‘the real 
movers’ as seen in section 3.4. When decision making is not the sole responsibility of 
domestic elected officials, but is influenced by occupying states, foreign actors or 
regimes, accountability obviously is undermined. Agents may wish to act in their voters’ 
interests but can be hindered by certain contingencies produced by foreign interference. 
In Lebanon, the dangerous security situation and foreign interference have hindered 
elected representatives from performing their duties as deputies or cabinet members. I 
will now look at Lebanon’s external relations in order to assess information asymmetries.  
 Lebanon is located in a turbulent region that has a multitude of unresolved 
conflicts (Khalaf 2002:305). Historically, the country’s geopolitical position has turned 
Lebanon into a battlefield for the interests of regional and international actors (Ibid:7). 
Foreign powers and regional brokers have had a pivotal role in either inciting or 
containing conflict according to their regional interests. Ziadeh (2006:138–139) asserts 
that “[r]egional and international interventions have had – and still have, as was most 
recently witnessed with Hariri’s assassination in February 2005 – a major effect on 
whether Lebanon experiences intercommunal coexistence or conflict, and on whether it 
builds national cohesiveness or sinks into state disintegration”. Too many foreign ties 
can produce a weak Lebanon if the loyalty of important groups or segments to foreign 
states is greater than to the Lebanese state. Hudson (1988:235) argues that 
consociationalism can work only if the state is strong and autonomous.  
 Several foreign states and non-Lebanese actors have had, and still have, particular 
interests in Lebanon. Syria’s role in Lebanon, however, deserves particular emphasis. 
The Ta’if Agreement enabled Syrian hegemony over Lebanon (See sections 2.2 and 2.3).  
Syrian intervention was accepted by the international community due to strategic 
interests in the Middle East, such as the alliances in the Gulf War. By re-instituting the 
old communal system, Syria ensured its dominance as the system was reformed enough 
to stop the fighting, yet fragile enough to require a non-Lebanese arbitrator. Syria’s bid 
for political hegemony in Lebanon was primarily a geopolitical consideration (Ziadeh 
2006:137). Later on, the occupation also served Syria’s economic interests. Syrian-Israeli 
60 The Grand Coalition 
conflict has played an especially pivotal role in Lebanese politics. Conflict has 
concentrated on the Israel-Palestine question9, the Shebaa farms10, and other broader 
regional interests.  
Furthermore, countries have often used Lebanon as a confrontation arena in 
pursuing their regional and strategic interests. Ali Osseiran (2007 [Interview]), deputy in 
the Development and Resistance bloc, laments foreign interests in Lebanon:  
[Lebanon] has been divided and subdivided, and it goes on and on, and we are at the meeting point between the 
West and the East where there is constant conflict. There is conflict between the Americans and the French within 
Lebanon, between the Syrians and the French, between the French and the Israelis, between the Americans and 
the Israelis, Syrians and the Israelis, between the Iranians and the Americans, and between the Israelis and the 
Iranians. 
 The domestic political forces’ ties to foreign powers have at times increased 
internal conflict. Ziadeh (2006:148) depicts the rules of the (communal) game in 
Lebanon as “combining pragmatic intercommunal alliances [see chapter 5] and regional 
patronage”. Hence, the various communities have gained regional patronage with their 
respective regional actors. Lebanese actors have financial, ideological, and/or cultural 
ties with foreign actors. The Sunni community in the post-war period has fostered 
regional ties to Saudi Arabia through Hariri whereas the Shiite community has ties to 
Iran and Syria. The Shiite ascendancy in the post-war period threatens the power balance 
with the two other communities represented in the Troika, the Maronites and the Sunnis 
(Ibid:149). In particular, Hezbollah’s close ideological and financial relations with Iran are 
criticised for enabling Hezbollah to create ‘a state within the state’. Insofar as political 
groups’ policies are elaborated externally, information asymmetries and chances of 
                                              
9 Palestinian refugees fled Palestine for Lebanon during the war preceding the creation of Israel in 1948 and later in the Six-day 
War of 1967. Today the Palestinian refugee population in Lebanon is estimated to be around 400,000. (UNRWA [17.05.2008]).  
10 Israel occupied the Shebaa farms during the Six-Day War of 1967. Since the Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon in 2000, 
the area has been a bone of confrontation. Israel sees it as part of the Israeli occupied Golan Heights whereas Lebanon claims it 
is part of South Lebanon (Kaufman 2004). 
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agency loss increase. It is uncertain how big a part of Hezbollah’s policies are made in 
Iran and how big a part in Lebanon, but interview data supports the view that policies 
are at least heavily influenced and condoned by Iran.  
 In the beginning of the 1990s, Saudi Arabia was restricted to protecting the 
Sunnis and limiting the influence of Iran and its Shiite allies because of the limitations 
imposed by Syria (Ziadeh 2006:148). The United States also played a low-key role prior 
to the Israeli retreat from South Lebanon in 2000 and the subsequent massive support to 
Hezbollah. Yet, they adopted a more aggressive approach after 2000 by backing the UN 
Resolution 155911 and calling for Lebanese sovereignty. Before 2000 there were one pro-
Syrian Sunni-Druze-Shiite axis with a few Maronites on one hand and one anti-Syrian 
Christian-Maronite axis on the other. These two axes disintegrated after 2000 due to the 
change in Syrian leadership and the re-entry of the Americans, French, and Saudis into 
Lebanese politics in the wake of 9/11 and the demise of Saddam Hussein in Iraq 
(Ibid:161). Analyzing Lebanon’s external relations, Khalaf (2002:305) contends that: 
The country remains largely impotent to act on issues destined to shape its political future. Ordinary Lebanese 
citizens, much like their political representatives, are still disempowered or not yet in a position to have a decisive 
impact on matters that directly affect their country’s political destiny or national sovereignty. As we have seen, 
Lebanon’s entry or exit from war, its involvement in the peace process, the outlines of its foreign policy; even the 
character of its electoral laws and local municipal elections are still largely shaped outside its borders.  
 Interviews with Lebanese political actors suggest that under Syrian occupation, 
elected representatives were hindered from internal decision making, or those who were 
elected were allies of the Syrian regime. Now when Syrian troops have pulled out, 
however, disagreement prevents decision and policy making within the Cabinet, 
according to cabinet Member Jean Hoggasabien (2007 [Interview]). Also, interviewed 
                                              
11 Resolution 1559 stipulates that all foreign troops redeploy from Lebanon, and that all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias be 
disarmed (UN SC S/Res/1559 (2004)). The latter will have consequences for Hezbollah and Palestinian armed groups within 
and outside the refugee camps.  
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elected representatives tell that with the end to Syrian monopoly, several other foreign 
interests are left more room to manoeuvre than previously. Foreign interference and 
pressure in the political crisis since 2005 have increased the institutional stalemate and 
made the confrontations between Lebanese domestic actors worse.   
This shows that foreign interference and domestic groups’ ties to foreign states 
contribute to the undermining of accountability in post-war Lebanon.  
4.2 Prospects for Representativeness 
4.2.1 Representativeness of the Post-war Executive Power 
Advocates of consociationalism argue that consociations correspond to an alternative 
democratic ideal that favors representativeness over competition (Andeweg 2000; 
Lijphart 1977). As consociations have ‘sacrificed’ some of the democratic criteria of 
majoritarian democracy to achieve higher representativeness and protection of 
minorities, one would expect that consociations should be very good at 
representativeness. In order to investigate the representativeness of consociations, 
O’Leary (2005), distinguishes between complete, concurrent, and weak democratic 
consociations, and between undemocratic consociations in which a significant segment 
is excluded either by a dominant coalition or voluntarily (See section 3.6.2). The 
distinction will be used to address the case of Lebanon. 
 In order to assess the executive power’s representativeness this section starts by 
examining the support levels of the three Troika members within their respective 
communities. Then the section examines the representativeness of the post-war cabinets 
by looking at the inclusion of confessions, political parties and groups.  Finally it 
concludes that the Troika is weak and that post-war cabinets have had elements of 
voluntary and involuntary exclusion, but on the whole have been quite representative.  
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The Troika 
The Troika is descriptively representative of the most significant segments in Lebanon as 
it comprises the Maronite, Sunni, and Shiite community. However, it is pertinent to ask 
if the Troika therefore fulfills the criteria for descriptive representativeness as only three 
of 18 communities are represented. The lines between significant and less significant 
segments must be assessed temporally and substantively.  As of this writing (May 2008), 
the large demographic shares of the Maronite, Sunni, and Shiite communities justify their 
privileged position in the political system (See Table 2). The allocation of the ‘three 
presidencies’ to these communities can therefore be considered legitimate. However, the 
distribution of the posts among the three does not take into account demographic 
changes since the 1932 census (Compare Tables 1 and 2). The Shiites therefore feel 
disadvantaged as they constitute a larger demographic group than the Maronites who are 
allocated the Presidency, a more powerful post than Parliament Speaker.  
 The institutional arrangement whereby the Troika comprises but three posts 
naturally has lower prospects for representativeness.  O’Leary’s (2003; 2005) measures 
representativeness by looking at the representation of political groups within one 
segment. Because the segments are represented only by one person in the Troika, the 
support levels of its members within their respective communities will be assessed 
instead. Figure 2 shows the support levels of the various Troika members in the post-war 
period. 
 First, Lebanon has had two post-war presidents (See Figure 2). Elias Hrawi was 
appointed President in November 1989. In 1995, the Syrian regime was able to obtain a 
constitutional amendment to renew his mandate for three years (Hudson 1999). Emile 
Lahoud was appointed President in November 1998. His mandate was extended in 2004 
in violation of the Constitution (Lebanonwire [11.04.2008a]). Albeit the Christian 
community’s descriptive representation is ensured through the Presidency, the two 
former presidents’ substantive representativeness was undermined. The choice of Hrawi 
and Lahoud did not mirror the Christian electorate’s opinions in the post-war period. 
The Christian community’s support concentrated in the Lebanese Forces, General Michel 
Aoun’s movement, and the Maronite Patriarch and the Qurnet Shehwan Gathering 
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(Knudsen 2005:6–7). All three political groups adopted a critical stance toward the 
Syrian regime and worked to end Syrian occupation. In contrast, the post-war presidents 
were allies and willing co-operators with the Syrian regime (Ziadeh 2006:154). Ziadeh 
(Ibid:160) contends that Syria alone chose the post-war presidents. Syria’s former 
President Hafez el-Assad was reported to have uttered during a meeting with former PM 
Hariri, “It is I alone who chooses the President of Lebanon” (Ibid). The Syrian regime 
has made sure that deputies are pro-Syrian to ensure that pro-Syrian presidents were 
elected and to ensure that the Presidents’ mandates were extended.   
Figure 2: The Representativeness of the Troika 
 
Source: compiled on the basis of interview data and secondary literature. 
 
 Second, the Prime Minister constitutes the second Troika member. Several prime 
ministers have served in the post-war years (See Figure 2). Hariri has dominated the 
Premiership in the post-war period. He headed three cabinets from October 1992 until 
December 1998, and two cabinets from October 2000 until October 2004 (Lebanonwire 
[18.02.08]). In between Omar Karami has headed two cabinets (December 1990–May 
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1992; October 2004–April 2005), Rashid el-Solh, Selim el-Hoss, and Najib Mikati have 
also headed one cabinet each. The 2005 Cabinet is headed by Fouad Sinioria. 
 Hariri’s popularity was mostly on the rise during the 90s, but he received massive 
support after 2000, in particular in Beirut and Sidon. In the beginning of his first tenure 
(1992–98), Hariri was greeted with enthusiasm and confidence that the economy would 
improve (Hudson 1999). He had built his financial empire from scratch and challenged 
the traditional elite, such as the Karamis and Solhs (Gambill and Abdelnour 2001). 
Returning from Saudi Arabia in 1990, he began to invest in post-war reconstruction 
projects. Initially, the economy rebounded but in 1998 it was on the verge of catastrophe 
(Hudson 1999). Hariri was criticized for vast corruption and enfeebling the opposition. 
Nevertheless, a study conducted by Haddad (2002:219) shows that 52 percent of the 
Sunni community supported the Hariri Cabinet in 1998. In Hariri’s next tenure (2000–
2004), he received massive support from the Sunni community, demonstrated by his 
electoral landslide in the 2000 elections (Gebara 2006). Hariri resigned in 2004 in protest 
over the extension of Lahoud’s mandate (Fattah 2005). 
 In 1998, Hariri was replaced by Selim Hoss. Hoss headed a technocrat cabinet 
that intended to ‘reform’ the economy and target corruption (Gambill and Abdelnour 
2001). Hoss had some success, but the support withered as the country descended into 
economic recession. Furthermore, Omar Karami, who replaced Hariri as Prime Minister 
in 2004, had low support within the Sunni community. Public pressure and massive 
demonstrations after the assassination of Hariri ousted the pro-Syrian Karami Cabinet 
from power (Patrie and Espanol 2007a:25). Karami resigned and Najib Mikati was 
elected interim Prime Minister. Mikati’s main objective was to oversee the 2005 
legislative elections. Foad Siniora, head of the 2005 Cabinet, has had tremendous 
support due to his close relationship with Saad Hariri. Future is by far the largest 
parliamentary bloc with 33 deputies (See Appendix 4).  
 Third, the Parliament Speaker constitutes the last Troika member (See Figure 2). 
Amal leader Nabih Berri has held the post since October 1992. Berri was reelected in 
1992, 1996, 2000, and 2005 (Lebanonwire [11.04.08b]). He has held the post for 13 
years. Thanks to his alliance with Hezbollah throughout most of the post-war period and 
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his backing from Syria, Berri has been able to stay in power. As Parliament Speaker, it is 
pertinent to say that Berri receives majoritarian support from the Shiite community for 
the way he fills his position. He has represented the Shiites and Hezbollah through his 
office, not just Amal. Hezbollah has increasingly mobilized slightly more Shiite voters 
than Amal has (See Appendix 3). Yet, as Parliament Speaker, Berri represents Hezbollah 
as much as his own party due to their alliance. 
 The overall conclusion on the Troika’s representativeness in the post-war period 
is that it is high on descriptive representativeness because it guarantees the 
representation of the three most significant segments. In this regard, consociationalism 
does lead to representativeness by a grand coalition. However, in substantive 
representativeness the Troika does not fare so well. This is most evident with regard to 
the Christian Presidency, which has received only minoritarian support within the 
Christian community. The post-war Presidents’ low support levels illustrate that 
descriptive representativeness does not necessarily lead to substantive representativeness. 
The predetermination of the Presidency to the Christian community has not resulted in 
the representation of dominant Christian opinions and interests within the Troika. Prior 
to 2005, the lack of representativeness of the Presidency was mostly caused by an 
adverse selection problem, resulting from Syrian occupation and the subservience of 
deputies (Haddad 2002:204–206).  
 In conclusion, Lebanon’s grand coalition can be considered weak as some of the 
segments give only minoritarian support. The Shiite and Sunni communities, however, 
have mainly given majoritarian support during the post-war period. Support to the Prime 
Minister has varied from minoritarian to majoritarian within the Sunni community.  
 
The Council of Ministers 
Precedence dictates that the Council of Ministers be formed on the basis of Muslim-
Christian parity and that it includes cabinet members from six main confessional 
communities. The various cabinets have been heterogeneous and inclusive of several 
confessional communities (Gebara 2007:16). All post-war governments have met the 
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parity criterion and several confessional communities have been represented. On one 
hand, the Council is therefore descriptively representative of the segments. On the other 
hand, cabinets’ substantive representativeness has had some shortcomings. For example, 
political forces with significant popular support have been excluded.  
 There is one case of voluntary self-exclusion (See section 3.6.2). Despite electoral 
victory in parliamentary elections, Hezbollah has refused cabinet seats during the post-war 
period until 2005 when the party for the first time joined in a national unity cabinet 
headed by Prime Minister Fouad Siniora. The other case is rather a case of involuntary 
exclusion, the exclusion of the FPM in the 2005 Cabinet. Hezbollah mobilizes a large part 
of the Shiite community and the FPM mobilizes a significant part of the Christian one. 
(See Appendix 3). The post-war cabinets have not lacked the representation of entire 
segments, however. Nonetheless, cabinets have lacked the representation of significant 
political forces within segments, as with Hezbollah and FPM. Exclusion of political 
groups with significant support reduces a cabinet’s substantive representativeness. 
Additionally, the current Cabinet lacks Shiite representation entirely as the Shiite 
ministers resigned. However, Amal and Hezbollah were included from the start in 2005 
and nothing hinders them from coming back.  
 O’Leary (2003:717) contends that post-war cabinets in Lebanon have been 
complete. Post-war cabinets have been important for the representation of various 
confessions. Especially, inclusive cabinets have been pivotal for the smaller confessions 
that are not represented in the Troika. However, when one looks at the share of support 
for the political parties and groups represented in government, one sees that post-war 
cabinets correspond more to a weak consociation. In a weak consociation, each segment has 
elected political representatives but all or some of these leaders have only plurality 
support within their segments (O’Leary 2003). This applies at least to the Christian 
segment as the Syrian regime installed numerous Christian cabinet members before 
2005, and because the largest Christian movement was excluded after 2005. As Hezbollah 
was not part of any post-war cabinet before 2005, the Shiite representation also lacked 
majority support during that time.  
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 Thus, cabinets’ descriptive representativeness does not necessitate substantive 
representativeness. The process of forming governments and the Syrian influence prior 
to 2005 determined which groups entered the Cabinet. First, the process around the 
formation of the Cabinet is crucial. There is no automatic link between the legislature’s 
composition and cabinet formation guiding which groups should form cabinets. On one 
hand, it is argued that proportional system designs12 are better at producing 
representative executives or ‘grand coalitions’ (O’Leary 2003). Reilly (2005) claims 
voluntary agreements are more important for cabinet formation than electoral systems 
are. Regional, historical, and demographic patterns appear to have more explanatory 
power. My interview data concur that this is partly the case in Lebanon as alliances and 
negotiations have determined the formation of cabinets, for instance in 2005.  
 Second, the Syrian regime has strongly influenced the formation of cabinets. 
During Syrian occupation, cabinets were formed in order to ensure Syrian control and 
would include pro-Syrians, political leaders and/or their followers, and technocrats. The 
2005 Siniora Cabinet was the first one without direct Syrian influence. It was a large 
national unity cabinet but nevertheless it left out one of the major Christian political 
forces, the FPM. Interviews with several cabinet members suggest that Aoun was 
offered seats but that the FPM did not accept the share it was offered. Farid Al-Khazen 
from FPM claims that the electoral alliance between Future, PSP, Hezbollah, and Amal 
made a deal to exclude the FPM (2007 [Interview]). Presumably, a government including 
the FPM was difficult as Aoun wanted to present himself as the only Christian 
representative, according to cabinet member Jean Hogassabian (2007 [Interview]). 
Cabinet member Ahmad Fatfat (2007 [Interview]) stressed that it was an objective to 
create a broad national unity cabinet in 2005, but that March 14 rejected Aoun’s efforts 
to monopolize the Christian representation. Christian seats went to their Christian allies 
instead, the LF and QSG.   
                                              
12 As we have seen, Lebanon seeks proportionality through a non PR-method. 
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 The analysis of the representativeness of the Troika and the cabinets shows that 
the post-war executive has been descriptively representative, but has severe 
shortcomings regarding substantive representativeness. Descriptive representativeness is 
therefore not sufficient to create democratic government. 
4.2.2 Corruption and Poor Policy Performance  
An assessment of the executive power’s substantive representativeness should also look 
at the performance of cabinets and how voters evaluate government. Haddad (2002:201) 
argues that voters have low trust in elected officials and are discontent with public 
policies in post-war Lebanon. Moreover, cabinets have shown poor policy performance 
and widespread corruption.  
 Risks arise for moral hazard and rent-seeking behaviour as accountability is 
substantially weakened in the absence of parliamentary monitoring. The structure of the 
Troika and Cabinet has reduced prospects for accountability. Vast corruption and poor 
policy performance in the post-war period demonstrate that elected officials are not 
accountable. Moreover, the Troika’s institutional structure reinforced the relationship 
between confessionalism and corruption. Corruption became a means to maintain 
communal consensus and it was tolerated as long as it preserved peace (Gebara 2007:17). 
 According to the World Bank Governance Data, Lebanon scored 25–5013 on 
corruption control (2007 [01.05.2008]). Gebara (2007:17–18) asserts that 
consociationalism mainly causes the institutionalization of corruption in post-war 
Lebanon, and that “the post-war era witness[ed] a scramble for confessional control of 
state resources, public funds, and the appropriation of ministries” (Ibid). This 
strengthened the dependence on the sect. The consociational political system has 
induced corrupt, rent-seeking behavior in the post-war period. Citizens depend upon 
                                              
13 In comparison, the Nordic countries averaged around 90-100 percent for corruption control (World Governance Data 2007 
[01.05.2008]).  
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illicit benefits from politicians due to the sectarian distribution of seats in the executive, 
legislature, and state administration. In contrast a rational bureaucracy would meet 
citizens’ needs regardless of sectarian identity.  
 Corruption in the post-war period and poor policy performance – demonstrated 
by the government’s inability to reduce socioeconomic disparities – have resulted in a 
loss of public confidence in the state and the legitimacy of state institutions (Gebara 
2007:18). Minister of Administrative Development, Jean Hoggasabian, told that the 
consociational political system makes it hard to institute administrative reforms as the 
level of political interference in the state administration is high (2007 [Interview]). The 
difficulties stem from direct links between citizens and public officials and between 
public officials and sectarian leaders. The sectarian nature of links results from the grand 
coalition, and sectarian distribution of legislative and public positions. The low electoral 
turn-out and boycotting are also evidence of a loss of confidence in the political regime 
and a gap between elected representatives and the electorate.  
 In conclusion, corruption, poor policy performance, and low trust in elected 
officials in the post-war period demonstrate that elected officials do not mirror the 
electorate’s opinions.  
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5 Elections 
An electoral system can be designed to create incentives and constraints so as to achieve 
particular outcomes (Reilly and Andrews 1998:191). Parliamentary elections have been 
held four times in post-war Lebanon: 1992, 1996, 2000, and 2005. Alliance making, vote 
pooling and bargaining have structured the election results (Salloukh 2006). Institutional 
structures such as sectarian distribution of seats, vote pooling and inter-sectarian 
alliances presumably lead to sectarian moderation and conflict management by causing 
the emergence of a multi-sectarian coalition at the centre of the political center 
(Horowitz cited in Ibid:641, 2002; Reynolds 2002; Reilly 2001). Analyzing the post-war 
period until 2000, Salloukh (2006) contends that inter-confessional alliances have 
produced flaws in accountability, representation and contestation, and lead to the 
election of sectarian rather than national politicians.    
 The chapter is divided into two main sections which assess accountability and 
representativeness respectively. The chapter starts by examining the nature of electoral 
alliances in post-war Lebanon. Analyzing the post-war parliamentary elections, this thesis 
finds that alliances are cross-ideological, short term and tactical, and have not lead to the 
election of more moderate politicians. Instead, the alliances have undermined 
accountability and representativeness. Second, the chapter analyses how alliances have 
resulted in the absence of competition within communities, reducing the potential for 
accountability. Third, the chapter analyses how vote pooling and alliances affect 
descriptive and substantive representativeness. For example, the electoral system has 
undermined the Christian community’s substantive representativeness in particular.  
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5.1 Prospects for Accountability 
5.1.1 Short Term, Tactical, and Cross-Ideological Alliances 
Post-war parliamentary elections in Lebanon are contested by inter-confessional alliances 
in multi-confessional electoral districts (Salloukh 2006). The various institutional 
determinants of the electoral laws of 1992, 1996, and 2000 structure the alliances. The 
nature of the alliances varies to a certain extent due to the sectarian distribution and 
political cleavages within the given electoral district (Ibid:640). Salloukh (2006) analyzes 
the 1992, 1996, and 2000 elections and finds that electoral candidates ally despite 
divisions over ideological and political issues, e.g. the roles of religion and the state in 
society, and social issues, economic development, and foreign policy (Ibid:640). First, the 
typical pattern in electoral districts with a clear demographic majority by a particular sect 
is cross-ideological alliances among the main confessional groups. Candidates from 
other sectarian groups are incorporated into the list to achieve the predetermined 
sectarian ratio. Second, in districts where the sectarian distribution is more equal, inter-
confessional alliances are formed in order to eliminate competition from rival lists. 
Third, districts dominated by one sect and one strong political leader create alliances 
formed by the leader, in which the remaining candidates from other confessions are 
picked and included into the lists.  
 In sum, electoral alliances in post-war Lebanon are generally short term, tactical 
and cross-ideological. The particular nature of the alliances has three main results. First, 
alliances result in the absence of competition. Second, cross-ideological alliances lack 
coherent and stable choices for the electorate. Third, the alliances have not led to 
moderation or accommodation. The consequences of alliance making thus undermine 
accountability. Lack of competition limits voters’ ability both to control and to influence 
politicians: without alternatives incumbents cannot be sanctioned; and representative 
agents cannot be selected. Below, the nature of alliance making in the post-war elections 
will be examined chronologically. 
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Post-War Parliamentary Elections 
The electoral law’s institutional determinants and Syrian influence lead to limited 
political competition in the 1992 elections (Al-Khazen 1998). The elections produced 
short term electoral alliances instead of durable political alliances as proposed by the 
moderate-focused incentivism approach. Tactical, short term alliances have favoured 
sectarian leaders and lead to a depoliticization of political life, exclusion of political 
forces, and lack of coherent political choices. In the South electoral district, Amal, 
Hezbollah, and Bahaya Hariri, Hariri’s sister, contested the elections together. The three 
political actors allied despite deep differences over numerous ideological and political 
issues, such as the role of religion in society, the appropriate strategy toward Israel, and 
the role of the state in society (Salloukh 2006). The alliance in the South excludes rival 
lists and candidates. One example is the case of Habib Sadek, a Sunni secular, heading 
the Council of Reconstruction in the South. Sadek had significant popular support at the 
time, but was eliminated by the alliance (Kassir 1997). That allied parties or groups in 
one electoral district may be competitors in another one, moreover, demonstrates the 
cross-ideological and apolitical character of the electoral alliances. For instance, in the 
Ba’alback-Hermel electoral district in the Beqa’, the Hezbollah-Amal alliance contested the 
elections alone (Salloukh 2006:642). In the North, an alliance was made between long 
time enemies Suleiman Franjieh and Omar Karami in order to exclude LF leader Samir 
Geagea from power. 
 Short term, tactical alliances without the potential for durable political 
compromise also characterized the 1996 elections. The Amal-Hezbollah alliance contested 
the elections in the South and in the Beqa’. In the Ba’abda-Aley electoral district Amal 
went against Hezbollah’s list together with Future, PSP, and the Maronite pro-Syrian 
politician Elie Hobeika. In Beirut, Hariri went against Hezbollah (Gebara 2006:646). 
There were several inter-confessional lists in the North electoral district.  
 The 2000 elections were dominated by Hariri’s increasing popularity. The 2000 
electoral law split Beirut into three districts (See Table 4). Hariri’s Dignity List contested 
the elections alone in two of the three Beirut districts (Lebanonwire [06.05.2008]). In the 
second district, Hariri and Hezbollah made an alliance. At first, Hariri intended to ally 
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with another Shiite candidate but withdrew the initial candidate from the list to allow for 
the victory of Hezbollah’s own candidate (Salloukh 2006:650). In return, Hezbollah voted 
for Bahaya Hariri in the South. Hence, mutual electoral gains motivated the alliance 
despite antagonistic relations and crucial disagreement over Hariri’s harmful neo-liberal 
policies affecting Hezbollah’s urban and rural constituencies and Hariri’s wish to deploy 
the Lebanese army along the Lebanese-Israeli borders. In the South, the alliance also 
included Amal, even though Hezbollah wanted to run alone in elections due to the party’s 
massive support after the end to Israeli occupation in 2000. However, the Syrian regime 
pressured Hezbollah to ally with Amal (Salloukh 2006:647). Throughout the post-war 
period, the Syrian regime sought to ensure some degree of intra-confessional 
competition as a strong sectarian leadership could challenge the Syrian regime’s position. 
In the Ba’albak-Hermel electoral district, pro-Syrian political actors Hezbollah, Amal, 
SSNP, Ba’ath Party, and pro-Syrian wing of Kata’ib allied despite different ideologies. 
 In the 2005 elections the electoral alliance between March 14 and the Hezbollah-
Amal axis demonstrates how the elite manipulate the electoral system to sustain their 
position. The electoral alliance that secured a majority in the 2005 elections did not 
correspond with the popular majority of the street that had expressed itself on March 14 
(Favier 2006:8). The electoral alliance excluded a large part of the Christian public 
supporting the FPM, who had participated in March 14 and called for an end to Syrian 
occupation. Cabinet Member Ahmad Fatfat from Future explained why March 14 chose 
to contest elections in alliance with Hezbollah:  
There is a problem within four electoral districts: Beirut, South-Beqa’, Ba’abda-Aley, and North-Beqa’. It was 
evident that we would lead electoral battles in all these regions, thus the electoral alliances had purely electoral 
interests. We said ‘fine’ we will not present ourselves at the elections in the North- and South-Beqa’ but will 
include a candidate from Hezbollah in the Hariri-list in Beirut. So we left the seat open. In exchange, Hezbollah 
will support us in Ba’abda. Hence, everyone gained from the alliance (2007 [Interview], my translation).  
 Moreover, discussions around the electoral law, whether to postpone the 
parliamentary elections and adopt a new electoral law or continue with the 2000 law, 
postponed the 2005 electoral campaign. The Christian community in particular suffered 
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from the 2000 law. Finally, Future, PSP, Amal, and Hezbollah agreed to go with the 
current law despite protests from the majority of the Christian leaders (Favier 2006:8–9). 
Thus, March 14 (Future, QSG, and the PSP, without FPM participation) struck an alliance 
with Hezbollah in several districts (Gebara 2006:9). The alliance resulted in practically no 
competition in any of the Beirut districts. In Mount Lebanon, FPM leader Aoun allied 
with his all-time political opponent and pro-Syrian candidate Suleiman Franjieh 
(Ibid:10).  
Table 6: Summary over Main Electoral Alliances Compared with Political Alliances 
Elections
* 
Pre-Electoral Alliances Political Alliances in Parliament 
1996 
 
• Amal-Hezbollah (South, 
Beqa’) 
• Hezbollah-Future-PSP-
Elie Hobeika (Mount 
Lebanon) 
• Hariri-Amal-Karami-Jumblatt-
Hezbollah-Armenian Bloc-
SSNP-Hrawi Bloc 
2000 • Hariri (Beirut 1) 
• Hariri-Hezbollah (Beirut 
2) 
• Amal-Hariri-Hezbollah 
(South) 
• Beirut Decision Bloc (Hariri)-
PSP-QSG-DR 
• Amal-Hezbollah-SSNP-Ba’th 
2005 
 
• Future-PSP-Amal-
Hezbollah (most/all 
districts) 
• Hezbollah-Amal-SSNP-Ba’th-
Kata’ib- (FPM) 
• FPM-Metn Bloc 
• PSP-Future-LF-QSG-DLM-
DR-Reform Kata’ib 
Source: Hudson (1999), Salloukh (2006), www.lebanonwire.com, Gebara (2006), Favier (2006), and 
interviews made with experts and politicians in Beirut, Lebanon, 2007.  
*Information of the 1992–1996 period is not included due to the inability to obtain reliable data. One 
possible explanation is that there were few stable alliance patterns in this period combined with a high 
number of non-partisans in parliament.  
 
 Deputies that I interviewed maintain that the Syrian regime constituted the main 
driving force behind alliance making in the 1992, 1996, and 2000 elections. The 2005 
elections were on the contrary held after the Syrian withdrawal. The 2005 observations 
may therefore separate the importance of the electoral system’s institutional 
determinants vis-à-vis the Syrian influence on alliance making. Syria was still a factor in 
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the 2005 elections, but not to the same extent as before 2005 when the regime 
intervened directly in forming alliances, by recruiting or vetoing particular candidates.  
 As we have seen, it was the electoral alliance between the sectarian leaders of 
Future, PSP, Amal, and Hezbollah, which secured their electoral victory in 2005. This 
alliance was not different from the alliances during the pre-Syrian order in terms of its 
tactical, short term, and cross-ideological nature. Thus, alliance making did not differ 
much from elections under the Syrian occupation in this regard. This supports the 
conclusion that the system contains incentives for tactical ends and manipulation by sectarian 
leaders.  Table 6 below demonstrates the differences in electoral alliances and 
parliamentary alliances in the post-war period.  
5.1.2 Absence of Competition, Coherent Alternatives, and Moderation 
This section discusses the three main consequences of vote pooling and alliance making 
more thoroughly in relation to agency problems and accountability. The main 
consequences are absence of competition, lack of coherent and stable choices, and non-
moderation. First, alliance making in the post-war period limits political competition and 
the contestatory aspect of elections (Salloukh 2006). In the 1992 elections, a record 
number of candidates won unopposed or with nominal competition (Al-Khazen 1998). 
Unopposed candidates are counted as candidates that face no rivals from the same sect 
in the electoral constituency. Candidates with nominal competition have opponents with 
no winning chance14. The total number of those unopposed, or with nominal 
competition, was 54, about 42 percent of the deputies. Competition is higher in smaller, 
more heterogeneous districts, like the electoral districts in Mount Lebanon. In contrast, 
in the South, the North, and the Beqa’, with larger multi-member constituencies and 
inter-confessional electoral alliances, the electoral alliances have been dubbed mahdala 
                                              
14 Opponents without chance of winning either lacked popular base or they were not part of a list. Thus, they had a tecnichal 
chance of winning although such candidates were picked by the authorities so that competition should seem greater (Al-Khazen 
1998) 
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(bulldozers) and busta (electoral buses) since 1995. The EU Election Observation 
Mission (2005:17) characterized the lists as “mere vehicles in which individual and 
sometimes rival political groups or figures ‘hop into’ in order to ‘crush’ all others and 
win the district’s entire seats”.  
 Absence of competition has undermined the vertical dimension of citizen 
control. The existence of alternatives conditions the possibility to sanction or select 
representative agents. Without real alternatives, voters’ capability of holding politicians 
accountable, either by sanctioning incumbents or selecting representative agents, is 
severely limited. Alliances are negotiated at elite level without much consideration for 
political actors’ popular support. This increases the gap between representatives and the 
people, and thus the possibility for agency loss. Elections may ensure accountability by 
reducing agency floss presuming officials want re-election (Manin et al. 1999). Yet in 
Lebanon, because of low competition a candidate’s electoral victory depends more on 
elites’ compiling of lists than voters’ opinions. Elections therefore induce electoral 
candidates to befriend the current elite to enter a list. 
 Second, cross-ideological alliances result in absence of coherent political 
alternatives. Political actors with different ideological stances and different opinions on 
several issues have allied in post-war Lebanon.  For instance, the Druze PSP leader 
Jumblatt has allied with the Hariris since the mid 90s. However, alongside Druzism15, 
the PSP’s ideological roots are found in socialism, while Harirism entails neo-liberal 
policies such as liberalization and privatization. Hariri’s fiscal and privatization policies 
have lead to greater disparities between rich and poor in Lebanon (Perthes 1997:17; 
Salloukh 2006:650). PSP deputy Wael Abou Faour (2007 [Interview 2007]) agreed that: 
                                              
15 Druzism is a strict monotheistic faith that belives in an esoteric (inner) interpretation of the Quran in addition to an exoteric 
(literal) interpretation (Swayd 1998). 
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[I]f the circumstances were different; if you wanted to talk about social equality or other things, maybe [the whole] 
alliance would collapse between us and Hariri. We have a very different position, our position on privatization is 
very different from all the others in the alliance [March 14].   
 Moreover, the alliances in one district often contradict the ones in other districts.  
The 1996 election in which Hariri contested Hezbollah in Beirut but allied with Hezbollah 
in the Beqa’ is an example. Or alliances may include both cabinet supporters and 
opponents. For instance, both pro- and anti-Syrian forces allied in 2005. In 1996, three 
out of four competing lists included cabinet supporters and opponents (EU EOM 
2005:17). Electoral alliances’ cross-ideological aspect thus hinders voters from choosing 
between coherent set of political actors and ideas. Coherent alternatives are an essential 
condition for the vertical dimension of citizen control. For instance, sanctioning 
incumbent elected representatives becomes impossible when the incumbents join their 
opponents on electoral lists. Albeit the tashtib (cross-out) practice allows citizens to vote 
only for certain candidates on the list, there are seldom other electoral candidates with 
realistic winning chances (Al-Khazen 1998).  
 Third, vote pooling and inter-confessional alliances have not produced durable 
political alliances between moderate politicians (Salloukh 2006). Horowitz (2002:23–24) 
contends that vote pooling promotes incentives for the emergence of durable inter-
sectarian coalitions of moderate politicians. In Lebanon, inter-confessional alliances 
rather demonstrate a lack of consistency between political discourse, the political stands, 
and alliances (EU EOM 2005:17). In other words, the alliances produce a gap between 
discourse and practice. Although sectarian leaders in multi-member constituencies 
change their discourse in order to attract voters from other confessions, the incentive for 
moderation ceases to exist after elections are held. 
 The alliances do not have the potential to promote long term national unity and 
moderation because they are short term in nature (Salloukh 2006:641). The electoral 
alliances end as soon as elections held, or even during elections, as the lists are not 
closed and may be subject to changes. The call for moderation therefore stops after 
elections are held. Closed lists, in contrast, force long term alliances (Salloukh 2007 
[Interview]). Political actors who ally on closed lists know that the whole list or none at 
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all get elected. Closed lists thus give stronger incentives for candidates to compromise 
on positions and issues before elections. Closed lists have greater potential for producing 
long term moderation that would also result in a change of practice.  
 Furthermore, the gap between discourse and practice increase information 
asymmetries between agents and principals.  Although a change from a sectarian 
discourse to a more moderate one may seem positive at first, “it distorts the political 
game” (Touma 2007 [Interview], my translation). In particular, the vote pooling system 
induces politicians to manipulate information and present themselves as more moderate 
to gain cross-confessional votes. Vote pooling therefore prevents the electorate from 
learning about electoral candidates’ real intentions and inter-confessional alliances may 
thus result in adverse selection. This problem concerns cross-confessional districts. 
There is more sectarian discourse in the few uni-confessional electoral districts in 
Lebanon. But as seen from the above, it is a superficial difference.  
5.1.3 Monopolization of the Muslim Communities 
Consociationalists argue that consociations can be democratic on the basis that 
democratic opposition within communities is not eliminated: “Nothing precludes intra-
bloc democratic competition, or the turnover of political elites, or shifts of support between parties” 
(O’Leary 2005:11, my italics).  This section, however, shows that the post-war period can 
be characterized by an absence of political competition within communities. One 
exception is the Christian community with multiple leaderships, although two main 
groups, FPM and LF, increasingly mobilize a significant part of the Christian electorate 
after 2005. This suggests a tendency of less fragmentation, albeit conclusions cannot be 
drawn yet. The Christian community is analyzed in the next section. This section 
analyzes the gradual monopolization of the Muslim communities in the post-war period. 
It concerns the Sunni, Druze communities, and to a certain extent the Shiite one (Favier 
2006). The development within the Sunni, Shiite, and Druze community will be 
described respectively, and then explained, below.  
 The Sunni community has gradually been monopolized by Hariri in the post-war 
period. Hariri faced competition up until the 2000 elections (Gebara 2007 [Interview]). 
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The Sunni community was diverse and it took time to consolidate Hariri’s political 
leadership (Salloukh 2007 [Interview]). Hariri was a self-made man and challenged the 
traditional Sunni elite, like Rashid Solh and Omar Karami. Volker Perthes (1997:19–20) 
labels the Hariri approach to post-war consolidation since he became Prime Minister in 
1992 as functional authoritarianism. The Hariri-project consisted of a strong emphasis on 
creating a friendly business climate and physical restoration, but also a strong element of 
authoritarianism that was not limited to the simple restoration of state functions after the 
war. Public demonstrations were banned, and many people with connections to 
oppositionals were arrested, and media pluralism was undermined.  
 In the late 1990s, Hariri took a more critical stance toward the Syrian regime 
(Ziadeh 2006:155). Hariri increasingly backed anti-Syrian Christian and Druze politicians 
although he did not make it public. The Syrian regime began to see Hariri as a threat 
before the 2000 elections. Although the Syrian regime gerrymandered elections to hinder 
Hariri from winning, Hariri’s Dignity List swept a landslide in Beirut and other Sunni 
strongholds (Gebara 2006:6). Hariri’s popular strength was severely miscalculated in the 
2000 elections. The death of the Syrian President Hafez al-Assad and the subsequent 
power struggle hindered equally strict control and monitoring of political life in Lebanon 
as earlier. Until 2000 monopoly tendencies within communities had been countered by 
the Syrian regime when monopoly was seen contrary to Syrian interests. Hariri was close 
to the Syrians before 1998 (Gambil and Abdelnour 2005), but he was at most condoned 
when he entered his second tenure (2000–2004). The assassination of Hariri in 2005 
increased the support to his son Saad Hariri who succeeded his father in a hereditary 
manner. Since 2005 Saad Hariri has enjoyed more support than his father.  
 The Shiite community has been represented by the Hezbollah-Amal axis in the 
post-war period (Favier 2006:11). This axis has been relatively stable in post-war 
Lebanon. The two compete among each other, but their alliance prevents other Shiite 
currents from appearing. Hezbollah ran in elections first time in 1992 and won the highest 
number of seats (See Appendix 3). It constituted the largest single parliamentary party 
bloc in 1992 (Harik 2004:1, 43–53). Hezbollah quickly adopted a pragmatic approach to 
“the typical Lebanese ‘get-the-seat’ mentality with ideology out of the window” (Salibi 
cited in Ibid:77). Rivalry between the two Shiite actors Amal and Hezbollah began in the 
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mid 80’s but Syria imposed rules that restricted competition in the Israeli occupied areas 
(Harik 2004:95, 151). Amal and Hezbollah were pressured to ally on lists in the South and 
the Beqa’. Competition was open for Shiite contenders only in Ba’abda, Beirut, and Jbeil. 
In the 2000 elections, the Hezbollah-Amal electoral list swept the Beqa’ and the South. 
Their status as the biggest parliamentary bloc remained with 9 seats (See Appendix 3). 
 Political leadership within the Druze community has historically been shared 
between two families, the Arslans and the Jumblatts. During the 1990s Jumblatt still 
faced challenges on traditional grounds by the Yazbaki faction (Arslans) (Hudson 1999). 
Yet, Walid Jumblatt has gradually strengthened his position since 2000. The 2005 
elections secured him as the Druze community’s uncontested leader (Favier 2006:11). 
The Druze have traditionally played a far more important role in Lebanon than to be 
expected from their demographic share. At the end of the 90s, however, Hudson (Ibid) 
claimed that their role appeared to be shrinking. However, Jumblatt’s alliance with Saad 
Hariri since 2005 reinstituted the important role that the Druze had in the system.  
 In post-war Lebanon, the absence of intra-group competition within the Sunni, 
Druze, and Shiite communities results from electoral alliances, plurality voting, and 
Syrian interference spoiling natural democratic competition. First, alliance making has 
contributed to sustain sectarian leaders. The electoral alliance between Future, Amal, 
Hezbollah, and PSP secured a victory of Hariri, Berri, Nasrallah, and Jumblatt (Favier 
2006). In particular, the 2005 elections consolidated Hariri’s and Jumblatt’s monopoly 
positions within the Sunni and Druze communities (Ibid:10). The Quadruple Alliance, 
including Hariri, Berri, Nasrallah, and Jumblatt, was made after the Syrian withdrawal. 
Hezbollah and Amal would give the other two parties a clear electoral majority in cabinet 
in exchange of an end to request the disarmament of Hezbollah. 
 Favier (2006:8, 10) claims that the 2005 elections constitute the end to pluralist 
leadership in Lebanon. The 2005 elections were different because voters did not use the 
tashtib (cross-out) practice. It is not uncommon that sectarian leaders appeal to citizens 
to vote for entire lists without making adjustments. Still, the tashtib practice has been 
rather common (Touma 2007 [Interview]). Voters’ behavior can be understood in the 
political context of the Cedar Revolution. The support to Hariri and March 14 was high. 
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Favier (2006:10, fn 19) argues that most deputies were elected because they belonged to 
a list put together by a sectarian leader and because citizens voted for entire lists. People 
thus followed Hariri’s appeal to vote for the entire list, “Zay ma heyya” [Ar. As she is] 
(Fatfat 2007 [Interview]).  
 Second, plurality voting has impeded pluralism within communities and 
contributed to monopolize communities. Plurality voting in multi-member districts has 
favoured the emergence of a single leadership within each sect. As Saad (2007 
[22.10.2007]) put it, the majority-vote system has “exclude[ed] political forces from 
parliamentary representation or [failed] to enable them to achieve such representation”. 
Various analysts, (e.g. Ibid; Salem 2006) argue that a strict PR system would end 
sectarian leaders’ monopoly and allow for new groups to enter parliament.  PR is 
therefore preferred over the Lebanese way of achieving proportionality through 
predetermination. With plurality voting in multi-member districts, each electoral 
candidate may win a seat from a plurality of the votes. All the other candidates get 
nothing although their share may not be far from the winners’ share. It therefore 
becomes very difficult for smaller groups, or groups with dispersed regional support, to 
be represented. In contrast, a PR system, in particular in one nation-wide district, 
produces better conditions for smaller groups. 
 My interview data shows that most political actors benefiting from plurality 
voting as of this writing (May 2008) do not wish to reform the electoral system. Cabinet 
member Ahmad Fatfat (2007 [Interview], my translation) recognized this: 
This is the core of the Lebanese problem (…). It is due to the majoritarian system. Since many years, I have 
fought for the proportional system, but it is contrary to the opinion of my movement [Future]. Within the Sunni 
community there is one bloc that controls everything; in the Shiite community there is one bloc that controls 
everything. In the Christian it is more diverse but not very much. (…) progressively the community is turning 
towards two blocs, the LF and Aoun. There exists a uniformity which is very dangerous due to the electoral 
system. For instance, you can win a region with 35percent. (…). The result is that there are no more people who 
present themselves for elections because it doesn’t matter anyway.  
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 Third, in all the post-war elections before 2005, the Syrian intelligence services 
have been an important factor in the compiling of electoral lists in order to create a 
subservient pro-Syrian clientele. The Syrian regime encouraged intra-confessional rivalry 
by a divide and rule strategy when it served Syrian interests. Other times the regime 
gained more by controlling conflict, such as within the Shiite community (Johnson 
2001:251). The Sunni and Druze leaderships were solidified because they did not face 
direct intervention from the Syrian regime after 2005.  
 Monopolization of communities challenges accountability on several 
accounts.The lack of democratic competition limits accountability according to a 
government accountability mode because voters cannot sanction incumbents (Powell 
2000). Voters’ ability to select representative agents according to an authorized 
representation mode is equally limited. Furthermore, monopoly increases power 
struggles among the elites, and communal fear increases the power of sectarian leaders. 
Consociational and integrative theory both argue that monopoly within segments is 
favorable to reduce sectarian conflict because sectarian leaders can compromise more 
easily (Lijphart 1977:25–26; Horowitz 2002:29). In Lebanon, monopolization of the 
Muslim communities has instead resulted in power struggles and increased sectarian 
tensions. Zahar (2007 [Interview]) and Salloukh (2007 [Interview]) argue that sectarian 
leaders’ monopoly positions allow them to control their communities by playing on 
sectarianism and fear. Belloni (cited in Roeder and Rotchild 2005:332) opines that “by 
fostering community isolation, mobilization, and a general feeling of insecurity, ethnic 
elites legitimize each other and maintain a tight grip on their constituencies. An 
increasing Sunni-Shiite rivalry has emerged in the post-war period (Richani 1998:136–
137).  
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5.2 Prospects for Representativeness 
5.2.1 Lack of Substantive Representation of the Christian Community 
The Ta’if Agreement prescribes parity of representation (5:5) between Christians and 
Muslims in parliament even though this does not correspond with actual population 
figures that indicate that the share of Christians to Muslims is around 3–4:6–7 (See Table 
2). Christians are overrepresented whereas Muslims are underrepresented. Nevertheless, 
the Christian community has faced marginalization and a crisis of representativeness in 
the post-war years. Boycott of the parliamentary elections and low electoral turn out 
reflect the community’s dissatisfaction over the electoral laws. Vote pooling, electoral 
alliances, and Syrian interference have undermined substantive representativeness.  
 The structure of segments conditions substantive representativeness. Decohesion 
within one community may exclude some groups from political power (Lijphart 1977). 
Multiple Christian leaderships have contributed to the lack of substantive 
representativeness. The absence of a strong Christian leader weakens Christians’ position 
within the system vis-à-vis powerful Sunni, Druze, and Shiite leaders. Yet, in a broader, 
national perspective, the intra-Christian fissure may also contribute to a process of 
deconfessionalization and democratization of political life (Khoury 2007). Post-war 
developments will be analyzed below with regard to the Christian community. The 
analysis shows that vote pooling, recruitment structures, and Syrian interference 
undermined substantive representativeness. Finally, the section discusses the relation 
between descriptive and substantive representativeness.  
 
Post-War Developments 
The fragmentation of the Christian community peaked in the last war years and during 
the negotiation of the Ta’if agreement. Electing President Amine Gemayel’s successor 
was attempted in 1988 but the local and regional power configuration undermined an 
orderly transfer of power (Al-Khazen 1998). Gemayel opposed transfer of power, and 
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the two other leading Christian figures – the head of the Army, Aoun, and the leader of 
the LF, Samir Geagea – rejected the US-Syrian imposed candidacy of Mikhail Daher. 
The fragmented state into two de facto governments: one headed by Aoun and another 
by Selim Hoss. The negotiation of the Ta’if Agreement, the 1992 elections, and the 
Ta’if’s Agreement faulted implementation split the Christian community into various 
positions (Ibid). The negotiation of the Ta’if Agreement split the Christian community 
into supporters (Kata’ib, LF, and the Patriarch) and opponents (Aoun). The partial 
implementation alienated the Christian groups who participated in its making. The 1992 
parliamentary elections elicited widespread opposition and boycott based on several 
objections. First, Christian groups rejected the 1992 electoral law because of substantial 
gerrymandering that marginalized their vote. A significant part of the Christian elite 
argued that their share of political power was unacceptable (Perthes 1997:20, 21, fn 13; 
Karamé [Interview]). This concerned the LF, National Liberal Party, and Opposition Kata’ib. 
Second, the problem of displaced Christians16 after the war was not sorted out. The 
electoral law stipulates that citizens must vote in their home district. Displaced 
Christians were therefore not able to vote. Third, the Christian groups objected the 
selective disarming of militia groups in which Hezbollah remained with a military wing.  
 The boycott and low electoral turn-out in the 1992 parliamentary elections 
decreased the representativeness and the legitimacy of the election results. In Beirut, only 
1.6 percent of the Maronites cast their votes, while 30 percent of the Sunnis did so 
(Gebara 2006). The turn-out rate for the totality of the sects was low, 30 percent, 
compared with a pre-war average around 50 percent (Al-Khazen 1998). Al-Khazen 
(1993:62) holds that the 1992 parliamentary elections “produced the least representative 
parliament since independence, had the lowest voter turnout, and brought to office the 
largest number of unopposed candidates in the history of Lebanon’s parliamentary 
elections.”  
                                              
16 70 percent out of nearly half a million displaced persons after the war are Christians (Al-Khazen 2001). 
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 Boycott was repeated again in the 1996 elections. Albeit the electoral turnout was 
higher than in 1992 it was still low (Gebara 2006:4). In Beirut only 17 percent of the 
Maronites voted compared to 40 percent of the Sunnis. Consequently, the Christian 
boycott and the low electoral turnout resulting from opposition to the electoral law have 
challenged a fair substantive representation of the Christian community.  
 In the 2000 and 2005 elections, all major Christian political groups participated. 
However, according to many Christians, they were still unable to have a meaningful share 
in the parliament (EU EOM 2005:18–19). The vote pooling system has contributed to 
widespread opposition by Christian leaders and the so-called ‘Christian frustration’ (al-
ihbat al-masihi). Vote pooling has lead to inter-confessional alliances in multi-member 
constituencies with politicians depending on votes from a cross-confessional electorate 
(Horowitz 2002).  In theory, both Muslim and Christian politicians should be elected by 
a cross-segmental electorate. But in practice, many Christian deputies are elected by a 
Muslim majority electorate, and few Muslim deputies are elected by a Christian majority 
electorate. This is caused by the constituency structure, district magnitude, and the lower 
demographic share of Christian.  Boycott and the displacement issue further decreased 
the number of Christian votes. 
 For instance, 23 Christian deputies were elected by Muslims, i.e. 36 per cent of 
the Christian deputies in the 1992 elections (Al-Khazen 1998). In all the post-war 
elections, Christian deputies in the South electoral district(s) were elected by a Muslim 
majority because the number of Muslim votes exceeds Christian ones. In 1992 there 
were almost four times as many Muslim voters as Christian ones (397,017 against 
107,793) only in 1992 (Al-Khazen 1998). The four Christian deputies in Jezzine and the 
one in Zahrani have been elected by a predominantly Muslim electorate in the post-war 
period. In the North, the two Maronite deputies in Bsherri are elected in the same 
manner. According to Ziadeh (2006:143), the votes of the Sunnis decide the election of 
the Armenian, Maronite, and Orthodox deputies in Beirut (See Table 4). 
 In comparison, the influence of Christian voters was decisive for only three 
Muslim deputies of all the electoral districts in the 1992 elections. This effect of the 
87  
electoral system is conceived and experienced as a major injustice (ghubn) by the 
Christian community, and has lead to a feeling of non-representation (Ziadeh 2006:154). 
 In addition to the structural determinants, alliance making and the composition 
of electoral lists have contributed to the lack of substantive representation of the 
Christian community. Elias Karamé (2007 [Interview], my translation) from the 
Opposition Kata’ib expressed that:  
[The electoral law] excludes the Christians. The Christians couldn’t elect their deputies; they were influenced by 
the Muslim majority. In certain regions they [the Muslims] installed the Christians by themselves, like in Mount 
Lebanon. Thus, there are people who are eliminated automatically: in Ashrafie [Electoral district in Beirut] it 
was Hariri who nominated the deputies; in the South they were nominated by Hezbollah. This, we could not 
accept. 
 Karamé mentions sectarian leaders’ role in the compiling of lists. As we have 
seen, many electoral districts with a Muslim majority have so-called ‘bulldozer lists’ 
sweeping all the seats. Sectarian elites often compile the lists without considering the 
popular base of the Christian candidates. Kiwan (2007 [Interview, my translation] 
concurs that sectarian leaders’ role in compiling the lists is problematic:  
[W]hat is even more troublesome [than the fact that Christian deputies are elected by a Muslim electorate] is that 
many of the Christian deputies are chosen by Muslim leaders. Hence, it is not even the Muslim electorate who has 
expressed herself, but the Muslim leaders who have decided to include x, y, z Christian candidates. 
 Additionally, the Syrian regime sought to marginalize anti-Syrian politicians by 
including pro-Syrian electoral candidates on electoral lists prior to 2005. The Syrian 
intelligence services inserted pro-Syrian candidates into the lists. These deputies were not 
representative of the Christians in the post-war years.  
 Hence, vote pooling, recruitment structures, and Syrian interference have 
undermined substantive representativeness. Parts of the Christian community feel that 
they have been deprived of electing representatives mirroring their views and opinions. 
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This is an adverse selection problem and has widened the gap between the Christian 
elites in power and the Christian electorate. Although Christians are overrepresented, it 
has not increased the substantive representation of the Christian community, but rather 
the contrary.  
 
Descriptive versus Substantive Representation  
The question of sectarian representation is highly controversial in Lebanon and is also 
reflected in the Ta’if Agreement’s inherent contradictions. The issue has several aspects. 
On one hand, several leading Christian figures, the Patriarch and the QSG among others, 
insist upon equitable political representation (sihat al-tamthil al-siyasi) (Salloukh 2006:653). 
They insist upon the middle-size electoral districts (aqdya) ranging from three to six seats 
instead of larger districts (mohafazat) with a numerical Muslim dominance (Salloukh 
2005:30; Knudsen 2005:9)17. The Patriarch argues that smaller electoral districts create a 
more balanced representation (L’Orient-Le Jour [05.03.08]). If the districts are reduced 
in size, more districts will become uni-confessional. In uni-confessional districts, 
Christians would elect Christians and Muslims would elect Muslims. Yet, many Muslims 
claim that the adoption of small electoral districts violates the spirit of the Ta’if 
Agreement (As-Safir [05.03.08]). Ta’if’s spirit entails that a deputy should be elected by 
both communities. However, the conceptualization of the mandate of the Lebanese 
deputy is ambivalent (Kiwan 2007 [Interview]). The Constitution stipulates that the 
deputy represents the nation and not his community only, but it is unclear whether a 
deputy is legitimate if the community prefers another candidate (Ibid).   
  Moreover, it has been argued that the Christian call for equitable sectarian 
representation may contradict the principle of mutual coexistence (al-aysh al-moushtarak) 
                                              
17 The Ta’if Agreement stipulates that elections should take place on the basis of the mohafaza (region pl. mohafazat). Yet, it also 
stipulates that Lebanon should undergo an administrative reform and redraw the lines of the current mohafazat (Ta’if 
Agreement found in Ziadeh (2006) Appendix L: Article 1.2. أ.4 )  
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as voting will take place along confessional lines only (Salloukh 2005). The call for 
equitable sectarian representation entails keeping parity between Christians and Muslims, 
and that Christian voters mainly should choose Christian representatives. On one hand, 
voting along pure confessional lines may harden sectarian identity (Horowitz 1985, 2002; 
Reynolds 2002, Roeder and Rotchild 2005). On the other hand, sectarian identity may be 
conceived as a more stable feature of plural societies, unchangeable through electoral 
engineering (Lijphart 1977; O’Leary 2005). Both experts and politicians assert in my 
interviews that inter-confessional alliances may have “advantages in terms of preventing 
the breakdown of the system in terms of narrow confessional lines” (Zahar 2007 
[Interview]). Muslim politicians also voiced concern over the possible consequences of 
adopting the qada as electoral district, arguing that it will “push us back” and that 
politicians will “become more extremist” in absence of having to appeal across group 
lines (Yaber 2007 [Interview]). However, as we have seen, open list systems and short 
term alliances do not have the potential for conflict management and moderation. 
Because the system does not produce long term, sustainable moderation, the reasons for 
adopting vote pooling are in doubt.  
 Additionally, Muslims find it hard to accept the underrepresentation of their 
community. Underrepresentation has contributed to the partly radicalization of the 
Shiite community because they feel underprivileged. The empirical findings therefore 
concur with O’Leary’s (2005:725) argument that overrepresentation of minorities 
combined with veto rights is problematic to majorities and affects democratic stability in 
a negative way.  The Muslim community in Lebanon expresses its dissatisfaction with 
the descriptive representation of their community. The Muslim communities have 
responded to the Christian call for equitable representation arguing that the Christian 
community must choose between a representation that reflects the actual size of the 
communities and a continuation of the vote pooling system. Yet, Christians claim that 
their demographic share equal the Muslim one if Lebanese citizens abroad were allowed 
to vote. The Lebanese population residing abroad, holding a Lebanese citizenship, is 
significant. Rubeiz (2005) maintains that Christians constitute a majority of the Lebanese 
diaspora. Inclusion of Lebanese citizens living abroad would thus be a determining 
factor of the demos.  
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 The analysis shows that both Muslims and Christians have felt underprivileged in 
the post-war period. It seems pertinent to conclude that overrepresentation of minorities 
does not necessitate substantive representativeness and is also problematic because it 
follows that another segment is underrepresented. Overrepresentation deviates from the 
criterion of representativeness (O’Leary 2003:725). Other mechanisms to ensure 
minority protection, such as predetermined posts in the executive and/or mutual veto, 
seem more appropriate.  
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6 Political Parties  
Political parties are intended to ensure an organizational framework for the holding of 
elections (Powell 2000:4). In the absence of such a framework, citizens would not be 
able to effectively use elections as instruments of accountability or representativeness. 
Political parties in Lebanon have been active since the formation of the state in the early 
1920s (Al-Khazen 2003:605), but have played a minor role historically (Suleiman 
1967:685). Parties first began to campaign seriously for parliamentary office in 1960 and 
1964. The important political agents in society were feudal lords, sect, clan, or family 
leaders instead. The traits and organization of political leadership varied according to 
community and region (Johnson 2001:25). In the rural areas, political leaders (Ar. zu’ama) 
were feudal lords and their legitimacy stemmed from family genealogies whereas in the 
urban areas the zu’ama came from notable merchant families of more recent ascension.  
Political parties in post-war Lebanon are still institutionally and ideologically weak. 
Rabinovich (cited in Melhem 1996) contends that the Lebanese consociational system 
hinders the development of political parties. 
 The chapter is divided into two main parts that assess accountability and 
representativeness respectively. The chapter starts by investigating the reasons for the 
lack of partisan politics in Lebanon and argues that the open list system constitutes the 
main cause. Second, it examines internal party democracy and lack thereof within 
political parties and groups. Third, the chapter assesses voter-politician linkages 
concerning the prospects of an accountability-oriented culture. The chapter then 
analyzes recruitment structures. Finally, it analyzes the non-aggregation of national and 
secular interests. It concludes that shortcomings in political parties have undermined 
prospects of accountability and representativeness.  
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6.1 Prospects for Accountability 
6.1.1 Individuals over Platforms18  
Political parties serve to link citizens to policy makers and individual candidates to 
collective policy commitment (Powell 2000:4). Thus they are paramount for the 
organizing of political participation of social groups (Huntington 1968). In contrast, 
Lebanon lacks a multi-party system similar to those found in functioning democracies 
(Al-Khazen 2003:605). The political process concentrates in party-based politics and 
non-partisan politics. Political parties’ influence was slightly rising after independence. 
Yet, political parties transformed into militias during the war19, but reverted to their 
party status in 1992. The number of partisans versus non-partisans was at its peak in 
1972, but their share of seats in Parliament gradually declined in the post-war period. 
Table 7 shows partisans and non-partisans in elections from 1972 until 2005. The Table 
shows a low share of partisans, albeit the 2005 share shows a rise. The next elections can 
show if this is a more persistent trend.  
 The minor role played by political parties in the post-war period results from 
institutional and social structures. The confessional system in general and the electoral 
system in particular, favour the importance of non-partisans over partisan candidates. 
First, the role played by electoral alliances/lists has been an important factor 
contributing to the situation of weak political parties (Knudsen 2005:8). The importance 
of electoral lists for electoral victory creates incentives for candidates to be affiliated with 
lists instead of political parties. Post-war electoral lists have been compiled by powerful 
sectarian leaders and by the Syrian regime until 2005. Non-partisan politics is favored 
because non-partisans can be included into various lists. Second, citizens vote for 
individual candidates and not for political parties on the electoral lists. Again non-
                                              
18 I owe this expression to Paul Salem (2007 [Interview]). 
19 The political parties all turned into militias with one exception, the National Bloc Party. 
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partisans may easily be included into several lists. As electoral lists are open, candidates 
run individually and each candidate’s total vote number determines electoral victory. 
This means that the candidates on the list are not tied together by a political program. As 
seen in the preceding chapter, the electoral lists entail tactical, short term alliances, often 
cross-ideological, and dissolve after the elections. Closed lists, in contrast, create 
incentives for more long term cooperation on the basis of a political program. 
Therefore, the open list system especially contributes to weaken political parties.  
Table 7:  Non-partisans in Parliament 1972–2005 
 1972 1992 1996 2000 2005 
Non-
partisans 
78 95 96 97 85 
Partisans 31 33 32 31 43 
Total Seats in 
Parliament 
99 128 128 128 128 
Percentage 
Partisans 
31.31 25.78 25 24.21 33.5 
Source: Based on Al-Khazen (2003) and Itani (2007).  
 Modern political parties link individual candidates to collective policy commitment 
(Powell 2000:4). Collective policy commitments, normally through political programs, 
are crucial to provide citizens with coherent choices. In Lebanon, citizens are not 
provided with coherent and stable choices because of non-partisan politics. Non-
partisans are not tied to any political party or program, but most are affiliated with a 
parliamentary bloc. Still, there is no bloc law in parliament determining the bloc’s legality 
(Salem 2007 [Interview]). Non-partisans are thus not legally bound to vote with the bloc. 
The non-partisans that I interviewed told that in principle they can vote as they wish, 
and that they have voted against their blocs in some instances. Yet, keeping the bloc’s 
unity is the normal procedure.  
 Lack of clear and organized alternatives to incumbents weakens citizen control by 
limiting voters’ ability to learn about their alternative agents’ policy preferences. 
Knowledge of how agents will act during negotiations and in policy making is important 
for voters’ selecting of representative agents. Knowledge is equally important if the 
target of voting is a collective government.  
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Following the idea of Schmitter (2001), non-partisan politics may obstruct the formation 
of cabinets as elections may not give an indication of which political groups should be 
included in the government. In an authorized representation mode, however, focus will 
be on selecting various representative agents, not a collective cabinet (Powell 2000). 
Hence, the post-war electoral system – through the open list system and alliance making 
– has contributed to weaken an important institutional mechanism to ensure 
accountability.  
6.1.2 Political Parties as the Personal Expression of Leaders20 
This section takes a closer look at the internal structure of political parties and how it 
affects accountability. Political parties’ internal structure can be cardinal for 
accountability. Internal party democracy can hold party leaders accountable because they 
are subject to internal elections (Katz 2006:35–36; Sisk 2001:132). Internal party 
democracy can therefore reduce agency floss. Analyzing political parties in pre-war 
Lebanon, Al-Khazen (2003:606) remarks that the absence of internal democratic practice 
characterizes parties and that “the internal organization, belief-system, and power 
structure of parties [were] not conducive to democratic practice, transparency, and 
accountability.” My findings concur with this picture. Interview data shows that political 
and/or sectarian leaders centralize and individualize decision making. Leaders may 
consult with a small decision-making group, but the leader controls the ultimate 
decision. This description was confirmed by my expert interviews. Below are some 
descriptions of the structure and decision making process within some Lebanese political 
groups: 
“Theoretically speaking, it is the political bureau. Practically, they are not made in the political bureau. 
Practically, we have a small decision making center, Jumblatt [PSP leader], the ministers, and some of the MPs 
                                              
20 I owe this expression to Zahar 2007 [Interview]. 
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that work daily with Jumblatt […]. [W]atever he decides, he does after consulting this decision-making center. 
But of course he is the main decision maker – the real decision maker.”  [Wael Abou Faour, Deputy, PSP]  
“The same thing takes place in each community – there is one person who takes the decision, Jumblatt, Hariri 
[Future leader]… It is not a democratic system in which every one participates […]. [T]his is valid for all the 
political parties, although maybe a little less with Jumblatt, that sometimes, the deputies are not informed about 
decisions, and must learn about them in the press.” [Ahmad Fatfat, Minister, Future, my italics] 
“We have a board of consultants. There is […] being formed down […] a kind of political bureau.  Decisions 
will be taken there, but obviously the leader of the majority, Saad Hariri, will have a major share.” [Ghattas 
Khoury, former Deputy, Future] 
“[We have elections] within the party and they are direct [elections]. There are no delegates – wherever the 
member finds himself, even abroad – can vote, through what we call a plenary session. We have a very well-
organized system.” Elias Atallah, Deputy and DLM leader] 
 “We don’t want it [Lebanese Option] as a party. We want it to be loose. We want to absorb many Shi'a 
figures. It’s a gathering. (…). No, [we don’t have a political program]. We are independent. We are self-
sufficient. We are for creating a Lebanese state that belongs to the families of their country.” [Ahmad Al-Assad, 
LO leader] 
 Party leaders dominate decision making within most Lebanese political groups. 
“Party democracy will depend on whether activists have information on leader’s 
strategies and policies, can monitor their performance, and can reelect or dismiss them 
accordingly” (Marvall 1999:165). The fact that deputies sometimes are informed about 
party leaders’ decisions in the press show a severe lack of internal party democracy. 
When party members cannot monitor their leader’s activities, risks for moral hazard 
increase. In turn, citizen capacity to control politicians will suffer (Ibid:166). Instead of 
ensuring openness to political process, and an arena to promote opinions and influence, 
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political groups reinforce political leaders’ power. Interestingly enough, the new Shiite 
movement, LO, does not express a more democratic viewpoint on internal party 
democracy, and rather seem to wish to reinforce the traditional power structures related 
to familism. 
 However, the various parties certainly differ in their internal structure and 
decision making, compare for instance the decision making within DLM and Future 
reported above. The institutional structure and historical setting affect party leaders’ 
behavior and party strategies (van Biezen 2003:15–16). Political conduct and institutional 
structure are thus intertwined. In fact, many political groups in Lebanon have adopted 
recognizable structures of a political party, such as internal elections of the leadership 
and political bureaus. Examples are Kata’ib, NLP, LF, LCP, PSP, SSNP, Amal, and 
Hezbollah. However, the personality cult of political leaders characterizes political groups 
in Lebanon (Al-Khazen 2003). Thus, albeit “democratic institutions” may be present, 
these are not very effective due to a culture that values personalized political leadership.  
 Some political actors occupying elected office are not organized as political 
parties, but rather as movements or gatherings. Al-Khazen (2003:621–622) asserts that 
new forms of political organization emerged due to the Syrian regime’s repressive 
politics on political parties. Political parties, such as the NLP, Kata’ib, and the Free 
National Current (FNC), were systematically targeted. LF was banned, the LCP and the 
NB were allowed to operate, but were not allowed any representation (Ibid:613). The 
new movements or gatherings have tended to be broad-based and non-confessional, 
regrouping various actors such as politicians, non-partisans, political parties, business 
people, lawyers, academics, social activists, and journalists. Some of the movements have 
gained political representation such as the Democratic Renewal Movement (DRM) led by 
Nassib Lahoud, and the Qurnet Shehwan Gathering (QSG) led by the Maronite Patriarch 
Sfeir. Other movements have tried to influence the political system from the outside, 
such as the Democratic Forum led by Habib Sadiq and National Gathering for Salvation and 
Change led by Najah Wakim.  
 Consequently, the lines between political parties and movements in Lebanon are 
blurry. Huckshorn’s (cited in White 2006:5) defines a political party as “an autonomous 
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group of citizens having the purpose of making nominations and contesting elections in 
hope of gaining control over governmental power through the capture of public offices 
and the organization of the government”. Because the definition focuses on the 
objective of political organization, it would therefore include the looser gatherings in 
Lebanon. However, to have a consolidating effect on democracy, a political party should 
also have an organizational aspect. It should be “an institutionalized coalition, one that has 
adopted rules, norms, and procedures” (Aldrich cited in Ibid:6, my italics).  
 Some of the most important political groups in the post-war are Hezbollah, FPM, 
LF, and Future. These groups were new in the post-war period. Hezbollah and LF were 
established during the war as militias, but are new as political parties or groups 
contesting elections. These forces mobilize a significant portion of the population: 
Hezbollah within the Shiite community, Future in the Sunni community, and the FPM 
and the LF constitute the two main contenders within the Christian community (See 
Appendix 3 and 4). Kiwan (1994:57–72) claims that the post-Ta’if groups have adopted 
the same behavior as the pre-war political groups. According to Kiwan (2007 
[Interview]), personalized, instead of institutionalized relations characterize these political 
groups. Their relations to voters are local and communitarian, rather than national. 
Hezbollah stands out from the other new political forces with a high level of 
institutionalized relations, albeit the party’s relations to the electorate are still local, 
personal, and communitarian. Future has been a rather loose association but is now in the 
process of turning into an official political party (Arab Media Watch [24.3.08]).  
 Thus, the lines between parties, groups, and gatherings are blurry. Political groups 
lack internal party democracy and leaders dominate decision making. Lack of 
institutionalized relations and internal party democracy contribute to undermine 
accountability.  
6.1.3 The Elected Representative as a Social Intercessor 
The nature of voter-politician linkages affects the opportunity for citizen control and 
accountability (Powell 2000). Because some linkages may produce a non-accountability 
oriented culture, these are important to assess. This section shows that voter-politican 
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linkages in Lebanon are influenced by clientelism, honor, and personalismo or 
charismatic authority.  
 My interview data shows that the deputy role is primarily perceived and 
experienced as a social intercessor. Providing social services to their respective 
constituencies was stated as one of the most important responsibilities by deputies. One 
deputy named this a social or administrative function (2007 [Interview]). The deputy 
functions as a social intercessor between the citizens and the state. My findings further 
show that a majority of the deputies have their own offices where citizens can meet and 
receive help on numerous issues. Moreover, deputies often establish NGOs, clubs, and 
etc. parallel to their political careers in order to serve their constituents, or in some cases, 
clients.  
 The role of the representative as a social intercessor is related to the term wasta. 
Wasta in a broad meaning refers to the goods and services obtained through informal 
patron-client networks (Huxley cited in Knudsen 2005:3). In weak states, wasta is 
prominent as a means to obtain benefits from government (Cunningham & Sarayrah 
1993:1). In Lebanon, the consociational system has maintained and reinforced the 
traditional wasta-mechanism. The citizen does not have direct access to the state but 
needs his deputy as a mediator. The consociational system creates a middle level between 
the citizen and the state in which the citizen relate only to the state through his 
community only. The sectarian distribution of seats within the executive, legislature, and 
state administration hinders free access to the state.  
 Clientelistic accountability thus characterizes voter-politician linkages in Lebanon. 
According to Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007:4) in clientelistic societies where elections 
have been introduced, clients may gain more leverage in bargaining. In Lebanon, 
however, competition is limited in many electoral districts. Hence, elections strengthen 
the patron over the client rather than vice versa. Ziadeh (2006:146–147) claims that the 
“Lebanese citizen (…) has the choice either to succumb to becoming a political client to 
his communal representative or to emigrate.” The poor economic situation in the post-
war period increases clientelistic linkages. There are great socio-economic and regional 
differences (Safi 2003:58). Salloukh 2007 [Interview] maintains that the country’s poor 
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economic situation has strengthened leaders’ positions, claiming that “[w]hen people are 
so poor; you can get anyone to vote for you”. The combination of limited electoral 
competition and a poor economic situation sustains the system’s clientelistic features.  
 Non-strategic relations also characterize voter-politician linkages. Honor, 
personalism, and charismatic authority, instead of political programs and ideas, partly 
determine political support. Historically, political leadership in Lebanon was associated 
with honor (Johnson 2001; Sharibi 1988). Inherited honor is still crucial in order to 
legitimate leadership by certain families, e.g. the Hariris and the Jumblatts. Linkages are 
based upon personalism: “the tendency of the politically active sectors of the population to 
follow or oppose a leader for personal, individual and family reasons, rather than 
because of the influence of a political idea, program, or party” (Suleiman 1967:686). 
Sharabi (1988:46) holds that citizens in Lebanon are “socialized into accepting the 
supremacy of the sectarian and communal leaders”. My expert interviews suggest that 
voter-politician relationships are a relation between leaders and followers. Most voter-
politician relations are characterized by aspects of honor, personalism, like Hariri of the 
Future and Jumblatt of the PSP. It is pertinent to argue that Hezbollah voters relate to the 
party on the basis of charismatic leadership in many ways. Following the idea of Diana 
Kendall (2002:375), Hassan Nasrallah’s power is “legitimized on the basis of a leader's 
exceptional personal qualities or the demonstration of extraordinary insight and 
accomplishment, which inspire loyalty and obedience from followers”.  
 Voter-politician linkages based on clientelism change the principal-agent 
interaction because voters select certain representatives due to provision of services. 
Linkages based on honor, personalism, and charismatic authority elections are not part 
of an agency relationship. Elections do not serve to hold elected representatives 
accountable but corresponds to Fearon’s (1999:57–58) idea of “elections with no 
expectation of accountability”. Consequently, this contributes to undermine political 
parties and increase individual leadership.  
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6.2 Prospects for Representativeness 
6.2.1 Recruitment Structures Restrict Voters’ Options  
Modern political parties are essential in structuring political competition through 
nominating candidates for political office (Schmitter 2001:74–76).   Recruitment 
structures determine political options, and thus affect substantive representativeness. In 
post-war Lebanon, recruitment to political office has been taken care of by sectarian 
leaders and the Syrian regime (Sallouk 2006, 2007). Electoral candidates are recruited on 
the basis of family, profession, or political party.   Positions are often ‘inherited’ (Salem 
2007 [Interview]). A look at the names of presidents, prime ministers, deputies, and 
cabinet members confirm that the same family names recur (Ziadeh 2006:146). Yet, 
every aspirant to political office needs to establish good relations with a ‘za’im’. All of the 
interviewed deputies and cabinet members were nominated after establishing a close 
relation to a za’im. As Marie-Joëlle Zahar (2007 [Interview]) put it, “you need to get 
under the wing of a za’im”. My findings therefore concur with studies of recruitment 
structures in the pre-war time (e.g. Harik 1975). That a few leaders only determine which 
candidates are to be on the electoral lists may result in an adverse selection problem. 
Lack of political competition, moreover, increases adverse selection problems. In effect, 
voters have little effective choice over candidates.  
6.2.2 Non-Aggregation of National and Secular Interests 
Aggregating interests is a fundamental function of modern political parties (Schmitter 
2001:81–84). Aggregating the electorate’s interests is cardinal for substantive 
representativeness. Political parties should aggregate interests from a local to a national 
level. Two main aspects explain the non-aggregation of national interests by political 
parties in Lebanon. First, non-partisan politics impede the aggregation of national 
interests. When elected representatives are not attached to a political program with 
national objectives, they tend to stress local and particular interests over national ones. 
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In order to execute national objectives, individuals must commit to a collective policy 
commitment. Without a party framework, individuals cannot execute national policies.  
 Second, the predominance of sectarian parties prevents the aggregation of 
national interests. Critics of consociationalism opine that consociations only succeed in 
aggregating the sectarian interests on the expense of national interests, class, and 
socioeconomics (Ghai 2002; Horowitz 1985; Richani 1998). On one hand, proponents 
of integrative dynamics (e.g. Horowitz 1985) hold that consociations create incentives 
for the emergence of sectarian political parties. In particular, it is opined that sectarian 
distribution of seats in the legislature and state administration hardens sectarian identity. On 
the other hand, proponents of consociationalism (e.g. Lijphart 1977; Hanf 1993) 
maintain that the emergence of sectarian parties in consociations result from the societal 
structure of plural societies, and not the institutional structure, because they conceive 
sectarian identity as primordial or relatively immutable. According to Richani (1998:4) 
sectarian parties can become manifestations of sectarian conflict and delink citizens from 
the state. The remainder of the section discusses why secular political parties in Lebanon 
are poorly represented.  
 Political forces in Lebanon have tended to reflect the communal nature of society 
(Al-Khazen 2003:606). Secular parties have failed to get a substantial share of political 
representation in the post-war period. The secularizing trend that existed prior to 1975 
was reversed by the outbreak of the war (Richani 1988:122). Secular parties in the pre-
war period included the Lebanese Communist Party (LCP), Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), 
Ba’th Party (Ba’th), Syrian Social National Party (SSNP), Organization of Communist Work 
(OCW), and the Popular Democratic Party (PDP). In the post-war years, Democratic Left 
Movement (DLM) and Democratic Renewal (DR) have emerged as secular political forces. 
Sectarian parties can be defined as “those groups that recruit mainly from one sect or 
religion” (Ibid:120). Several parties in Lebanon whose voter bases are predominantly 
sectarian define themselves as secular, as opposed to religious parties such as Hezbollah. 
For the purpose of this thesis, I will adopt the former understanding of secular parties. 
Table 8 shows secular political forces’ representation in Lebanon 1972–2005.  
102 Political Parties 
Table 8:  Representation of Secular Political Forces 1972–2005 
Political Force 1972 1992 1996 2000 2005 
LCP - - - - - 
Ba’th 1 2 2 3 1 
SSNP - 6 5 4 2 
PSP* 5 3 (3) (4) (8) 
OCW - - - - - 
PDP - - - - - 
Pro-Iraqi Ba’th - - - - - 
DLM - - - - 1 
DR - - - - 1 
Total 6 11 7 7 5 
Source: Al-Khazen (2003) and Itani (2007) 
*PSP became a predominantly Druze party between 1992 and 1996.  
 
 Secular political forces have been disfavored by several factors in the post-war 
period that relate to the consociational system’s institutional determinants and the social 
structure of society (Richani 1998:135–136). This thesis argues that three main factors 
have resulted in the weak representation of secular forces in the post-war period: 
particular features of the consociational electoral system, the confessional structure of 
society, and the role played by the Syrian regime in Lebanese politics. However, although 
other factors than the consociational system are hence significant – confessionalism was 
reinforced and the Syrian role was facilitated through the institutional structure.  
 First, the Syrian occupation consolidated sectarianism because the regime aligned 
with sectarian representatives rather than with secular leftist parties. SSNP and the pro-
Syrian wing of the Ba’th, however, were “loyal parties” and had permanent 
representation in Parliament (Al-Khazen 2003:613). The SSNP advocates pan-Syrianism, 
i.e. the ideology to unify a greater Syria including Cyprus, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Palestine, and Syria (Corstange 2000). It has had a considerable representation under the 
Syrian order, helped by the Syrian intelligence services. The Ba’th was split in a pro-
Syrian and a pro-Iraqi fraction of which the latter was represented only, although its 
share was less considerable than the SSNP. The PSP was founded as a secular, socialist 
party under Kamil Jumblatt, but transformed into a sectarian one in its social base, 
political ideology, and behavior from 1949 to 1996 (Richani 1998:137). The conditions 
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for secular parties were unfavorable because the Syrian regime disallowed politicians 
from working freely and used coercive methods to constrain their actions. Secular parties 
were hindered from electoral competition, and some were also banned, for example the 
Pro-Iraqi Ba’th (Al-Khazen 2003:613). The Syrian regime’s involvement in alliance 
making discouraged secular parties’ representation. Alliances were imposed from Syria 
and unwanted alliances were hindered. For instance, the PSP was prevented from allying 
with the LCP and from including LCP deputies on its electoral list (Faour 2007 
[Interview]). In addition, it was prohibited from electoral campaigning in the South, the 
Beqa’, and the North. PSP deputy Wael Abou Faour (Ibid) commented on the 
conditions for secular parties to operate under the Syrian order: 
[D]uring the Syrian hegemony people were not allowed to participate in political life except through their sects. 
Our party was allowed to represent the Druze, but no more than that. Our comrades from the other sects were not 
allowed to work. And [PSP was neither] allowed to work in other areas or with other sects. 
 Second, people mobilize along segmental cleavages (Lijphart 1977:3–4). Khalaf 
(1987:118–120) emphasized that confessionalism and the way it intersects with norms 
such as familism, personalism, and clientelism, hinders the emergence of a democratic 
order. Moreover, sectarian divides may overlap with class divides which can make it 
increasingly hard for secular parties to overcome these (Richani 1998:28). In the pre-
Ta’if period, most of the bourgeois class was drawn from the Christian communities, in 
particular the Maronites (Ibid:24–25). Richani (1998) argues that Lebanese secular parties 
failed to create a sufficiently cross-sectarian voter basis because of its inability to recruit 
Maronites. Most Lebanese secular parties are leftist parties. Historically, the Muslim 
communities have constituted the underprivileged classes. There were some changes 
during the 90s, but the Christian communities still remained predominant. Yet, in the 
latter years the gap between Muslims and Christians has been reduced, in particular with 
regard to the Sunni community.  
 Moreover, my findings suggest that people’s communal fear conditions support 
to secular parties. Instability and conflict favor the support to sectarian leaders because 
people view leaders as protectors when there is national disintegration. Support to 
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secular parties, at least under conflict and crisis, it thus limited. It also explains why 
citizens give support to sectarian over ‘national’ leaders. Secretary General to the 
National Liberal Party, Elias Bou Assi, (2007 [Interview, my translation] gives an insightful 
description of the basis for sectarian support:  
If I have the choice between two [leaders], one from a traditional family and the other a self-made, self-taught man 
(…) it [my choice] will depend on the situation. If I – in my interior forte entailing my unconsciousness and my 
worries – I would analyze and find that I am threatened and a potential victim, I will not give priority to the one 
who might deserve it, who is brilliant. I will rather opt for the one who is – maybe not mediocre, but less brilliant 
– because he is able to regroup and get support from more people than the other. When do you start to reason in 
another way? When there is peace and you don’t feel threatened (…). I’m referring to my own situation and 
experience: How can I renounce ‘a Gemayel’ or ‘a Chamoun’ when they have more listeners than myself with the 
people who knows him and not me. Because I fear the future, I need a support. The one who can guarantee this is 
the one I will follow. Unfortunately, it’s like this.  
 Third, plurality voting disfavors political parties with regionally dispersed support 
as it is a first-past-the-post system. A few secular parties have had considerable 
membership, but their strength was seldom concentrated in one district, such as the LCP 
(Melhem 1996). In the 1996 elections the LCP failed to get any representatives although 
the party’s candidates received 140,000 votes of a total of 1,100,00 voters, i.e. about 13.5 
percent (Richani 1998:115).  
 In sum, non-aggregation of national interests and sectarian parties’ low 
representation result from the consociational institutions and the plural societal 
structure. Non-aggregation of voters’ interests reduces substantive representativeness. 
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7 Consociation: A Challenging Formula 
“[The electoral] law does not at any stage produce a real representation of the Lebanese people” (Rabih Haber 
2007 [Interview]).  
The aim of this thesis has been to empirically assess accountability and 
representativeness in the case of Lebanon in light of the theoretical debate on 
consociationalism. The state of the art literature argues that consociational institutions 
weaken accountability (e.g. Lustick 1997; Brass 1991) but strengthen representativeness 
(e.g. Lijphart 1977; Andeweg 2000). The study has analyzed accountability and 
representativeness in post-war Lebanon by looking at institutional mechanisms to ensure 
accountability and representativeness. Elections and political parties are mechanisms to 
ensure both of the latter. A grand coalition is an institution that intends to ensure 
representativeness whereas a parliamentary opposition ensures accountability. 
7.1 Summary of Findings 
My findings concur that consociationalism weakens accountability in several ways in 
Lebanon. The institutional structure of the Troika and big post-war cabinets limits 
Parliament’s monitoring role and control over the executive. This raises risks for moral 
hazard and thus weakens accountability. The structure of the executive branch and the 
opportunities for the three most significant segments to veto each other create 
incentives for opposition and conflict within the executive. The result is agency loss and 
fractionalized, incoherent decision making.  
 Alliance making seriously undermines the possibility for citizens to hold elected 
officials accountable through using elections as sanctioning or selecting devices. The 
Lebanese electoral system provides incentives for tactical and instrumental use by 
political, sectarian elites. The resulting cross-ideological, short term, and tactical alliances 
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lead to an absence of competition in general and a monopolization of political power in 
the Muslim communities in particular. Post-war alliances do not provide citizens with 
clear alternatives. Even more, alliances do not have the potential for conflict 
management and moderation because they are short term.  
 The electoral system contributes significantly to the situation of weak political 
parties. The open list system and the importance of alliances to electoral victory increase 
non-partisan politics. Non-partisans are unable to provide collective and coherent policy 
commitments to the electorate. The personality cult of leaders is reinforced by the 
system’s favoring of elite autonomy. The result is a low level of party democracy and 
domination by individual leaders. Thus in sum, all the institutional mechanisms intended 
to ensure accountability – a parliamentary opposition, elections, and political parties – 
are weakened by the consociational political system.  
 The picture for representativeness is more complex. The study finds that descriptive 
representativeness, in terms of sectarian representation, is partly guaranteed by 
consociational institutions in post-war Lebanon. The three most significant communities 
have been represented in the top executive Troika, and several smaller confessions have 
been represented though grand post-war cabinets. However, the predetermined ratio of 
seats does not correspond to actual population figures. Furthermore, political elites’ 
substantive representativeness, meaning that they mirror voters’ opinions, is 
questionable. The Troika members have not received majority or even plurality support 
within all the three segments during the post-war period.  
 The Christian community has showed great dissatisfaction with Christian 
representatives. Substantive representativeness suffers from vote pooling especially. 
Under the current system, the Christian community feels unable to elect the deputies 
who represent their opinions. The problem is worsened by sectarian elites’ compiling of 
electoral lists, often without regard for candidates’ popular bases. Muslim representatives 
reflect the opinions of their communities to a larger degree. Yet, the overrepresentation 
of Christians also produces Muslim dissatisfaction, especially within the Shiite 
community who has been underprivileged in the post-war period.  
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 Lebanese political parties do not ensure substantive representativeness because of 
the predominance of individual and sectarian interests. The consociational system’s 
individualizing aspect results in weak political parties. Recruitment structures, moreover, 
limit voters’ options. Poor policy performance undermines substantive 
representativeness because elected officials are unable to solve national tasks such as 
economic and social disparities.  
 The analysis of accountability and representativeness in the case of Lebanon thus 
confirms the theoretical contention that consociational systems weaken accountability. 
Furthermore, the analysis shows that citizen control is undermined both according to 
proportional and majoritarian visions of how elections ensure citizen control. On the 
other hand, the analysis modifies the theoretical contention that consociation 
strengthens representativeness. The analysis of the post-war period demonstrates that 
achieving proportionality through predetermination of seats in the legislature and 
executive posts does not guarantee descriptive representativeness. Because the Christian 
community is overrepresented and the Muslim one is underrepresented, the Lebanese 
situation deviates from the principle of proportionality. The resulting power struggle 
between communities and dissatisfaction were reasons for questioning whether 
overrepresentation is a means to protect minorities. Furthermore, this thesis has 
especially questioned the argument that descriptive representativeness necessitates 
substantive representativeness. The analysis shows that in Lebanon, descriptive 
representation of the Christian community has not ensured substantive 
representativeness. The analysis, moreover, concurs with prevailing theory that 
accountability is necessary to ensure substantive representativeness.  
7.2 Methodological Challenges 
This study argues that the various institutional characteristics of the consociational 
political system have significantly weakened accountability and partly weakened 
substantive representativeness. To make such claims I have addressed rival explanations 
in the analysis when necessary. Some additional independent variables to the 
consociational ones (grand coalition, mutual veto, and proportionality) are included in 
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the analysis. Main additional variables are foreign interference, particularly the Syrian 
occupation, and Lebanon’s plural societal structure. Based on the analysis I argue that 
causal complexity exists and that the independent explanations should be seen as 
complementing rather than rivalling ones. The thesis argues that Syrian interference and 
the societal structure have contributed to undermining political elites’ accountability and 
representativeness. Because a case study design cannot measure partial relations 
(Andersen 1997), the estimation of the relative importance of the variables is based upon 
established theory. Concerning the relative importance of the Syrian interference, the 
case study has compared observations before and after the Syrian withdrawal, hence 
enabling control regarding alliance making. The analysis showed that alliance making still 
showed the same patterns. Control can be established regarding alliance making but not 
political parties whose development is a more long term process. In addition to 
addressing rival explanations, the validity of my findings is strengthened by a 
theoretically guided research design and data triangulation.  
7.3 Undemocratic Consociation 
O’Leary (2003, 2005) argues that political elites’ accountability and representativeness to 
the people determine whether a consociation should be labelled democratic or 
undemocratic. My findings suggest that Lebanese political elites are neither accountable 
nor very representative indeed. Accountability and representativeness, however, are not 
dichotomous variables and it is thus hard to assert whether Lebanon is an undemocratic 
consociation or merely a very weak one. According to O’Leary’s criterion, this study 
draws the conclusion that Lebanon can be labelled an undemocratic consociation.  
 O’Leary (2003, 2005) holds that consociations are democratic when they do not 
preclude electoral competition but merely turn it intra-sectarian. This analysis suggests a 
modification of this contention. In Lebanon’s case, an absence of intra-sectarian 
competition is the general picture. The analysis also shows that there is significant inter-
sectarian competition in between elections.  
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7.4 Relevance and Generalization 
The theoretical and practical challenges posed by plural societies face scholars and 
practitioners. Determining which type of institutional structure that best ensures 
democratic transitions and consolidation of democracy in plural societies, is at the core. 
This thesis’s backdrop is the critique of the quality of democracy in consociations. The 
question to be asked is: Are consociations ipso facto undemocratic or is only the 
Lebanese consociation undemocratic? 
 This study argues that Lebanese consociation is not unique as a case. It thus 
argues that there are some general relationships between consociational institutions that 
weaken accountability. It is therefore interesting to see if some of the main patterns 
found in the Lebanese case apply to other cases. One description of Dutch consociation 
found in Lijphart (1968:177) suggests the same patterns of accountability as the 
Lebanese ones.  
 “Elections are said to be meaningless because the voters are not presented clear alternatives. Issues are not sharply 
defined, and responsibility for past governmental policy cannot be plainly determined because of the fuzzy line 
between government and opposition parties. And when, occasionally, the voters do happen to get the opportunity to 
make a real choice, their verdict may be disregarded by the parties of the establishment in the formation of a new 
cabinet”. 
 As seen in this thesis, the description of Dutch consociation could very well have 
been applied to the Lebanese case. However, generalizing is always uncertain, but 
democratic consociations can, at least, be considered a challenging formula. Several 
studies of consociations have focused on the lack of accountability. This study has also 
focused on representativeness. The analysis demonstrates that consociational systems 
may not lead to descriptive representativeness because of predetermination of seats and 
overrepresentation of minorities. Advocates of consociationalism argue that self-
determination is better than predetermination (O’Leary 2003; Lijphart 1991a). However, 
few studies explicitly focus on the relation between descriptive and substantive 
representativeness in consociations. This study shows that descriptive representativeness 
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does not necessarily lead to substantive representativeness. Assessing whether the same 
patterns of representativeness as the Lebanese ones can be found in other consociations 
is thus an objective for further studies. 
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Appendix 1 
List of Interviewees  
Al-Assad, Ahmad Leader, Lebanese Option Gathering; Shiite.  
Assi, Dr. Elias Bou Secretary General, National Liberal Party; Member, Comité de 
Suivie de 14 mars; Professor of Political Science, Université 
Saint Joseph; Christian.  
Atallah, Elias Deputy Tripoli, North Electoral district (2005–); Leader, 
Democratic Left Movement; Active, Lebanese Communist 
Party (1961–1993); Maronite. 
Faour, Wael Abou Deputy Rashaya, Beqa’ Electoral district (2005–); Member, 
Progressive Socialist Party’s Political Bureau (2001–); Secretary 
General, Progressive Socialist’s Youth Organization (1997–
2002); Druze.   
Fatfat, Dr. Ahmad Minister of Youth and Sports (2005–); Member, Future Tide 
Movement Bloc; Deputy Dinnieh (2000–2005); Minister of 
Interior (February–November 2006, par interim); Sunni. 
Gebara, Dr. Khalil Co-executive Director, Lebanese Transparency Association. 
Haber, Rabih Managing Director, Statistics Lebanon. 
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Hogassapian, Jean Minister of State for Administrative Planning (2005–); Deputy 
Beirut 3 (2000, 2005–); Member, Future Tide Movement Bloc; 
Armenian Orthodox.  
Jaber, Yassine Deputy Nabatieh, South Electoral District, (1996, 2000, 2005–); 
Non-partisan; Member, Berri's Resistance and Development 
Bloc; Minister of Economy and Trade (May 1995–November 
1996); Shiite.  
Khoury, Dr. Ghattas Deputy Beirut 1, Beirut Electoral District, (2000–2005); 
Member, Future Tide Movement Bloc; Maronite.  
Pharaon, Michel Minister of Parliamentary Affairs (2005–); Member, Future 
Tide Movement Bloc; Deputy Beirut 1, Beirut Electoral 
District, (1996, 2000, 2005–);  Minister (October 2000– April 
2003); Member, Greek Catholic Superior Council Greek 
Catholic.  
Karamé, Dr. Elias Vice President to Kata’ib President  Pierre Gemayel (1980–84); 
President, Kata’ib (1984–1986); Leader, Opposition Kata’ib; 
Member, Qurnet Shehwan; Greek Catholic. 
Al-Khazen, Dr. Farid Deputy Keserwen, Mount Lebanon Electoral District (2005–); 
Member, Free Patriotic Movement Parliamentary Bloc; 
Professor of Political Science,  American University of Beirut; 
Maronite. 
Kiwan, Dr. Fadia Director, Institut des Sciences Politiques, Université Saint 
Joseph.  
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Osseiran, Ali Abdel Deputy Sidon-Zahrani, South Electoral District (1992, 1996, 
2000, 2005–); non-partisan; Member, Speaker Berri’s Liberation 
and Development Bloc; Minister of State (October 1992–May 
1995); Shiite. 
Salem, Dr. Paul Director, Carnegie Middle East Center; Former Member, 
National Commission on Electoral Law.  
Salloukh, Dr. Bassel F. Assistant Professor of Political Science, American Lebanese 
University. 
Touma, Michel Editor, L’Orient-Le Jour, Lebanon.  
Zahar, Dr. Marie-Jöelle Professor of Political Science, University of Montreal, Canada; 
Visting Pofessor, Université Saint Joseph, Lebanon. 
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Appendix 2 
Table of Main Political Parties and Groups in the Post-War 
Period 
Political 
Party/Group 
Leader Communal 
Representation21  
National Liberal 
Party (NLP) 
Dory Chamoun Christian 
Kata’ib22  Georges Saadeh (–1998); Mounir el-
Hajj (1999–2002) Karim Pakradouni 
(2002–05); Amine Gemayel (–2005) 
Christian 
Reform Kata’ib Amine Gemayel  Christian 
Opposition Kata’ib Elias Karamé Christian 
Progressive Socialist 
Party (PSP) 
Walid Jumblatt Druze 
National Bloc Party 
(NB) 
Raymond Eddé (–2000); Carlos Eddé 
(2000–) 
Christian 
Amal Movement 
(Amal) 
Nabih Berri Shiite 
Hezbollah Hassan Nasrallah Shiite 
Future Movement 
(Future) 
Rafic Hariri (–2005); Sa’ad Hariri 
(2005–) 
Sunni 
Qurnet Shehwan 
Gathering (QSG) 
Maronite Patriarch  Christian 
Lebanese Forces 
(LF) 
Samir Geagea Christian 
Free Patriotic 
Movement (FPM) 
Michel Aoun Christian 
Democratic Left 
Movement (DLM) 
Elias Atallah Secular 
                                              
21 The majority of the voter basis belongs to respective confession/community  
22 Two factions, Reform Kata’ib and Opposition Kata’ib, have opposed the party leadership from the 1990s. The party entered 
a reconciliation process in 2005.  
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Democratic 
Renewal (DR) 
Nasib Lahoud Secular 
Syrian Socialist 
National Party 
(SSNP) 
- Multi-confessional 
Lebanese 
Communist Party 
(LCP) 
- Secular 
Ba’ath Party 
(Ba’ath) 
- Secular 
Tashnag - Armenian 
Hanchag - Armenian 
Ramgavar - Armenian 
Source: Based on interviews with politicians and experts in Lebanon (2007) and Al-Khazen (2003). 
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Appendix 3  
Table of Parliamentary Elections 1972–2005 
Political 
Party/Group 
/Movement 
1972 1992 1996 2000 2005 
NLP 11 - - - - 
Kata’ib  7 - - 1 1 
Reform - - - - 2 
PSP 5 3 3 4 6 
NB 3 - - -  
Ex-NB    
Amal - 6 8 7 6 
Hezbollah - 8 7 9 10 
SSNP - 6 5 4 2 
Ba’ath 1 2 2 3 1 
JI - 3 1 -  
SIPP - 1 - -  
Al-Wa’d - 2 2 -  
Tashnag 4 1 2 1 2 
Hanchag - 1 1 - 1 
Ramgavar - - 1 1 1 
LF - - - - 6 
FPM - - - - 7 
DLM - - - - 1 
DR - - - - 1 
Tripoli 
coalition 
- - - - 4 
Source: Based on Al-Khazen (2003) and Itani (2007).  
Note: This Table does not show bloc members, but members of political groups.  
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Appendix 4 
Table of Major Blocs in 2005 
Bloc Name Deputies (total) 
Future Movement Bloc  33 
Bloc of Resistance (Hezbollah) 14 
Liberation and Development Bloc 
(Amal) 
 
15 
Free Patriotic Movement Bloc  14 
Progressive Socialist Party Bloc 18 
Source: Itani (2007)
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